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This dissertation is composed by a set of studies on access to and preventive healthcare in
contexts of poverty, conflict and complex demographic history.
The first chapter dedicates to traditional healing practices and their role in the modern
world. Using data from Indonesia, results show demand for traditional treatment changes
with medical treatment prices and supply, which should be considered for policy purposes.
The second chapter studies the introduction of a co-payment component in hospital costs
for Palestine refugees living in Lebanon. Patients changed their healthcare provider after
the policy and evidence suggests inequalities in access to care deepened. The third chapter
describes the type of households living in these camps and identifies differences between
male and female-headed families in terms of budget management and mental health. We
find evidence that women leaders are more fragile in terms of income and mental health
compared to their male peers. The fourth and final chapter evaluates the impact of an inter-
sectoral intervention to tackle substance abuse among teenagers in Brazil. The experiment
decreased the adolescents consumption frequency and we believe more actions of this type
should be considered for similar settings.
Keywords: global health, access to healthcare, traditional healing, co-payments, gender
inequalities, substance use.
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The year of 2020 was a turning point for public health at a global level. We exponentially
improved our information and medical technology services, high quality vaccines were
developed at a record speed, hospitals were built in a matter of weeks.
While the Global Pandemic is affecting everyone, health systems, structures and financial
resources vary significantly across countries and communities. These differences will
define the extent to which inequalities in terms of health outcomes and well-being will
deepen even further in the near future.
This dissertation includes four chapters that study access to healthcare and health outcomes
in different regions of South East Asia, Middle-East and Latin America, where access to
jobs, hospitals with beds, doctors and equal access to healthcare are nothing but a wishful
thought. Chapter 1 uses an extensive dataset to find empirical evidence of interactions
between traditional and medical practices as a way to use local cultures to the benefit of
their own health systems. The second and third chapter look closely into health services
provided by the United Nations Agency for Palestine refugees living in Lebanon (UNRWA),
analysing the introduction of hospitalization costs co-payment schemes and inequalities in
access to health care, respectively. The last chapter travels all the way to Brazil to study the
impact of an inter-sectoral intervention to reduce substance consumption among teenagers.
All chapters share the characteristic of looking into relevant aspects of access to health
care in atypical settings (from non-OECD countries).
1
2 Introduction
The first chapter looks into Indonesia, a country with a strong culture for traditional
healing practices, and studies price elasticity of demand for these services, in a time where
formal medical care is continuously expanding. As the population continues to grow and
several countries are still struggling to achieve Universal Health Coverage, using local
and historically established entities to support the provision of healthcare has the potential
to become a key service in the future to support National Health Systems. We combine
an extensive longitudinal panel dataset from 2000, 2007 and 2014, with individual and
community level information. During the period of analysis, each agent reported whether
they got any treatment, which provider they chose and how many times, decisions which we
recreate with patient decision models. We adapted a set of multinomial logit and negative
binomial response estimations with year and island fixed-effects to fit our interpretation
of the decision process. Taking advantage of the rich dataset in use we also measure the
impact of building a new health facility on traditional practitioners (natural experiment).
To study whether patients benefit from the collaboration between medical and traditional
services, we also make a first attempt at measuring determinants of objective and subjective
health outcomes (BMI and SAH) in this setting. In general, we found that Traditional
Practitioners (TP) demand can decrease from the increase in provision of formal medical
care, but both services continue to be used in parallel. TP costs are associated with an
increase in the probability of visiting a private clinic; and healthcare costs at public centres
are negatively related with the probability of visiting a TP. Since public health centres
are typically cheaper than private clinics, it is interpreted as possible that medical and
traditional services are used as complements by the wealthiest and as substitutes by the
poorest. These results make an argument for national health plans in these settings to
consider the relevance of traditional practices, something that is rather unnoticeable in
OECD countries. Having local authorities completely engaged in the development of
Health Plans - often made to the image of richer countries and influenced by international
organizations - can make them more suited to the characteristics of the population, and
thus more efficient.
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In the second chapter, while still looking into potential consequences of investing in
Universal Healthcare Coverage (UHC), we assess the impact of introducing co-payments
for hospital care for Palestine refugees in Lebanon. Using a complete population dataset,
we analyse how charging 10% of treatment costs (provided for free until then) to patients
in specific hospitals can affect their choice of provider. This project relies on multinomial
logit, negative binomial, and linear regression models. Results show a shift in demand from
hospitals in which the co-payment was implemented - private and public - towards hospitals
that continued to provide free care - Palestine Red Crescent Society hospitals (PRCS).
The latter are also the ones known to have more financial constraints and that face more
challenges to provide quality health care services. Moreover, the probability of changing
provider was higher for patients with severe health conditions and financial constraints. For
UNRWA, this is an important result because the institution was not expecting that charging
10% in secondary care costs would have a strong impact - probability of choosing a PRCS
hospital increase by 18 pp - even if followed by an increase in coverage for tertiary care
(which is less used). At the time, this policy was so polemic that users were demonstrating
against it at UNRWA’s facilities.
Our findings suggest that sharing costs between provider and patients can have a
strong negative impact on the accessibility of care and thus, when necessary, should
be implemented with responsibility and awareness. These changes contribute to deepen
inequalities among patients, in this case leaving the poorest and sickest with less options
of care, which can be particularly problematic in a context of conflict.
For the third chapter we continue exploring the features of healthcare supply in Palestine
refugee camps. We now look into gender differences in an extremely patriarchal community
where women have less access to informal networks, jobs and general support to sustain
their household. This cross section analysis looks into gender differences in terms of
household healthcare expenses and mental health issues associated with being head of
household. We use different estimation methods to compare households headed by men
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and women, including two-part probit and glm, propensity score matching and binary
models. This study estimates differences in price elasticities between both groups and
makes a thoughtful attempt to disentangle stigma from preferences effects. Following
previous literature, findings show that expenditure in healthcare as percentage of total
spending is higher in female-headed households (FHH). Female leaders, specially widows,
are more likely to have poorer mental health, showing, however, slight improvements from
2010 to 2015.
For the fourth chapter of this thesis the focus is on preventive healthcare and risk behaviours.
We study a randomized control trial among teenagers in the tri-border area of Iguazu in
Brazil. The experiment consisted in an inter-sectoral intervention to create focus groups
between randomly selected students (locals and migrants), teachers and professionals from
social institutions. Each group then developed a set of extra-curricular activities, that were
later delivered to students both in the treatment and control groups. These activities were
created in the spotlight of health education related subjects and the project was implemented
between 2017 and 2019. The impact evaluation used a difference-in-differences model to
measure alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis consumption among participants. The intervention
was successful in decreasing the probability of consuming once a month, but not for heavier
consumption patterns. Nonetheless, it improved the impact of participating in all activities
and peer effect turned out as an important driver of consumption for all substances.
This dissertation brings together a set of public health issues that emerged in adverse
conditions, all in regions with difficult demographic challenges, in conflict or post-conflict
areas, which are actually, and unfortunately, common to may countries in the world. This
thesis makes thus a relevant contribution to subjects and communities not often under the
scope of economics studies and hopes to provide a meaningful insight for future research.
Chapter 1
Traditional Healing: Does the past have
a future?
Abstract
Traditional practitioners have managed to survive the spread of modern health-care practices, but
how these two worlds have interacted until today is a rather unexplored subject with important
implications for the design of National Health Plans. To study this issue we use data from Indonesia,
the largest country in Southeast Asia, currently investing in Universal Health Coverage, and with
one of the strongest and well known cultures for traditional healing. This study estimates the price
elasticity of demand for traditional practitioners, while conventional medicine continued to spread,
using an extensive longitudinal panel data from 2000, 2007 and 2014. Demand is measured using
patient decision models to predict treatment seeking attitudes, type of treatment and number of
visits to each provider. We also use a natural experiment to measure how TP demand reacts to the
construction of a new health facility and measure health outcomes related to using both modern and
traditional health services. Estimation procedures use probit, negative binomial and multinomial
logit response models with year and island fixed-effects.
Results show that while demand for traditional practitioners is negatively affected by the expansion
of the health-care system, patients continue to resort to both systems simultaneously. An increase
of one standard deviation in TP costs is associated with an increase in the probability of visiting
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a private clinic by 8.9 pp, while an increase of one standard deviation in public healthcare costs
relates to a decrease in the probability of visiting a TP by 4.1 pp. Medical and traditional services
are thus used as complements and substitutes, depending on the type of system used.
Promoting national health plans in these settings without understanding the role of TP will most
likely create unnecessary inefficiencies and potentially allow for conflictual treatments. More
dialogue between the relevant agents and data are needed to understand how a collaboration
between both systems could benefit everyone involved, from patients, to providers and the public
healthcare system.
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
In a world still striving to provide basic health-care coverage for all, it is key to understand
the nations’ societal and cultural features that can contribute to a well-functioning health
care system. Traditional medicine practices naturally emerged from a need to provide
medical assistance in places with strong spiritual beliefs and surrounded by a rich
biodiversity. The curative abilities of the traditional health practitioners (TP) allied to their
spiritual connection allow them to create a bond with the patients difficult to reach for most
conventional doctors. Moreover, vulnerable groups and indigenous communities need
health care services that are fast and accessible in remote areas, which is still a challenge
for many public health systems. [1]
The Global Market for Herbal Supplements and Remedies is projected to grow from USD
104.6 billion in 2020 to USD 166.2 billion in 2027, at a record growth rate (CAGR) of 8.1%.
[2] This speculation alone should be enough to call the attention of national governments,
specially in low and middle income countries (LMICs), where these practices are common
and where we expect that more than 90% of urban population growth will happen, until
2050. [3]
A great setting to study this subject can be found in Indonesia, home to one of the
richest cultures of TP in the world and that since 2014 is actively investing on achieving
universal access to healthcare [4] - which has much more to it than just expanding its
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geographic presence. Taking advantage of this ‘perfect storm’, this study goes deeper
into one particular aspect of expanding healthcare and well being: the prevalence of
and interactions with traditional healing practices during that process. According to the
Indonesian Ministry of Health, traditional health practitioners include (1) massage, broken
bones, circumcision, acupuncture, chiropractor, and others; (2) traditional healers using
herbal remedies; (3) indigenous healers with a religious approach; and (4) indigenous
healers with a supernatural tint. In this study we study TP practices in the first two
categories, which report to the Ministry of Health. The 3rd category is the responsibility of
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the 4th of the local district municipality. [5]
Despite the statement in the Indonesian Basic Health Law of 1960 that all citizens had a
right to be physically, mentally and spiritually healthy, and the undeniable presence of TP
in the health care market, the debate on whether TP should be included in the National
Health Plan is rarely addressed, even less from an economic point of view. Studying the
potential substitution or complementary effects between both systems sheds light on the
impact of non-conventional practices on families. On one side, there might be deficiencies
in the provision of health care services that TP are compensating for, producing a positive
externality for the health system and reducing pressure on public services, while on the
other, TP may contribute for delaying the conventional treatment, thus worsening the
patients condition. Since both mechanisms may be interacting at the same time, the reality
will never be possible to understand without exploring the details.
K. Leonard has made an exceptional contribution for the literature on this topic in the
context of African countries. In ‘African Traditional Healers:The Economics of Healing’,
the author points out that Traditional Healers are integrated for so many generations in
certain societies that they can neither be the answer to all healthcare problems in the
community, nor useless agents taking advantage of cultural believes for their own benefit.
[6] To develop a formal health care system exclusively on a scientific basis in these contexts,
places patients in a constant and not necessarily beneficial dilemma.
The present chapter uses an extensive database from a household and community survey
with several waves (Indonesian Family Life Survey, IFLS, 2000 to 2014) to analyse the
relationship between conventional and traditional practices (complements vs. substitutes)
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and estimate the impact of TP provision on patients’ health in Indonesia. This constitutes
innovative research by contributing with empirical evidence to the debate on whether TP
should be included in National Health Plans in specific countries, from an economic and
social perspective.
Indonesia is considered one of the herbal medicine centres of the world, where traditional
medicine is an important and ancient feature of society. Constituted by more than 17,000
islands and the fourth most populated country in the world, Indonesia is extremely wealthy
in biological resources and ethnic diversity. In such a complex framework at geographic
and social level the design and implementation of any national-level policy becomes
challenging. [7] In the early 90’s a Health Law Act placed Complementary and Alternative
Medicine (CAM) as part of curative and nursing care, highlighting the need for increasing
supervision of traditional medicine. Since then, some clinical studies focused on how could
CAM be supervised and standardized, but the scientific evidence available is still very
limited. Evidence is even more scarce in what concerns economic impacts or determinants
of healthcare provision. [8]
Despite the existence of regulation and the national acknowledgement of the practice,
traditional health services have been rather at the margin of the national health discussions.
To build up a relationship between traditional healers and other health-care providers needs
more than a mindset change. Most of traditional medicine practices were established on
an informal basis, creating several barriers to the standardisation of their methods. It is
important to stress that Traditional Medicine provides an important source for self-care
with a focus on health and healing rather than disease treatment by itself. In Indonesia,
CAM is still used by around 40% of the population (up to 70% in rural areas) and the share
of users continues to increase. [9] On the other hand, estimates on CAM usage are mostly
outdated and it is unclear to what extent conventional medicine will substitute traditional
practices in terms of healthcare needs once its access is universally ensured. [10]
The National Health Insurance scheme (NHIS) was established in Indonesia around 2014
and in three years became the largest single-payer health insurance scheme in the world.
[11] As part of the National Health Plan, the Indonesian Government committed to achieve
universal healthcare coverage (UHC) until the end of 2019. Medical health-care provision
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was thus in the spotlight of investment, with a growing number of health-care facilities
and workers, and Traditional Practitioners (TP) suffered from unprecedented threats to
their market. While both services co-exist, how sensitive were users to these changes? Did
demand for traditional healing practices, deep-rooted in the local culture, change with the
progressive increase in supply for conventional medicine? To address these questions, the
present analysis estimates determinants and relationships between the two services and
patients’ health using a patient-decision theoretical framework and non-linear econometric
models.
The overall findings suggest that the provision and utilisation of medical services can
affect the demand for traditional practitioners in Indonesia, and vice-versa. Both poor
and rich families continue to use TP services, but while the richest use both services as
complements, the poorest are more likely to have to chose between both. A one positive
standard deviation in TP costs is associated with an increase in the probability of visiting a
private clinic by 8.9 pp and a similar change in costs at public health centres relates to a
4.1 pp lower probability of visiting the TP. This evidence is also supported by other results
from different estimations. This evidence follows Thorsen and Pouliot (2015) [12] where
demand for traditional medicine is related to higher levels of household income. In terms
of health outcomes we find education to be a relevant driver of good health outcomes, and
that patients visiting both private and TP services are associated with healthier BMI levels.
The remaining of the study is organised as follows: section 1.2 covers the relevant literature
on the subject; section 1.3 describes the data, including descriptions of the dependent and
explanatory variables used in the estimation procedures; section 1.4 explains the methods
used; section 1.5 presents the main results and, finally, section 1.6 presents the discussion
and section 1.7 concludes the analysis.
1.2 Literature Review
According to the latest estimates, about four billion people, (80% of the World population)
use herbal medicine for primary health-care. This is a largely quoted statement in the
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literature, presented by the World Health Organization (WHO) at the WHO Traditional
Medicine Strategy 2002−2005. [13] In this report WHO not only recognises the important
role of traditional medicine in our society, but also the need to define a strategy for
addressing issues of policy, safety, efficacy, quality, access and rational use of alternative
medicine. Nonetheless, these estimates are known to come from an estimate of a 1983
WHO textbook which makes this percentage quite outdated.
Most of the available research on the topic of traditional medicine focuses on clinical
and experimental trials. [8] Bodeker and Kronenberg highlight that there is a need to
understand how the presence of traditional healers has an impact at social, political and
economic levels. There is a range of social and cultural factors that influence the use of
traditional and alternative medicine that health policy decision makers should take into
account. According to that study, particularly in LMICs, patients still resort to traditional
and alternative medicine for its affordability, availability, and cultural familiarity. While
it is not always true that traditional treatment is less costly or geographically closer
(depending on the patient and the treatment), the proximity to cultural and family values
gives traditional healers a very peculiar and relevant advantage relative to other health
care providers. This fact brings us closer to the point that traditional healers have a
very important role in their communities and their practice could be acknowledged by
collaborating with national health systems.
Patient satisfaction and how it should influence decisions in the health care services
management is a rather popular topic in health-care literature. Patient satisfaction can be
achieved at several levels and public opinion is often not completely taken into account
in the design of health care policies. [14] In this context, traditional healers seem to
understand well their patients needs and requirements. In a concrete example, healer
credibility is pointed out as one of the main reasons why breast cancer survivors resorted
to traditional medicine in a small sample study conducted in Malaysia. [15], [16], [17]
Such studies look into the traditional healers contingent-based payment scheme and the
importance of motivating patients to strive and follow treatment. Evidence shows that
there is a whole cultural and social dependence on TP that can be explored, aside from the
characteristics of the practice. Moreover, both studies agree that there is room to explore
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how TP techniques can be used to further improve health-care services.
In 1998, after the hit of the financial crisis, a particular project under Social Safety Net
(SSN) program in Indonesia provided the most vulnerable households with health cards.
The program entitled a price subsidy to all household members and an extra budgetary
support to health care facilities providing subsidised care. [18] The researchers produced
an impact evaluation of this project to estimate the effect of a household receiving a health
card and a health clinic receiving a subsidy. That allowed to better understand the context
of the Indonesian society and to have some background on an impact evaluation exercise
on public health. According to the results, demand for traditional medicine seems to
follow the trends of public health services in general, which supports the idea that both
branches target the same public. The Health program was only somewhat successful as the
population that benefited the most were actually the non-poor. The authors highlight the
need to clearly understand incentive mechanisms for health care providers and be more
objective in the allocation of public spending investments to health care.
On the relative role of TP in health-care provision, Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo found that
in a rural area of India visits to traditional healers still account for a relative large share
of total outpatient care visits (19%) and household expenditure (12%). [19] Here, richer
households tend to resort less to traditional healers and villages served by health facilities
that are closed more often have higher demand for these services.
Several studies have associated demand for traditional medicine to poor and disadvantage
or the less educated patients. [20],[21] However, more recent studies on treatment seeking
show these assumptions are not always verified. [12] Thorsen and Pouliot suggest a
framework to analyse treatment seeking determinants in peri-urban and rural Nepal using
factors such as age, wealth and medical plant knowledge, that we believe to suit our
objectives as well. They find evidence that having a more educated household leader
decreases the probability of seeking a traditional healer, while higher income has the
opposite impact. Also characteristics of bio-medical health-care services provision,
traditional practices credibility, strong cultural identities and disease understanding have
been considered as more important drivers of traditional healers demand. [22] In addition,
evidence from Indonesia and Tanzania shows that suffering from more severe and chronic
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illnesses such as asthma, diabetes and hyper-tension can also increase the demand
for traditional treatment. [23] In general, health care demand can be influenced by
several factors including demographics, socioeconomic status, health care supply and
environmental conditions. [24], [25] This makes individual characteristics such as age,
marital status, reported health and education as important variables to include in the
healthcare demand estimation.
When visiting a certain physician patients have to make an initial choice of seeking
care, which type of physician they need and how often this visit will occur depending
on the diagnosis and the doctor’s opinion. These decisions are determined by different
decision-making processes, a first one that only depends on the patient, a second step
that also depends on the supply and costs of health care available, and the last one
depending on the physician’s judgement. To model patient demand in different stages,
health economics commonly uses two-part models that treat these stages separately. One
of the first applications of this method happened in 1995. [26] Pohlmeier and Ulrich
developed a negative binomial hurdle model that estimates the discrete choice of visiting a
physician as different process of that of the number of visits. Following their results, two-
part models are highly recommended to estimate two different decision processes, since
not treating them separately would lead to misinterpreting reality. A more recent study
also looks into healthcare decisions in Nigeria with a two-part model. [27] Their focus is
the decision of seeking treatment and which physician to chose. In a setting of adverse
economic conditions these decisions become even more conflicting by forcing constant
trade-off in budget management to maximize the household’s utility. The study concludes
that severity is the most important determinant of healthcare demand, highlighting the use
of a Nested Logit Model as the most appropriate method. In addition, the study raises
awareness for the relevance of traditional practitioners in the health system, who charge
the highest treatment costs among all healthcare and well-being providers and yet continue
to exist.
Kayombo and colleagues analyse an initial collaboration between bio-medical practitioners
and traditional healers in Tanzania.[28] Due to the burden of HIV/AIDS in the region,
mobilising resources from the two health systems to collaborate is extremely important to
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tackle the spread of this disease. In the study a research team conducted an open ended
questionnaire identifying traditional healers providing health-care to HIV/AIDS patients.
Results show it will be a long process to achieve a meaningful collaboration between
traditional healers and bio-medical practitioners. In a related study, the authors conducted
a survey to nineteen TP to assess their knowledge and willingness to collaborate with the
national tuberculosis (TB) programme in Vanuatu.[29] The findings show TP also treated
lung diseases and that many had already collaborated with the Government funded health
care system. Healers could actually help providing a faster identification and care of TB
cases, which favours the inclusion of traditional healers in TB treatment management. With
a similar strategy, another study leaded by Maputle focused the use of traditional medicine
during pregnancy in a South African province. [30] Results show that it is necessary to
increase collaboration between health care providers and follow up of traditional medicine
treatment to prevent potentially harmful effects of incompatible treatments.
While literature shows that traditional medicine still has an important role in several
communities, the sector’s dimension is difficult to measure and the social, political and
economic implications of its presence have not been fully explored. Traditional medicine
can be more affordable than medical treatment, is typically more available in rural areas
and TP have an unique proximity with the population that gives them credibility, makes
patients feel understood and closer to their family values. We found existing evidence that
demand for traditional care has different motivations than demand for medical care, but
with parallel trends over time. Even if they differ in their essence, traditional and medical
treatment seem to answer very correlated needs, like having more need to feel cared for
when being sick. In addition, the few studies that tried to understand the consequences of
increasing collaboration between the two types of services showed positive results. It is
thus possible that traditional and medical care behave as complement goods, rather than
substitutes.
Most of the mentioned studies rely on survey analysis and descriptive statistics, without
showing an objective evidence on the impact of co-existent bio-medical health care centres
and TP nor how this can affect the population. In the present study, we try to fill this gap
using a series of methods to model patients decision processes, using an extensive dataset
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and a natural experiment.
1.3 Data and Statistics
The quality of the database and the data treatment process are paramount features of this
study. We use data from 2000, 2007 and 2014 which corresponds to waves from 3 to 5 of
the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS).
IFLS is a panel survey part of an on-going project that collects data at individual, household
and community levels. The first wave, in 1993, interviewed 7,224 households in 13
provinces, which represented about 83 per cent of the Indonesian population. This wave
was collected using multi-stage probability sampling and constitutes the base framework
for the remaining ones. The survey waves that followed were also designed in a way that it
was possible to track respondents through time, even those who commute in between. As
such, in IFLS 2 the same respondents as in IFLS 1 were interviewed four years later. IFLS
3, in 2000, was also fielded on the full sample. Later, IFLS 4 and IFLS 5 were published
in late 2007 and 2014, respectively, interviewing the same set of IFLS households. This
means 16,204 households and 50,148 individuals were interviewed. In addition, another
2,662 individuals who died since IFLS 4 had exit interviews with a designated person
that was close to them. [31] With less than 6 per-cent household level attrition between
the baseline and first follow-up (four years later) and a cumulative attrition between the
baseline and second follow-up (five years) is 5 percent. [32]
The content of IFLS covers multiple subjects of study, providing complete and detailed
information on each of them. The conducted surveys allow to collect information on a
broad range of characteristics inherent to individuals, households, and communities. In
what concerns health and health-care services, the IFLS contains sections on subjective and
objective health measures and demand for health services at individual and household level.
All waves contain extensive information about health status. A limitation to this study is
that this information is not exactly the same across surveys. Indeed, besides self-reported
health and few reported ability to perform activities of daily living, the health section varies
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significantly with time. For this reason, the analysis was reduced to the year 2000 and
thereafter using individual level data from the Household survey, merged with information
at community level, health facilities and traditional practitioners. 1
Table 1.1 provides some descriptive statistics at the individual level. The sample is balanced
in terms of gender and living area in every wave. Reported health is generally high across
time as the share of respondents answering to be at least somewhat healthy is close to
80%. The highest degree of education attained is increasing through time, reaching 9% of
respondents with university education level in 2014. The level of household expenditure,
presented in logarithm, can be considered proxy to household income, also increases with
time. This last factor was computed and provided directly by IFLS.
Table 1.1: Individual Summary Statistics
2000 2007 2014
Age 33.38 40.03 46.12
(19.49) (19.31) (19.00)
Female 0.52 0.52 0.52
Married 0.62 0.65 0.75
Urban 0.42 0.45 0.54
SAH 0.72 0.86 0.75
Log(HH exp.) 12.03 12.93 12.89
(0.75) (0.69) (0.89)
Education
- Elementary 0.50 0.44 0.44
- Junior High 0.18 0.19 0.19
- Senior High 0.24 0.27 0.25
- College 0.03 0.04 0.03
- University 0.04 0.06 0.09
Note: IFLS Households survey 2000, 2007, 2014. This
table presents mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
of each variable in the sample, using individual survey
weights. Female, married and urban are binary variables and
give the percentage of individuals that are female, married
and living in urban areas. Self-Assessed Health (SAH)
obtains the value 1 if the respondent considers to be at
least somewhat healthy and 0 otherwise.Education dummy
variables show the respondents share that attained each
education level.
The community-level IFLS surveys considered in this study were conducted among
community leaders, health centres workers and traditional healers. These sections
capture aggregated characteristics of respondents in the same community, as well as
of particular services and institutions responsible for ensuring the well-being of the
1The different database are merged based on household, individual and communities identifiers (hhid,
pidlink and commid)
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community. Indonesia has a vast variety of health-care services.2 Following IFLS strategy
we focus on attendance to only three types of providers/establishments: Health Centres or
Health Sub-centres (Puskesmas or Puskesmas Pembantu), Private Clinics and Traditional
health workers (TP). To control for the construction of a new facility we generalise the
concept to health facilities, that includes any of the previous type of providers mentioned
except from TP.
The survey conducted to TP is only available for the IFLS waves published in 1993, 2007
and 2014. Since this project only uses data from 2000 and thereafter, only 2007 and
2014 data are considered. These data have valuable information on TP practices and
characteristics, including whether a TP prescribes modern medication or has any other
occupation besides traditional medicine - see Table 1.2. This allows for producing an
analysis of the practice and learn some characteristics of this type of provider.





Medicinal Herbs 0.36 0.44
Modern medication 0.06 0.04





Junior High 0.10 0.14
Senior High 0.12 0.12
College 0.01 0.00
University 0.02 0.04
Note: IFLS Traditional Health Practitioners Survey
2007, 2014. This table presents mean and standard
deviation (in parentheses) values for each variable.
All dummy variables represent the percentage of
individuals. Education dummy variables show the
respondents share that attained each education level.
TP in this sample are generally women around 60 years of age. About half of the
practitioners in the sample have other jobs besides being a TP and around half also
works as a mid-wive.3 Not all of them state to charge for their consultations, which can
2See table A3 in Appendix.
3See Table A3 for the definition of mid-wive.
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indicate the use of alternative payment methods such as food or personal favours or even
by voluntarily contribution.[33] Regarding treatment, medicinal herbs are much more
prescribed than modern medication, as it would be expected. These traditional medicines
can be either produced by individual persons at home industries or produced and packed on
a commercial scale. The first type may not be registered and are made by TP themselves
for use by their own patients - giving TP another income source. If it is the second type,
the medicine must be registered and licensed before they may be sold at a formal vendor.
[34]
The estimation procedure that follows consists in estimating healthcare demand indicators,
using health and healthcare supply related variables as determinants. We start by identifying
the main drivers of having visited a TP in the last 4 weeks and secondly, we use the number
of visits as the dependent variable, adding more explanatory variables related to costs and
number of facilities. For the natural experiment stage we perform a third specification
including a binary variable that indicates whether a healthcare centre was built since the
last survey wave. Lastly, we try to assess how healthcare supply affects the population’s
health status by measuring how it relates to the BMI and reported SAH by participants.
The next section provides a more detailed description of the variables of interest used.
1.3.1 Dependent Variables
The main variables of interest measure demand for treatment type. This is measured as
a categorical variable that indicates whether an individual visited a public HC, a private
clinic or a TP during the 4 weeks preceding the time of the interview. The variable is
obtained from a survey question present in all IFLS waves with the same formulation.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show how the average share of respondents that visited a TP in the four
weeks before taking the survey changed from 2000 to 2014, by province. In 2000, only
the provinces of South Sulawesi, South Sumatera, North Jawa and North Nusa Tenggara
have a percentage of visitors above 5%. In 2014, the average share of the respondents that
visited the TP by province was 23.63%. Despite the fact that we are using self reported
measures and there can be an effect of people being more and more comfortable with
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acknowledging that they visit the TP, that alone is already a sign that times are changing
and the presence of TP services is not showing signs of disappearing. In comparison with
other services, between 2000 and 2014, the percentage of TP patients increased from 3 to
21%, whereas the share of participants that visited a public health center was around 30%
in all waves (table A1 in Appendix).
Figure 1.1: Percentage patients reporting to visit TP in 2000
Figure 1.2: Percentage patients reporting to visit TP in 2014
The pattern in this question confirms that TP services are still being used by the local
population and that attendance seems to be increasing. In Figure 1.3 the average proportion
of participants visiting the TP, public and private health services is measured by expenditure
(as proxy of income) percentile. The tendencies show that private and TP usage is
increasing with the level of total household expenditure, whereas attendance to public
services has the opposite relation. As both private care and TP are paid services, this
relationship was expected. Nonetheless, this could be offset if poorer families living in
more isolated areas would visit the TP more due to lack of alternatives. Following this line
of thought, in the estimation section we will try to understand better what is behind the
determinants of TP demand and how it varies with other services utilization.
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Figure 1.3: Proportion of participants visiting the public, private clinics and TP measured by percentile of
expenditure (in log, as a proxy for income)
In the literature there are also several examples of studies that consider the number of
visits to each facility as determinant of treatment demand ([35], [36] ). Table 1.3 shows the
average number of visits to the public health centre, private clinic and TP in the last four
weeks, by year and age. Older patients on average visit the TP more frequently, which is
expected given that they are also more likely to have more and more severe health issues,
as well as more free time. The number of visits does not vary significantly with the type of
provider, indicating that people resort to traditional medicine as frequently as they do for
medical providers. Eventually, they may even resort to both services for the same condition
(i.e. as complements). However, this cannot be confirmed with this survey.
Table 1.3: Number of visits to healthcare centres, private clinics and TP in the last 4 weeks, by year
Public Private TP
2000 2007 2014 2000 2007 2014 2000 2007 2014
15-24 1.325 1.406 1.319 1.425 1.092 1.172 1.334 1.270 1.886
(0.692) (0.657) (0.789) (0.701) (0.440) (0.469) (0.644) (0.661) (1.461)
25-44 1.469 1.795 1.562 1.376 1.160 1.316 1.596 1.538 1.547
(0.831) (2.249) (1.119) (0.858) (0.644) (0.750) (0.877) (1.327) (1.260)
45-64 1.470 1.697 1.588 1.980 1.322 1.625 1.686 1.351 1.551
(0.765) (1.196) (1.184) (1.208) (1.930) (0.929) (1.138) (1.206) (1.542)
65-79 1.287 1.796 1.920 1.391 1.050 1.348 1.195 2.217 1.644
(0.631) (1.151) (1.096) (0.623) (0.220) (0.680) (0.632) (4.425) (1.207)
80+ 1.514 1.790 1.432 1.390 1.752 2.302 1.500 1.206 1.657
(1.412) (1.445) (0.755) (0.597) (0.443) (1.616) (0.707) (0.572) (0.942)
Note: IFLS Community Survey 2000, 2007, 2014. Number of visits average and standard deviation (in parentheses) of
respondents who affirm to have visited a public health centre, private clinic or a TP in the last 4 weeks, by age group.
On the supply side, Table 1.4 shows average numbers of facilities available in each village
over time, as reported by the community leader/representative. Note that both public health
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centres correspond to medical treatment, and just counting for these two services, together
they more than double the number of traditional practices. Although due to lack of data
we will not use information on number of hospitals, the average number available for each
person also grew from 2.02 in 2000 to 4.18 in 2014, making medical care much more
present in the country.
Table 1.4: Number of facilities available to the residents
2000 2007 2014
Health Center 2.22 2.15 2.16
Priv. Clinic 4.78 4.30 5.45
TP 2.51 3.02 3.97
Note: IFLS Community Survey 2000, 2007,
2014. Average number of facilities available to
the participants from each village/township. Public
health centres and Private clinics are considered
medical treatment.
Regarding the reasons for visiting each provider, data in Table 1.5 shows that for both
public health centres and private clinics the purpose that more people reported for their
visit is treatment of illness and consultation. Massages and physiotherapy are the top two
reasons for visiting a TP. Since 2000, the share of TP users for massage, physiotherapy
and consultation increased 68, 15.7 and 14.5 pp respectively. While this may indicate
that patients use both services as complements for different treatments, the share of users
resorting to TP for consultation, with illnesses and even injuries has been increasing since
2000.
Table 1.5: Purpose of visit by type of provider
Public Private TP
∆ pp (00− 14) ∆ pp (00− 14) ∆ pp (00− 14)
Check up 40% -2.5 9% 2.1 3% 2.6
Consultation 29% -12.4 10% -5.0 8% 14.5
Family 14% -15.0 4% 2.0 2% -0.5
Immun 44% 50.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0
Injection 30% -10.7 5% 0.9 3% 8.1
Massage 4% -5.4 2% -2.7 99% 15.7
Medical 32% 4.3 9% 2.7 5% 8.3
Other 24% -5.5 9% 8.9 14% -5.8
Physiotherapy 13% 12.0 8% 8.0 57% 68.0
Prenatal 24% -0.8 9% 5.6 4% 4.4
Treatment of illness 34% 0.5 10% 4.8 6% 6.1
Treatment of injury 25% 2.9 8% -0.1 13% 13.4
Total 29% -6.5 8% 2.2 14% 17.6
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To understand further the relationship between the three types of health care providers
mentioned we analyse communities where a health facility was built as a natural experiment
to measure the impact of a conventional medicine supply shock. Due to data availability
constraints, we cannot use a propensity score matching (regions are too heterogeneous)
and thus, the best option is to perform a simple differences exercise, as explained in the
1.4 section.
In the last estimation we look into health outcomes. We use two health outcome measures,
the Body Mass Index (BMI) and Self Assessed Health (SAH), both considered to be reliable
determinants of morbidity (e.g., [37], [38], [39]; and [40]). However, the relationship
between both indicators is not straightforward as they seem to capture different morbidity
predictors.[40] The BMI is a formal measure of physical well-being given by the ratio
between weight and the square of the body height (expressed in units of kg/m2). This
index was constructed using data on anthropometric measures provided in the Household
Survey for all waves. The dependent variable is unordered categorical and obtains the
value 1 when the individual’s BMI is underweight (below 18), 2 when normal (between 18
to 25), 3 when overweight (over 25) and 4 for obese (above 30). [41], [42], [43], [44] As
for the SAH, the dependent variable is binary with the value 1 if an individual reports to be
(maximum) somewhat healthy and 0 otherwise, based on a Likert scale of 5 levels, from
very bad to very good. This question from the IFLS survey is present in all survey waves
and thus allows us to compare subjects in different waves.
BMI is a relatively objective health measure, but that can also depend on cultural aspects
related to food habits and healthy standards. Moreover, because of its non-monotonic
property, both low and high values are undesirable, which makes it more complex to use. In
turn, SAH relates to the way each individual feels at the moment of the interview. Both self
reported health or BMI can be biased, either by each personality and culture or by excess
fat or highly developed muscle mass. [45] Using both variables, with the caveats and
advantages they imply, the estimation exercise aims at understanding how patients’ health
status change with healthcare usage and existence of modern and traditional health-care
services in simultaneous, as it happens in Indonesia.
Table 1.6 below shows the descriptive statistics by BMI level including the good health
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indicator. Those who are underweight report an average health status 7 percentage points
lower relative to the full sample. By contrast, those in the overweight and obese BMI levels
have the highest average reported health. In LMICs, wealthier families are associated
with higher weight, since being financially stable also means having more resources to
buy food, healthcare and having better treatments than poorer families. Culturally, being
overweight can also be a form of ostentation, which makes some unhealthy habits actually
being appreciated and desired. The average age of those with normal BMI is 2 years lower
than the total average, which can be due to several factors. As people get older in this
context probably they become less active, have lower income, slower metabolisms and care
less about themselves, which makes them less healthy either by lack or excess of weight.
Table 1.6: Individual Statistics by BMI level - Mean (SD)
All subjects Underweight Normal Overweight Obese
Age 40.77 (16.27) 43.80 (20.62) 38.62 (16.59) 42.22 (13.96) 42.19 (13.12)
Weight 54.63 (11.50) 41.20 (5.75) 49.84 (5.68) 60.95 (7.17) 76.97 (10.16)
Height 154.25 (7.92) 155.01 (8.61) 154.86 (7.82) 153.61 (7.48) 152.42 (8.63)
BMI 22.96 (4.53) 17.04 (1.21) 20.74 (1.25) 25.79 (1.90) 33.09 (3.16)
Good health 0.67 (0.47) 0.60 (0.49) 0.66 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.66 (0.47)
Note: IFLS Community Survey 2000, 2007, 2014. This table presents mean and SD values for BMI across the sample. BMI is given
by the ratio between weight and the square of the body height
1.3.2 Explanatory Variables
Following the literature review, the first group of explanatory variables introduced in the
estimation model relate to the respondents’ characteristics including age, marital status,
reported health and education, measured as the highest level attained from Elementary
school to University. [46] The model also includes a set of variables that measure
preferences and self-reported costs for health-care services (health centre, private clinic)
and TP. The direction of these cost variables give us the relationship between different
types of services - if higher costs of service 1 increase demand for service 2, they are
substitutes and if the relationship is the opposite, they are complements. In addition, in
the survey village chiefs are asked whether there was an important event in the village,
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in particular the construction of a health facility, a new school or a new road. These
variables allow to grasp how TP services can be affected by an increase in the provision
of the national health-care system and general development. The data for this variable
are aggregated by district (Kecamatan), the 3rd out of 4 levels in the Indonesian regional
subdivision scale. As a regional heterogeneity indicator, we control for living in an urban
area, which is of main importance in a country like Indonesia.
To measure the relationship between the availability of health-care services and
participant’s health outcomes, as before, the first variables added control for individual and
environment characteristics which tend to be relevant predictors of health related habits.
The model is then extended to include number of each type of health-care facilities and
TP. These variables are added as an alternative to attendance to different type of health
services, which is endogenous to the health status itself - the dependent variable. These
factors show how the existence of traditional and medical health-care facilities can affect
health outcomes and give some information on the trend for TP to collaborate or not with
the national health system.
1.4 Methods
This study relies on an extensive individual level longitudinal short (3 years) panel data-set.
As aforementioned, this data-set was constructed by gathering information on households,
communities and health practitioners across 3 IFLS waves of data collection. While most
of the survey structure is constant over time, there are differences in the questions included
and in their formulation that need to be taken into account. Different-level database were
merged using community, household, and individual identifiers available in IFLS for
tracking the respondents over time. The data on communities and households is replaced
with repetition for each individual. The complete dataset is a panel with a very large
number of observations (N) and a very small time horizon (T). Within this framework,
recent literature as shown that fixed effects models provide biased results.[47]
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1.4.1 Two-part model for seeking treatment
For the purpose of modelling the first patient’s choices we consider a two part model to
analyse the different processes the decision-maker goes through. This strategy follows a
health-care decision making processes, for which the data are perfectly suited by including
information on whether each participant visited a physician, which type and how many
times [27]. Figure 1.4 shows the diagram of the decision process.
Figure 1.4: Patient choice, two-step model
The decision to seek treatment or not is nested on the first level of decision, followed
by the choice of type of provider, determined by a set of individual characteristics and
other variables. Decisions are taken simultaneously, based on the option that maximizes
the individual’s utility at each level. The first decision on whether to seek outpatient,
self-treatment or no treatment may be modelled as a multinomial logit decision. If the
individual decides to seek outpatient treatment, then at the second stage the decision is to
select which type of practitioner to visit. [48]
The approach that describes demand for the initial contact reflects the decision of the
patient to seek treatment, which results from the patient’s utility maximization problem
and is focused on the intensity of the illness [49]. In this setting, the decision to seek
treatment depends on the severity of their condition.
Assume individual i has j + 1 alternative health care decisions. The individual chooses
between alternatives based on the utility associated with each choice. The conditional
utility of choosing option j is:
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Uijk = α +Xijk + year
FE + islandFE + eijk (1.1)
Where j ∈ N = 0, 1, 2..., J and k ∈ P = 0, 1, 2..., K
Patient’s i utility from first node (treatment) j, and second node (provider) k, is thus a
function of socio-demographic characteristics, health status and providers characteristics
represented by Xijk, as well as island and year fixed effects and eijk, the i.i.d. error term.
Xijk represents the set of observed attributes that vary with each decision level. Any
attribute that varies among the first stage will lead to variation among the second, i.e., the
severity of the health condition that helps the patient make their first decision will also
feed the following on which type of practitioner to chose. While the first stage decision
depends only on socio-demographic characteristics and health status variables, at the
second stage decision makers also take into account the provider characteristics such as
costs and services available, that will be part of the attributes in Xijk. [50] Cost variables
correspond to the cost reported by each respondent (costs reported by the providers were
frequently missing), which is important for interpretation purposes and allows for variation
at individual level.
To define the observed choice that results from individual utility maximization, consider
the indicator function that follows:
Prob(optionijk|Uijk) =
1 if Uijk > Uilm, ∀ j 6= l and k 6= m0 otherwise (1.2)
Both for this and the previous expressions, the options included in the dependent variable
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., we are just including patients who opted for
one of the options.[51] The behavioural model in the second stage assumes that the patient
does not determine the provider according to medical criteria alone, but also according to
economic incentives.
26 Chapter 1. Traditional Healing: Does the past have a future?
Table 1.7 describes what variables are included as socio-demographic, health status and
providers characteristics (Xijk). On socio-demographics, education indicates the highest
level attained and expenditure is included in logarithm transformation. The health variables
enter the specification as binary, except for BMI which is categorical and enters the model
with 3 out of 4 levels (3 binary variables), so that there is one base level, which is omitted.




Socio-dem. Gender, marital status, highest education level,
expenditure (as a proxy for income), living in an urban
area
Individual
Health status BMI levels, having felt acute morbidity symptoms in
the last week, having had a negative health shock in the
last year or having been hospitalized in the last week
Individual
Health services Number of facilities available for each provider type,
distance from nearest facility
Community
Costs Patient self-reported cost of treatment at public health
centers, private clinics and TP in logarithm
Community
As an additional specification, a vector b is included as one time-varying independent
variable with coefficient vector γ. This corresponds to a binary variable that identifies
when an individual belongs to a district where a health facility was built since the last wave
(1) or not (0). We also add a similar variable for natural disasters, new schools and roads
to control for general progress and development. Note that this does not correspond to
a differences-in-differences model because within each community every individual had
access to the health centre that was constructed and this event happened in different years
for different communities. As such, we can only compare indicators before and after the
construction. One possible strategy to overcome this issue is to perform a propensity score
matching exercise to create an artificial control group in a village where an health facility
was not recently built. However, in such an heterogeneous country like Indonesia and with
the data available we could not find enough balanced categories between different areas to
produce valid estimates.
Results of the simple differences model will be presented as marginal effects which
quantify how the probability of the dependent variable varies with a one unit change in the
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explanatory variable.
Heckman selection model for costs estimation
To measure substitution and complement relationships between traditional and medical
practices, we needed to add treatment costs to the specification. However, in IFLS these
values are self-reported by patients, and thus, only larger than zero for those who attended
treatment. This means that instead of having costs by disease or treatment, we have per
individual who attended healthcare services. Specifically, survey participants were asked
how much they spent in each service during the previous 4 weeks. By dividing this value
by the corresponding number of visits we get average costs by visit, for those who visited
any service. To reach an average value of treatment costs by provider for all individuals in
the sample we then produced estimates of the average individual treatment value based on
personal characteristics - our proxy for treatment prices.
Consider visiting a healthcare centre, νi is a dummy variable with the value one when
patients seek outpatient treatment at a specific service and costs, ci, to be truncated variables
such that:
c∗i = xiβ + νi (1.3)
And:
si =
1, if viλ+ εi > 00, if viλ+ εi ≤ 0 (1.4)
Then, ci = c∗i when si = 1. With this strategy we estimated costs using a Heckman
selection model with very few characteristics (xi) - age, education, SAH and distance to
nearest health service. This strategy is only possible because costs are self-reported and
vary individually. The selection variable si for private clinics and TP is whether the person
visited or not these services. For public providers, since some treatments are procured by
the national government, we define the selection variable as a person being ensured and
feeling acute disease symptoms in the last week. All variables included in the selection
model were not used in the multinomial estimation, since they will be already controlled
28 Chapter 1. Traditional Healing: Does the past have a future?
for in the costs prediction.
After having the model predictions, for a matter of simplification costs per visit were
standardized and averaged by household.
1.4.2 Negative Binomial model for number of visits
The third stage of the decision model consists in estimating the number of visits to each
provider as in [26]. Here we estimate a panel count data model using the negative binomial
regression method to find relevant determinants of TP demand in terms of number of visits
and health care utilization (visits and number of health centres available). The negative
binomial estimator is designed to explicitly handle overdispersion, as it is the case of the
dependent variables on the number of visits to the TP or HC and, in fact, most count
variables.[52] The covariates included are the same as for the probit regression with robust
standard errors.
Robustness checks will be presented in Appendix, using different sample restrictions and
different indicators to ensure the validity of the results. This robustness checks include
Conditional mixed-process (CMP) models.
1.4.3 Multinomial logit for Health outcomes
The final estimation exercise focuses on health outcomes using Self Assessed Health
(SAH) and the Body Mass Index (BMI), as mentioned before. BMI is estimated using
a multinomial logit model controlling for year, province and island fixed effects. For
this case, an ordered probit model would not suit this estimation because the dependent
variable, does not follow an order, both very low and very high values are not desirable
from a health point of view.






where x′i are case-specific regressors, here individual health characteristics and community
health care provision services. The model ensures that 0 < pij < 1 and
∑m
j=1= 1. For
identification purposes, βj is set to zero for one of the categories, and the coefficients are
interpreted with respect to that category.[52]
All the analyses were conducted using Stata version 14 (StataCorp LP, College Station,
TX).
1.5 Results
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 summarise the main estimation results for the demand estimation
two-step approach using multinomial logit models, controlling for year and island fixed
effects.
The probability of seeking treatment depends, as expected, positively on the disease
indicators. Namely, feeling worse compared to the previous year (negative health shock)
is associated with a higher probability of seeking treatment by 9.3 percentage points (pp)
and having been hospitalized in the last 12 months by 10.6 pp. The seeking treatment
variable is given by whether a participant visited any health facility or received a visit by a
health professional in the last four weeks, whether hospitalization refers to patients who
received inpatient care in the last 12 months. The hospitalization is thus more likely to
have happened before the decision to seek treatment.
Socio-demographic variables also have a relevant impact. Income proxied by household
expenditures (in log) has a positive impact on the decision to seek treatment, as well as
living in an urban area. A one percent increase on expenditures is related to a 3.2 pp
higher probability of seeking outpatient treatment and living in an urban area relates to
a 1.1 pp lower probability of seeking treatment (self-treatment or outpatient) (p < 0.01).
These results show that individuals deciding whether to get treatment or not are more
influenced by their health status, rather then by income and geographic disparities (the
variable of intent is income proxied by expenditures). At the same time, seeking outpatient
also implies more expenditure on healthcare services, so this result must be analysed with
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care and together with the remaining evidence.
Table 1.8: 1st step - Seek treatment (Mult. Logit (marginal effects))
Base outcome: No treatment Self-treatment Outpatient
Married -0.002 -0.032***
(0.006) (0.006)












BMI - good -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
BMI - high 0.005*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.001)








*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the estimation
results of a multinomial logit model with year, province and island fixed effects,
using IFLS Community Survey data from 2000, 2007, 2014. The dependent
variable is a categorical variable with value 0 if the patient did not seek
treatment (outcome 1), 1 if used self-prescribed medication (outcome 2) and 2
if used medical care (outcome 3). Options are mutually exclusive and results
show marginal effects for outcome 2 and 3.
The second estimation results show that treatment costs (as proxy for prices), household
expenditure (as a proxy for income) and health status are relevant for patients to decide on
the type of treatment. To get the age marginal impacts we estimate the effects for visiting a
TP for participants at 20, 35 and 70 years of age (see Appendix table A5). As a participant
gets older the impact of having been hospitalized becomes stronger and the impact of
distance to the next facility larger, which can both be associated to higher fragility and
mobility difficulties with age. As for costs, the impact becomes less relevant for older ages,
indicating price elasticity is decreasing with age.
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Table 1.9: 2nd step - Outpatient visit last week (Mult. Logit (marginal effects))
(1) (2)
Base outcome: Public HC Visit Priv Visit TP
Log(pce) 0.097*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003)






BMI - good 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.005)
BMI - high -0.006 0.033***
(0.007) (0.005)






Cost public -0.004 -0.041***
(0.012) (0.008)
Cost private -0.023* -0.013
(0.013) (0.009)
Cost TP 0.089*** 0.048***
(0.013) (0.009)
N. Public HC 0.003 -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001)
N. Priv. 0.007*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)






*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Note: Results using a multinomial logit model with year, province and
island fixed effects and data from 2000, 2007, 2014. The dependent
variable is categorical: Service type has the value 0 if the individual
visited a public health centre during the last week (outcome 1), 1 if
the individual visited a private clinic (outcome 2) and the value 2 if
the patient visited a TP (outcome 3). Options are mutually exclusive
and results show marginal effects for outcomes 2 and 3. Full table in
Appendix, A6
Since cost variables are in standardized values, coefficients indicate how much the
probability of each outcome changes when costs differ from their mean by one standard
deviation (a "typical" deviation). For TP, a typical increase in costs is associated with a 4.8
pp (p<0.01) increase in the probability of having visited that service in the last week. This
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positive relationship may result from two main potential mechanisms. Either costs depend
strongly on the severity of disease and this implies higher costs or there is a quality and
recognition signal for more expensive TP. TP costs are also positively related to private
clinics demand. Following the significant and positive impact of household expenditure,
visiting a more expensive TP is associated with using a more expensive clinic as well. A
typical increase in public costs decreases the probability of visiting a TP by 4.1 pp (p<0.01),
this time evidencing the presence of a substitution effect. Having national insurance also
has a negative impact on the probability of visiting TP, which is expected since insurance
covers visits to the public health centres and not to the TP. The number of TP available
in the community has a small positive impact of 0.9 pp (p<0.01) on demand and distance
to the nearest health facility has a positive and statistically significant impact of 22.3 pp
(p<0.05) on the demand for TP. As mentioned in section 1.4, treatment costs used for this
estimation are predictions from the Heckman model (results in Appendix - Table A4) ,
standardized and averaged by household, based on self-reported costs, not tabulated by
procedure.
As a robustness check, we performed a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for
healthcare demand. Results are presented in Appendix, Table A10 and present similar
evidence in terms of health outcomes and relationship between costs and demand. The
positive impact of TP costs on their own demand can be a sign of disease severity (despite
controlling for hospitalization, having an acute disease and feeling worse than last year),
high expenditure levels of its typical users or that patients see costs as a quality indicator.
Turning now to the impact of a new medical health facility (HF) on the TP demand, the
multinomial results are presented in Table 1.10. In provinces where a health facility was
built, it was 8 pp (p<0.01) less likely for participants to have visited a TP in the last 4
weeks. All variables related to progress have a positive impact on the probability of visiting
a private clinic and negative for TP, with public services visits as the base outcome. Natural
disasters have a significant negative impact for both the demand for private and TP.
The results using number of visits and the negative binomial model provide similar evidence
(Table 1.11). With this model the dependent variables are not mutually exclusive, thus
visiting other services can be added to the explanatory variables. Having visited either a
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Table 1.10: Natural experiment results - New HC
(1) (2)
Visit Priv. Visit TP
New HF 0.054*** -0.076***
(0.012) (0.009)
Treatment road 0.021*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.004)
Treatment school 0.064*** -0.055***
(0.008) (0.005)




*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
Note: Results from a multinomial logit model with year,
province and island fixed effects and data from 2000, 2007,
2014. The dependent variable is categorical: Service type
has the value 0 if the individual visited a public health
centre during the last week (outcome 1), 1 if the individual
visited a private clinic (outcome 2) and the value 2 if the
patient visited a TP (outcome 3). Options are mutually
exclusive and results show marginal effects for outcomes
2 and 3.
public or a private healthcare facility in the last 4 weeks decreases the probability of having
one more visit at the TP and the effect is stronger for public services (21.7 pp (p<0.01)).
Treatment costs of other services also have a relevant impact on the dependent variable. A
typical increase in treatment private costs is associated with a decrease in the probability
of going one more time to the TP by 8.2 pp (p<0.05). A typical increase in treatment costs
at public facilities have a similar effect.
Using a CMP model to estimate TP costs in a first stage and number of visits in a second
stage provides supporting evidence of the previous results. (Appendix table A9)
More expensive healthcare usually means more severe health conditions and less resources
to visit the TP. For those who use public facilities, who are more likely to live under
strong budget constraints, TP turns out as a substitute good - the increase in medical
costs, is associated with a lower demand for TP. The positive impact found for household
expenditure (as a proxy for income) and the evidence that TP demand decreases with
costs in public services follows the evidence in previous literature that demand for TP
in Indonesia is driven by income.[53],[12] Overall, results show that individuals when
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Table 1.11: Number of visits to the Traditional practitioner (Neg. Binomial - Marginal effects)
Dep. variable: N. Visits TP (1) (2)
Log(pce) 0.084*** 0.083***
(0.009) (0.012)




BMI - overweight -0.047** -0.045*
(0.023) (0.027)

























Pseudo R-sq. 0.081 0.114
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimation results using a Negative Binomial model with year,
province and island fixed effects, using IFLS Community Survey data
from 2000, 2007, 2014. The dependent variable, Number of visits to TP,
is a count variable that indicates the number of visits to the TP in the
last month. Treatment costs are predictions from the preliminary linear
model and Heckman estimation, in logarithm. Full table in Appendix
A7.
seeking care consume both TP and medical care, with some income driven differences:
wealthier families consume both services as complement goods, while the financially
fragile are more likely to have to chose between both.
To analyse expenditure differences, let us distinguish households between lowest and
highest expenditure quantiles (households in the middle quantile were not included).
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Results presented in Table 1.12 show supporting evidence that treatment demand is very
much influenced by expenditure. Having been hospitalized has a positive impact on TP
demand for low spending participants and on private for high spenders. Average treatment
costs in general have a negative and significant impact on TPs. TP costs are associated
with a decrease in the probability of a low spender patient visiting the private clinic, but
relates to a higher probability of visiting the TP.
Table 1.12: 2nd step - Outpatient visit last week (Mult. Logit (marginal effects) - by expenditure
quantiles)
Low quantiles Top quantiles
Private clinic TP Private clinic TP
Log(pce) -0.024** 0.057*** 0.153*** 0.014**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Higher education 0.219*** -0.135*** -0.030* 0.076***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.010)
BMI - normal -0.039*** 0.029*** 0.035** 0.057***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
BMI - overweight -0.061*** 0.029*** -0.005 0.048***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009)
Good health -0.058*** 0.023*** -0.002 0.036***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
Hospitalized -0.051 0.203*** 0.261*** 0.026
(0.054) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022)
Insurance -0.023*** -0.089*** -0.013 -0.041***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Cost public 0.105*** -0.140*** 0.109*** 0.005
(0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.013)
Cost private 0.146*** -0.069*** -0.056*** -0.071***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.022) (0.013)
Cost TP -0.095*** 0.157*** 0.106*** 0.048***
(0.024) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013)
N. Public HC -0.012*** -0.017*** 0.018*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N. Priv. 0.012*** -0.020*** 0.014*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
N. TP 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Distance -1.633*** 1.372*** -0.505** 0.184
(0.201) (0.151) (0.204) (0.122)
Obs. 20,982 19,599
Pseudo R-sq. 0.145 0.128
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimation results using a Multinomial Logit model to estimate the number of visits to the TP,
respectively. Estimation performed separately for households in the first two (low) and the last two
(high) quantiles of monthly expenditure. Families in middle quantile are not included. This includes
year, province and island fixed effect, using IFLS Community Survey data from 2000, 2007, 2014.
Results show marginal effects for each coefficient in all specifications. The full table is provided in
Appendix, Table A8.
Turning to the health outcome estimation the models now focus on how the provision of
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healthcare and TP can have an impact on patient’s health, measured by SAH and BMI
indicators (Table 1.13). Household expenditure (as a proxy for income) is related to a
higher probability of reporting a good health status, but also of being overweight in terms
of BMI. Results show that a 1 percent increase in household expenditure is related to a 4
pp increase in the probability of being obese. Women are less positive about their health
assessment, as well as respondents who engage in self-treatment and living in more urban
areas.
Table 1.13: BMI and good self assessed health (SAH) (Multinomial and Probit results - Margins)
BMI - Underweight BMI - Overweight Good health (SAH)
Log exp. -0.030*** 0.038*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Woman -0.048*** 0.092*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Self-treat -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.047***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.014*** 0.037*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BMI - Normal 0.030***
(0.001)
BMI - Overweight 0.031***
(0.002)
Symptoms 0.006*** 0.002 -0.073***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N. Public HC 0.014*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N. Priv. -0.010*** 0.006*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N. TP -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N. Public x TP -0.017*** 0.011*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N. Private x TP 0.014*** 0.000 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 887,556 887,556
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.12
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Estimation results using a Multinomial logit and Probit models to estimate the
likelihood of being under or over the BMI healthy level (categorical) and SAH (binary). This
includes year, province and island fixed effect, using IFLS Community Survey data from
2000, 2007, 2014. Results show marginal effects for each coefficient in all specifications.
The interaction variable is used to grasp and the effect of having a modern health-care facility
built in a district with a given number of TP. The full table is provided in Appendix, Table
A11.
Health care services and TP supply are here measured as the number of facilities for each.
Variables are included in logarithm transformation so it is easier to interpret their impact.
A one percent increase in the number of TP relates to a decrease in the probability of being
under or overweight by 1.4 pp and 1.6 pp, respectively, who are generally people with
more co-morbidities and less healthy. The effect on SAH is negative, as it is for public
and private medical care. The number of public facilities is associated with underweight
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respondents, while the probability of being overweight is associated to the number of
private clinics - which should be another income related effect. The interactions between
the number of TP and the other facilities is not always associated with better health (in
terms of BMI), but have a positive impact on the probability of reporting a good health
status, of 1.6 pp for public health centres and 0.9 pp for the interaction with private clinics.
All results mentioned are significant at a 1% level.
1.6 Discussion
The results for income, education, distance and urban coefficients in the different
specifications suggest TP are providing care for the richest and for those in more rural and
remote areas. At the same time, it is clear that medical and traditional services are related
and that TP are being (mostly) negatively affected by conventional practices.
Insured families are registered in the national insurance scheme, created in 2014. These
patients have most of healthcare services for free and thus should be able to afford TP if
they wanted to. However, we find a negative and significant impact of being registered in
the insurance scheme and visiting TP, meaning that it can be providing incentives for the
poorest to resort more to medical treatment and less to the alternative options available.
It is also possible that even with access to healthcare, these families still struggle with
budget constraints as they are also more likely to suffer from more severe physical health
issues. Even though our results show that the new public insurance scheme was successful
in bringing users to the public healthcare system, since our data stops exactly on the year
the scheme was implemented, those that were already insured had just been offered free
healthcare treatments (health care supply shock) and the programme had not yet been
completely widespread. If more data on later years is available one could study how this
effect changes in time and whether having free access to healthcare increases the available
budget for TP among the most financially constrained.
Another interesting result we find is that being hospitalized is associated with a higher TP
demand for low income participants. For participants in the highest income quantiles being
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hospitalized is associated with higher demand for private clinics. Note that, because we
cannot argue for causality, it is possible that more visits to the TP and to the private clinic
are worsening the patients condition and not the other way around. However, the survey
question on hospitalization refers to the 12 months previous to the survey, i. e., patients
were asked if they were hospitalized at any moment in the 12 months previous to the survey.
In turn, the question on seeking any treatment (health centre, private clinic or TP) refers
only to the week previous to the survey. From the way both questions are asked to the
participants, the hospitalization episode most likely happened before the decision to seek
treatment, and not after. Hospitalizations are typically related to more severe conditions
and can happen at private or public hospitals. If hospitalization services are not be enough
for the patient to feel safe and cured or if the condition requires for rehabilitation, this
leads patients to search for other sources of care. The wealthier can go to private clinics,
but for the families in the lowest income quantiles the TP can be the cheapest and most
accessible way of getting more and more personalized treatment, including services are
not covered by insurance at public health centres. This could be an explanation for why
having been hospitalized is associated higher demand for private clinics by the richest
families and higher demand for TP by the poorest. This mechanism could also explain
the increasing share of patients seeking TP for physiotherapy, illness and injury treatment
(section 1.3.1). Such dynamics can be worrying and constitute another argument in favour
of increasing collaboration between systems. If the country reaches universal healthcare
coverage, but services and medicines quality do not follow, TP may become an alternative
for families looking for rehabilitation services, specially among the less wealthy.
We believe further research is needed to understand inequities in access to wellness and
healthcare in similar contexts to further grasp the role of TP in the community and how
they could be included in the National Health Plans.
Despite this thorough analysis, there are some caveats to the study. The first is that,
although our data sample is representative of the Indonesian adult population, we lack a
field intervention to measure the interactions between different services in a controlled
environment, which does not allow us to argue for causality. Secondly, the complexity and
extension of this dataset created a serious challenge to have harmonized data. For example,
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as treatment costs are self reported, the values used for treatment prices are predictions
from a Heckman model. Which we consider to be valid (by our robustness checks), but
still do not correspond to real pricing information per se. In addition, survey questions
and their numbering change between waves, which required a long and intensive study
of what questions to use over the years. Finally, we also need to take into account the
attrition between survey waves, a common disadvantage of longitudinal datasets, even if
IFLS teams make a huge effort to follow families that moved residence from one year to
another. [32]
1.7 Conclusion
The use of traditional and complementary medicine services lasts for centuries in several
cultures around the world. Traditional Practitioners create an important reputation among
their communities which makes them potential key agents for the future of public health.
While some steps have been taken towards the regulation and formalisation of the practice,
little is known on how TP have been adapting to social development or whether they have
been affected at all.
Using Indonesia as a case study, our findings show that, although modern health-care
has been spreading through the country, TP are still generally used and have strong
interactions with private and public health care providers. Private services and TP are
used as complements by higher income families and as substitutes by low income families,
likely due to budget constraints. The most significant determinants of TP demand are
health conditions and willingness/availability to pay.
Overall, there is evidence that Traditional Practitioners are affected by the provision of
medical health-care, but the population seems to use both services in a very consistent
way. This study provides an innovative contribution to the literature that argues towards a
more integrated health system in a cultural-rich environment as Indonesia. From the results
obtained and the whole analysis described, the future of health policy design should take
into account the potential power of cultural values and beliefs to complement and improve
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treatment and the general well being of the population.
Further analysis is needed to understand how modern and the traditional health systems
could be integrated, how available are both sides to negotiate that integration, always
ensuring the populations health and healthcare access are a priority.
Chapter 2
Co-payments and equity in care
- Enhancing hospitalization policy for Palestine refugees
in Lebanon1
Abstract
This paper measures the impact of introducing a 10% co-payment on secondary care hospitalization
costs for Palestine refugees living in Lebanon (PRL) in all UNRWA contracted hospitals, except
for the Red Crescent Society. This ex-post analysis provides a detailed insight on the direction
and magnitude of the policy impact in terms of demand by hospital type, average length of stay
and treatment costs. With a complete population episode level dataset, we use multinomial logit,
negative binomial, and linear models to estimate impacts on the different dependent variables,
controlling for disease, patient and hospital characteristics.
After the implementation patients were 18% more likely to choose a Red Crescent Society hospital
for secondary care, instead of one with co-payment (p<0.01). This impact was stronger for episodes
with longer stays, which were also the more severe and expensive cases. Average length of stay
decreased in general and we did not find a statistically significant impact of the co-payment on
costs, for the provider or for the patient.
Findings suggest that introducing a 10% co-payment for secondary hospital care had an impact
on patients’ health care budget, leading to demand shifts towards cheaper options - i.e., patients
had to chose care based on financial constraints rather than on their treatment preferences. Before
1with Gloria Paolucci, Akihiro Seita and Hala Ghattas
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changing healthcare payment schemes in different types of hospitals, facilities offering free of
charge treatment should be assessed and prepared for potential demand shifts to avoid overcapacity
and the collapse of health care services for such a fragile population. In addition, exemptions
from co-payments should be considered for patients with severe health conditions and financial
constraints, who, according to our results, are the most likely to change their pattern of care due to
an increase in treatment costs.
2.1 Background
Palestine refugees are the oldest and one of the largest refugee groups in the world, having
been displaced since 1949 and accounting for around 5.5 million people spread across
Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza.[54] Particularly in Lebanon, Palestine refugees are
not recognized as citizens, living with extremely restricted access to the job market (not
entitled to work in as many as 39 professions) and without property rights. The United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
provides essential development and humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees including
education, primary health care, relief and social services, amongst other services. However
UNRWA has faced financial challenges in the last few years. [55][56][57]
The Lebanese healthcare system has been under increasing pressure since the Syria conflict,
which started in 2011 and forced local communities to be displaced to the neighbouring
countries, including Lebanon.[58] Implementing the most appropriate and sustainable
payment schemes in healthcare is thus as complex as it is key to ensure general access to
health care and healthy lives in this context.
In terms of secondary health care, UNRWA has historically covered health expenses of
Palestine refugees through the partial reimbursement of costs, incurred at any contracted
hospital (private, public, UNRWA and NGO hospitals). The amounts covered vary across
operation areas and are managed at the local level by the Health Department of the
respective field office or headquarters. In the beginning of 2016, due to severe budget
constraints, UNRWA in Lebanon explored alternative health financing arrangements and
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implemented new policies adjusting the co-payment coverage scheme, reducing secondary
care cost coverage from 100% to 90% in private and public hospitals, while maintaining
all costs covered at the Palestine Red Crescent Society hospitals (PRCS).
This study goes into the details of this policy change and aims to shed light on its impact
on demand and supply of healthcare. This work contributes to the literature on the effect
of co-payments in healthcare with a complete population database in a limited resource
context, and provides specific insights to inform policies to improve access to healthcare
for Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL).
UNRWA Hospitalization policy changes: a natural experiment
The policy change of interest in this study had a long and complex path towards
implementation. In January 2016, UNRWA increased tertiary care coverage from 50 to
60% and reduced secondary care coverage from 100% to 80% in private, 85% in public and
95% in PRCS hospitals. Additionally, by the end of February 2016, UNRWA announced
the creation of a Medical Hardship Fund (MHF), a program designed to ensure access
to treatment for those living in extreme poverty and suffering from catastrophic health
conditions - including support at the secondary healthcare level (in 2016 the percentage of
UNRWA hospitalization accessed by MHF was of 18.4% [59]). Nonetheless, under these
new conditions most patients had to cover a larger share of their hospitalization costs out
of pocket which raised strong concerns and led to protests against the Agency’s decision.
UNRWA contracts services from thirty-five private hospitals, five Palestine Red Crescent
Society and four public hospitals in Lebanon. Since the access to the most available
hospitals became more expensive, users had less options for treatment - in 2016 the
average cost of an appendectomy (surgical removal of the appendix) was around 734 USD
in public and 683 USD in private hospitals. With UNRWA covering 90% this means
the patient would still have to pay around 70 USD, which can be a significant cost for
a family already in financial distress. The resulting tensions led UNRWA to open the
matter to negotiations and suspend the cost-sharing policy between April and June 2016,
changing coverage back to 100% for secondary care in all hospitals (as it had been until
December 2015).[60] This period gives us pre-policy implementation data to use as a
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natural experiment for the analysis. After the negotiations were concluded, UNRWA
re-adjusted the policy to meet partially demands of the population. On June 1st 2016, the
percentage of the Agency’s coverage for secondary care was set to 90% for government and
private hospitals and 100% for PRCS hospitals, maintaining the 60% coverage for tertiary
care in all contracted hospitals (up to a ceiling of 5,200 USD per admission) (see Figure
2.1). Together with this last policy, UNRWA revised the monitoring process for length of
stay at the geographical area level (geographical areas of operation are formally defined by
UNRWA). Each patient diagnosis and expected length of stay were confirmed by an Area
Hospitalization Medical Officer (AHMO) (who produced an approval in accordance) and
later extensions had to be approved by UNRWA. Unjustified stays were not covered by the
institution, which provided an incentive for hospitals to comply.
Figure 2.1: Policy timeline
The period after June 2016 will be equivalent to an experiment second-stage when we
measure how the 10% co-payment changes demand between the ex post and ex ante stages.
UNRWA is the main official provider of health care for Palestine refugees and almost all
refugees are accessing hospitals through UNRWA hospitalization support program.[61]
According to Chaaban et al. (2015) the overall health conditions of this population are
fragile. Namely, around 37% of the Palestine refugees from Lebanon (PRL) reported
to be chronically ill and more likely to be hospitalized, with acute illness and disability
percentages around 63% and 10.3%, respectively.
A preliminary look into the data shows PRCS demand in terms of hospital visits was
decreasing until June, when the second policy adjustment was put in place, as Figure 2.2
shows. At the same time, demand for private hospitals seems to evolve in an opposite
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direction from that of PRCS. With the imposition of different cost-sharing levels in
different hospitals, June was a turning point in terms of decision making for households
with secondary health care needs.
Figure 2.2: Average number of visits, per month, in 2016
A growing body of literature has examined the impact of cost-sharing policy
implementation and abolition on health care demand. Nabyonga et al. (2005) presents an
impact assessment on the abolition of user fees in Uganda.[62] The authors carried out a
longitudinal study in 106 health facilities across the country to explore how demand for
health care services reacted to the policy change. The study found an increase in utilization
among all population groups, with a relatively higher increase among the poor. Similar
evidence was found by De Allegri et al. (2011) who focused on the reduction of user fees
for maternal care services.[63] The results of two multivariate logistic regression models
suggested that poorer women might have benefited the most from the new financing policy
with important implications for decreasing inequalities. Evidence from the Occupied
Palestinian Territory also shows that out-of-pocket payments have a regressive effect and
increase pre-existing income inequalities.[64] However, in all the above cases user-fees
(when known) were higher than the ones imposed by UNRWA in secondary hospitalization
in 2016 and in most cases addressed a reduction rather than an increase in out-of-pocket
fees.
Notably, one important tool that previous research has found to be effective in the successful
implementation of new policies is to provide transparent and complete information to the
community. This is especially true in complicated environments, where the population has
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few resources and is already struggling with day-to-day expenses. Indeed, studies have
shown that a gradual introduction plan can be enough to transform a failed implementation
into a smooth transition generally accepted by the population and with better results
regarding budget saving outcomes.[65], [66], [67]
The introduction of cost-sharing policies is a complex exercise as it has immediate negative
implications for the user - costs increase. Nonetheless, some policies of this nature may
actually bring important benefits to health care services.[68][69] In UNRWA’s case, the
new policy was introduced as a strategy adjustment for “greater sustainability and increased
support for tertiary care", by shifting part of the coverage from secondary to tertiary level
hospitalizations.[70] However, to what extent this policy was effective and what were
the implied unforeseen effects is not clear. Of particular interest is whether users change
behaviour after the cost-sharing policy is implemented and whether UNRWA is able to
contain costs. Throughout this project, we answer these questions by analyzing how the
bill value, UNRWA contribution and hospital visits change pre and post-intervention. For
this purpose we focused on secondary care data for which we have pre and post policy
information. This work is a valuable contribution towards increasing quality of health
care for Palestine refugees, while providing a general framework of how hospitalization
services are being used.
The overall findings suggest that introducing a 10% co-payment for secondary care for
private and public hospitals had a significant impact redistributing demand between types
of hospitals. Namely, after this policy change patients were 18% more likely to choose
a PRCS hospital for secondary care. In addition, the average number of stay in days
decreased in all hospitals, which can be related to the effectiveness of having improved
occupancy control at the same time of the policy change.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents the data and
concerns of external validity, section 2.3 explains the methods used including the theoretical
and empirical models, 2.4 presents the main results and, finally, 2.5 provides conclusions
and discussions of the analysis.
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2.2 Data set
The data used in this work are part of a broader ongoing program of data collection being
conducted by UNRWA in all contracted hospitals with the goal of ultimately constructing
a comprehensive time series of hospitalizations. 2
For a matter of confidentially, the refugee registration number was anonymised, but in a
way that allows to follow up of each patient. The data collection was initially piloted in
2013 and started being fully conducted in 2016.
For this project we use a subset of the original data from January 2016 to October 2017
with complete information on all UNRWA hospitalizations (the availability of the data
depends on the on-going digitalization process). We focus on Palestine refugees from
Lebanon in secondary care for which we have 32,061 observations, not including birth
deliveries and MHF cases who benefit from a different financial support program and
were differently affected by the policy change. We excluded MHF cases by eliminating
observations from patients that got complete coverage using other than PRCS hospitals
after June 2016 which is the best identification possible given that data on the MHF cases
identifier is not available. The data contains individual level information collected from
every hospital in UNRWA areas of operation, Beqaa, Central Lebanon Area (CLA), North
Lebanon Area (NLA), Saida and Tyre, from 27 private hospitals, 5 PRCS and 4 public
hospitals. The Lebanon map in figure 2.3 shows the distribution of UNRWA contracted
hospitals across the country (more detailed maps by region in Appendix 4.4). The available
variables include the patients’ age and gender, entry and discharge date, diagnosis and
surgery description, bill value, UNRWA contribution, patient contribution and hospitals’
characteristics. Because we have the complete population data-set, there is no need for
sampling and the findings will be robust and representative of the population. This is an
important strength of this paper that makes it unique in the literature.
Gender of hospital users is generally equally distributed between males and females
however, as seen in Figure 2.4, there are some imbalances when data are stratified by
age group. There is a relatively higher number of young males going to the hospital until
2Data were provided by UNRWA directly, but all opinions are the responsibility of the researcher.
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Figure 2.3: Hospitals location in Lebanon
the age of 10 to 20 years. Between 29 and 70 years, the groups are quite balanced and
from 70 years onwards women become the majority. Existing evidence on Palestine youth
shows that young males tend to have more dangerous behaviors that put their lives at risk,
while females spend generally more time at home throughout their lives and end up living
longer.[71]
In what concerns regional disparities, CLA is the area with the highest number of hospitals,
12, followed by NLA with 10, Beqaa with 7, Saida with 6 and Tyre with 4. Nonetheless,
Saida has the highest number of incidents in the database, most likely due to having the
highest population size and density of Palestine Refugees and Ein El Hilweh camp (in
Saida), which were exposed to several conflicts during this period of time (Figure 2.5).
Of the total observations 6,781 are surgical and 25,280 medical cases. Surgical cases are
paid fee for service, independently of the number of days patients stay at the hospital. As
such, these cases should not be affected by the higher monitoring from UNRWA at the
time of the policy change. Regarding seasonality, the number of visits to the hospitals
2.2. Data set 49









0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 60-70 70-80 80-90 90+
N
Male Female
Note: Data from January 2016 to October 2017 for secondary care.











Beqaa CLA NLA Saida Tyre
N
Male Female
Note: Data from January 2016 to October 2017 for secondary care.
decreased significantly during Ramadan in both years and, especially because it coincided
with the policy change in 2016, it is important for this to be considered in the analysis.
We are able to observe high responsiveness in the data with regards to the timings of policy
changes and cultural events. This, combined with its representativeness, suggest a high
quality and reliability of the data sources. The progress of the project was closely followed
by UNRWA, that supervised and provided guidance on unregistered events and the general
results interpretation related to culture and societal-specific features.
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2.2.1 External validity
The Palestine community living in Lebanon has a unique culture and has struggled with
very particular social and political challenges over time. Although still registered as
refugees, Palestine Refugees from Lebanon have been sharing the same geographic area
as Lebanese for the last 70 years. On the other hand, this population continues to be
marginalized and socially excluded with many living in precarious conditions. Moreover,
with the Syrian refugee crisis, services became more crowded and scarcer in the country.
To assess how PRL compare with national averages we use the most recent data published,
including the 2009 WHO Data Book for Lebanon , World bank data and the AUB
Socieconomic Survey 2015 of Palestine refugees.[72][61]
Comparing AUB 2015 estimates for PRL in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the
West Bank and Gaza, we see generally a young population with approximately half under
24 years of age and West Bank and Gaza standing out with the highest percentage of
population in this age group (Table 2.1).[61]
Table 2.1: Population in % of gender by age groups, 2015
Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic West Bank and Gaza PRL
Age groups Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
0-24 46% 46% 52% 53% 61% 62% 45% 51%
25-64 48% 48% 44% 43% 36% 35% 46% 43%
65+ 7% 6% 4% 4% 3% 3% 8% 7%
Poverty affects young Palestine refugees with 74% of adolescents living in poverty and
5% in extreme poverty, in line with recent evidence on the reality of other refugee groups
such as Syrian.[73] The overall estimation is that 65% of PRL live below the poverty line,
against 68% of Syrian refugees and 28.5% of Lebanese (UN Lebanon annual report 2018).
PRL expenditures per month are also lower than the average of their Lebanese counterparts.
Nonetheless, the employment rate for Lebanon was 43.9% slightly higher than the estimate
for PRL of 37%, very close to the rate for the same year in Syrian Arab Republic and
considerably higher than the 33.7% for West Bank and Gaza.
Regarding health indicators, the incidence of NCDs is high and increasing across the Arab
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world. The reported prevalence of chronic and acute disease among PRL is 37% and 63%,
respectively. With heart disease, stroke and diabetes as the top three causes of death in
Lebanon, the most common NCDs are similar for both groups and a common issue across
the region.[74][75] Infant mortality rates on the other hand, show slightly lower values
for PRL at 19 per 1000 births, compared to 21 in Lebanon, 29.6 in Syrian Arab Republic,
21 in West Bank and 23 in Gaza. This is an indicator that is usually strongly correlated
with life expectancy.[76] In this sense, these indicators highlight that the PRL population
in Lebanon have strong similarities with other countries and refugee populations across
the region. This is one of the key factors strengthening external validity and making this
policy impact analysis valid in similar contexts.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Theoretical model
To understand patient behavior following the introduction of a co-payment in secondary
care hospitalization costs, we develop a theoretical model that formalizes a hypothesis on
how individuals decide between hospitals. 3
We are studying the policy implementation as a natural experiment in two stages, the ex
ante stage where patients have free access to secondary care, and the ex post stage where
treatment in public and private hospitals is charged at 10%, but not in PRCS hospitals.
Given this setting, we assume the different hospital types have different quality levels and
use a vertical differentiation model to analyze competition and interaction among hospitals.
Providers compete in terms of quality, which is valuable because it can result in better
health outcomes or improve the treatment process itself.
We start by considering that patients obtain utility from their treatment. This utility is
directly influenced by the cost and benefit of treatment, which in turn are dependent on the
3The most common types of cost-sharing are: co-payments, payment of a fixed amount for each medical
service; coinsurance, payment of a fixed percentage of the health care expenditure; and deductibles, payment
of the first need of care each year. [69]
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condition’s severity level. In this market for health care there are two hospitals, indexed by
j=1,2, where hospital 1 is of higher quality than hospital 2 and patients have preferences for
these hospitals. The treatment cost share is exogenous and can vary over time and between
hospital type. The demand each provider faces is then determined by the preference of the
indifferent patient.
Each patient makes the decision to take treatment or not and from which hospital to demand
treatment. This said, the patients’ utility U(j, η), j = 1, 2, with disease severity η, when
choosing provider i is given by:
U(j, η) = θjB(η)− SjCj(η) (2.1)
where B(η) is the benefit of getting treatment, which we assume to be equal for all patients
of the same severity whatever hospital they select, and Sj is the share of the total cost,
C(η) (measured in USD units), that the patient is required to pay, i.e., SjCj(η) is the
out-of-pocket payment, exogenously established. Both Cj(η) and B(η) are increasing on
severity (B′(η) > 0, B′′(η) < 0, C ′j(η) > 0, C
′′
j (η) > 0), meaning that higher severity
corresponds to higher benefits, but also higher cost. The augmented preference for the
quality hospital is given by θ, where θ1 > 1 and θ2 = 1, such that the benefit of getting
treatment at hospitals with higher quality is larger. In this framework, consider that:
• η1 > η2 ⇒ Cj(η1) > Cj(η2), ∀ η;
• S1 > S2; and
• C1(η) > C2(η), ∀ η;
Then:
1. There exists a η∗ such that, for η ≥ η∗:
B(η) ≥ S2C2(η), everyone gets treatment at the hospital;
2. There exists a η∗∗ such that,
For η∗ < η < η∗∗:
θB(η)− S1C1(η) < B(η)− S2C2(η), everyone chooses hospital 2.
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And for η ≥ η∗∗:
θB(η)− S1C1(η) > B(η)− S2C2(η), everyone chooses hospital 1.
To study these conditions we need to understand how the thresholds vary with changes in
out-of-pocket payments, Sj .
For this purpose, we derive the severity thresholds functions, η∗ and η∗∗, in order to Sj ,
through the application of the Implicit Function Theorem:
If f : Rm×R⇒ R is aC1 function, f(x0; y0) = 0, and ∂f∂x 6= 0, then for some neighborhood
U ⊂ Rm of (x0) there is aC1 function g : U ⇒ R such that g(x0) = y0 and f(x, g(x)) = 0










The calculations yield the following results (proofs in Appendix, section A2.1):
Proposition 1
The severity threshold for patients to get treatment, η∗, is positively related to treatment
costs at the low quality hospital, S2C2(η). This is, as the patients’ contribution share









An increase in patient contribution charged in hospital 1, S1, increases the severity threshold









An increase in patient contribution charged in hospital 2, S2, decreases the severity
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threshold that leads patients to choose the high quality hospital, η∗∗.
∂η∗∗
∂S2







An increase (decrease) in patient contribution charged in hospital 1, S1, decreases
(increases) the number of patients going to hospital 1 and increases (decreases) the number













Where, Wj is the number of patients going to each hospital. Since from Proposition 3 the
severity threshold of going to hospital 1 increases, the average costs and length of stay are
also expected to increase at hospital 1.
Additionally, because this is a context of strong financial distress, it is important to consider
that some heavy users with severe cases at high quality facilities will be forced to shift
hospital due to lack of financial resources.[61] In order to include these cases in the model
we need to add a budget constraint at the patient level, such that:
• M > SC(η1);
To understand further how this condition interferes with the model, figure 2.6 shows how
the increase in patient contribution in hospital 1 from 0 to 10% can affect their choices.
Consider the budget constraint and the increase on patient contribution, S1. From the above
explained theory, there is a threshold severity level η∗∗ after which patients will prefer
to choose a high quality hospital (hospital 1). We also saw that when S1 increases, the
severity threshold, η∗∗, increases (from η∗∗ to η∗∗′ in the graph) and it takes a more severe
health condition to make people willing to pay more. Following, the number of patients
decreases and the average patient length of stay (LoS) increases at hospital 1. However,
from the group of people that are willing to pay more, some will not be able to follow this
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increase in costs. Taking this into account, more people will shift to hospital 2, and there
will be a negative effect on the average LoS at hospital 1. The overall effect on average
LoS at hospital 1 will be a trade-off between the two effects described. In Figure 2.6, the
light grey area represents the point after which patients choose hospital 1 and the dark
grey represents those that are willing to pay, but will choose a low quality hospital because
M < SC(η1).
Figure 2.6: Budget constraint dynamics (from S1 = 0 to S
′
1 = 0, 1)
Applying this theoretical reasoning to the study, we can consider PRCS hospitals to be
hospital type 2 and private and public hospitals to be hospital type 1. We will use the
relationships above to interpret the results achieved from the econometric results, in order
to understand the rational behind the patients’ behavior changes. Let us consider two
hypothesis, following the introduction of a 10% co-payment as of June 2016:
• Patients that shift to hospital 2 due to financial constraints were overusing the high
quality hospital, when the low quality hospital has enough resources to treat all
diseases and conditions with lower costs for UNRWA;
• Patients that shift to hospital 2 due to financial constraints will not have access
to sufficient care and this will have negative future impacts in terms of level of
morbidity and mortality.
If the first hypothesis is confirmed, the new policy was effective to reduce inefficiencies
and allowed UNRWA to contain costs, on the other side, the second hypothesis implies
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that the policy not only did not allow UNRWA to contain costs, but also made access to
healthcare more difficult for poorer families with severe health conditions. The estimation
and econometric methods adopted will allow us to explore these hypotheses and understand
what is the most plausible scenario according to the data under analysis.
2.3.2 Estimation and econometric methods
The main purpose of this study is to estimate the effect of co-payments on patients’
healthcare decisions - PRL - and the providers costs - UNRWA. We exclude the period
between January and March 2016 and focus on the shift from full coverage (in force during
April and May 2016) to cost-sharing (after June 2016). We use a differences estimation
equation, as follows:
Yit = α + β1T + β2Xit + β3Hit + β4Intit + εit (2.6)
Where i = 1,.., N denotes individuals and t represents time (day). The dependent variable,
Yit, corresponds to each outcome of interest: bill value, UNRWA contribution, patient
contribution, stay in days and the probability of choosing a PRCS, a public or a private
hospital (all monetary variables will be expressed in USD). T is a treatment vector time-
varying independent variable with coefficient β1, such that T=1 if the period is after the last
policy change (from June 2016 onward) and T=0 otherwise. MatrixXit includes individual-
specific characteristics, including gender and age, Hit corresponds to the demographic
profile and characteristics of the hospitals (region, distance to refugee camp, type). Finally,
we add interaction terms between bill value, UNRWA contribution and patient contribution
with variable T , here represented by Intit, and εit is the error term (all estimations
were applied in Stata 14.0 with support from Microsoft Office Excel 2016). In simple
differences analysis the event under study must be exogenous to the outcome variables,
which is verified in this case as the policy change was an exogenous decision taken by
UNRWA.
We use a total population, where the individuals are observed each time they use
hospitalization services and it is thus not necessary to use fixed effects methods for the
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results to be robust. 4 Nonetheless, to avoid heterogeneity issues we use clustered standard
errors by hospital in all estimations and robust standard errors for further robustness checks
presented in Appendix.
Because we wish to identify mechanisms through which the policy change had an impact
on several features of hospitalization services we estimate various specifications of the
general model in (2.6), with different estimation methods, depending on the dependent
variables.
Dependent variables
The policy change under analysis implied different coverage between hospitals that may
have had an impact on the patients’s choice. With a complete database of hospitalization
cases, every individual episode corresponds to one out of the three hospital types - private,
public or PRCS. In this framework, we conducted a multinomial logit model, where the
outcome variable is hospital type, a categorical with values from 1 to 3, where 1 corresponds
to PRCS, 2 to private and 3 to public hospitals. Following the theoretical reasoning in the
previous section, this approach assesses the indirect utility of each alternative, assuming that
individuals choose the one that provides the greatest utility.[79] The dependent variable is
thus the indirect utility of each choice as a function of individual, hospital and unobserved
characteristics. The coefficient estimates give the differential effects of the observed
characteristics on utility, from which we compute the average marginal effect of each
variable.
The second estimation exercise focuses on measuring the policy impact on the Length
of stay (LoS) at UNRWA contracted hospitals for secondary care. LoS is calculated as
the number of days between the admission and the discharge date of a given patient and
can be considered as a severity indicator in the sense that more severe conditions are
associated with longer hospitalization periods. In addition, simultaneously with the policy
change, UNRWA also increased LoS monitoring for all patients covered by UNRWA.
If this measure was efficient, LoS is expected to decrease in all hospitals, potentially
4With a total population we are not using the estimated average, but the true parameter. There is no need
to estimate time-varying average treatment effects. [77], [78]
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decreasing also bill values for medical cases. To perform this estimation we use a negative
binomial regression model, largely used for non-negative integer dependent variables with
over-dispersion (variance is more than double of the mean), as it is the case. [80][81] As a
robustness check we also perform the same regression using multilevel poisson estimation
model, presented in Appendix, section A2.3.
Following this, to understand the financial consequences of these changes we turn our focus
to the impact on bill value, UNRWA and patient contribution. The bill value corresponds to
the total costs health-care by individual, including the procedure’s value, doctors services
payment, occupancy and medication expenditures (while hospitalized) or a fixed fee in
case of surgery. This value is then presented to the patient, who receives financial support
from UNRWA that usually corresponds to a fixed share of the total bill value (in secondary
care, the sum between UNRWA and patient contribution is generally equal to the total bill
value, with some exceptions for when the patient receives support from a third contributor).
These three continuous variables present a left-skewed distribution which is common in
health-care costs data due to the presence of few heavy users. [82] In order to properly use
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model we performed logarithm transformations so that
we can use normally distributed variables. For this set of estimations, in equation (2.6) Yit
becomes log(Yit). Although this implies a loss of accuracy, this method is widely in used
in the literature for these situations and studies have proven its robustness. [83]
2.4 Results
Considering the theoretical framework presented, the empirical results explore whether
patients are using services more efficiently after the introduction of 10% co-payment costs
for certain hospital types, or whether access to hospital services became more difficult for
families with severe health conditions and in financial distress. The estimation results in
this section will help us achieve the answers.
Table 2.2 shows the results for the multinomial logit model that measures the impact of
each explanatory variable on the probability of going to each hospital type. The Policy
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coefficient had a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of an episode
happening at a PRCS (demand) and the opposite effect for Private hospitals. Namely, after
June 2016 patients were around 18% (p>0.01) more likely to choose a PRCS hospital
instead of a private or public hospital (note that because it is a multinomial logit, patients
are distributed across the three hospital types, as such when the demand changes for one of
them it has to fully compensate in at least one of the others). Regarding public hospitals,
the database includes 17,287 observations for PRCS, 7,208 for private and 2,679 for public
hospitals. Since this is a complete population dataset and there are significantly fewer
public hospitals, demand for these hospitals will most likely be driven by particular reasons
such as distance (statistically significant - table B1 in Appendix), which can make patients
less sensitive to changes in prices.
Table 2.2: Policy impact estimation on demand for hospital type (Multinomial logit - margins),
from April 2016 to October 2017
(1) (2) (3)
PRCS Priv. Hosp. Pub Hosp
Policy 0.180*** -0.147*** -0.033
(0.061) (0.032) (0.065)
UNRWA contribution 2.880*** −1.819*** −1.061*
(0.678) (0.404) (0.633)
Bill value −3.001*** 1.880*** 1.121*
(0.717) (0.430) (0.661)
Stay in days 0.022*** −0.017*** −0.005
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Surgery 0.098** −0.048 −0.050
(0.043) (0.030) (0.031)
UNRWA contr.
[(at pol.=0) - (at pol.=1)] −3.26 2.405 1.324
Stay in days
[(at pol.=0) - (at pol.=1)] −0.069*** 0.045** 0.022
Observations 32,810 32,810 32,810
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variables are binary variables with the value 1 if the patient is at
each hospital type and 0 otherwise. Note that all patients get treatment, thus for each
observation at least one option must be selected. Coefficients show average marginal
effects for multinomial logit regression results. Standard errors clustered by hospital in
parentheses. Policy is a dummy variable that indicates the period after the last policy
change (from June 2016 onwards). These model specifications control for individual and
hospital specific variables. Full table in Appendix table .
Apart from the general demand shift, the variable for length of stay has opposite signs
between PRCS and the other hospital types. Generally, average length of stay is higher for
private hospitals, as more severe episodes require more resources. In fact, a simple mean
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test shows the average value is 0.7 days lower at PRCS and the difference is statistically
significant at 1%. This said, the results from the multinomial estimation show a higher
average stay in days at PRCS, as an increase in one day at the hospital makes it 2 percentage
points more likely to choose a PRCS hospital. We believe this contradicting result comes
from controlling for the variable bill value, which is highly correlated with length of
stay (0.8) and is also expected to be correlated with disease severity. In this sense, when
controlling for this factor, we can consider that length of stay becomes an indicator of
efficiency. Since private hospitals are profit oriented, the length of stay should be closer
to the optimal number of days necessary for each procedure, and thus lower compared to
other type of facilities. There is also a noteworthy preference of surgeries being performed
at PRCS hospitals which can be driving the positive and significant coefficient of average
stay in days. As for Bill value and UNRWA contribution, the variables have the expected
signs and are statistically significant, in PRCS hospitals interventions are cheaper and
UNRWA contributes at 100% for all secondary care costs.
To control for non-linearities in cross-products, the interaction coefficients were computed
following Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012).[84] The interaction effect allows both the intercept
and the marginal effect (slope) of UNRWA contribution and LoS on the expected probability
of the dependent variable to be different before and after the policy was implemented.
Due to the model non-linearity the marginal effect is not constant over its entire range.
As such, the difference between the marginal effect in both moments gives the change in
the conditional probability that the outcome variable is equal to one for a unit change in
UNRWA contribution, as the co-payment share changes from zero to 10% (policy variable
changes from 0 to 1). Regarding UNRWA contribution, the difference the marginal
effect before and after the policy is implemented is not statistically significant, which was
expected given that all patients were subject to the policy change. In turn, the difference in
the marginal effect of LoS before and after the policy is negative for PRCS and positive
for private. This means that the effect of staying 1 additional day at the hospital in the
probability of going to a PRCS hospital was 0.7 percentage points lower after the policy
was in place. At the same time, for private hospitals, one additional day hospitalized has
a more positive impact on the probability of a patient choosing this hospital type, after
the policy was implemented. As such, while demand increased at PRCS hospitals and
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decreased for private, staying longer became less likely to happen at PRCS facilities after
June 2016. This may indicate that the increase in monitoring of LoS was successful in
reducing inefficiencies at PRCS or that, due to the higher demand, services were forced to
reduce hospitalization time for patients.
Because LoS distribution is highly skewed to the right and most patients in this sample
stay only one day at the hospital, we divide the sample into two groups: the ones that stay
one day at the hospital and the ones that stay at least two (there are only 4 observations that
stay less than one day at the hospital and they were excluded for this part of the analysis).
Following the results in table 2.3, with this specification, after the policy was implemented
the probability of going to a PRCS hospital was higher among episodes with longer stays.
Considering the aforementioned high correlation between LoS and bill value, such result
follows the theoretical hypothesis that for those which the 10% meant a significant cost (i.e.
higher bill values), the policy change had a more significant impact. In the t-tests results of
the policy marginal effects (specification 1 and 2) equal to 0.117 and 0.181, respectively,
the null hypothesis was not rejected.









Bill value −1.983*** −2.724***
(0.484) (0.548)
UNRWA contr. 1.886*** 2.641***
(0.444) (0.520)
UNRWA contr.
[(at pol.=0) - (at pol.=1)] −2.271 −3.674
Observations 16,851 24,495
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Dependent variables in log transformations; Estimations include
controls for type of hospital, gender, age, Ramadan and LoS. Standard
errors clustered by hospital in parentheses. Policy is a dummy variable
that indicates the period after the last policy change (from June 2016
onwards).
Looking at the policy impact on LoS, table 2.4 shows a statistically significant IRR
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coefficient of 0.860, i.e., after the co-payment was implemented the average number of stay
in days changed by a factor of 0.860, ceteris paribus (p<0.01). This general decrease of
the average length of stay can either be a consequence of the policy change or the increase
in monitoring that UNRWA implemented at the time of the policy. In particular, in PRCS
the change in control and the introduction of a co-payment have two opposite effects. On
one side, average stays should be shorter due to the increase in control, on the other, LoS is
expected to increase with demand, especially if that demand shift is driven more by heavy
users. Going back to the table, the interaction coefficients between hospital types and
the policy are below 1 (relative to PRCS). This means, the average number of days at the
hospital per episode was higher at PRCS after the policy being implemented, suggesting
evidence that even with higher control, patients seem to have stayed hospitalized at PRCS
longer than before (on average).
Table 2.4: Policy impact estimation on Stay in Days (Neg. Binomial - IRR), from April 2016 to






UNRWA contr. × Policy 1.001***
(0.000)
Priv. Hosp × Policy 0.778***
(0.051)







Constant 2.194 ∗ ∗∗
(0.138)
Observations 32,811
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Note: Coefficients show Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR)
for a negative binomial regression results. Standard
errors clustered by hospital in parentheses. Policy
is a dummy variable that indicates the period after
the last policy change (from June 2016 onward).
This model specification controls for individual and
hospital specific variables. Full table in Appendix,
Table B2.
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In what concerns costs, table 2.5 shows that the policy change had no significant direct
impact on any of the three outcome variables - bill value, UNRWA and patient contribution.
If on one side, UNRWA provided less financial support for patients going to more expensive
hospitals, on the other, more people are going to the cheapest option (PRCS). If both
effects balance out than the impact on costs is expected to be diminished and potentially
not significant. In other words, demand reacted to the policy change by changing their
hospital choice, which might have been enough to accommodate the changes in costs.
Table 2.5: Policy impact estimation on Bill value, Patient contribution and UNRWA contribution
(OLS), from April 2016 to October 2017 (with controls)
(1) (2) (3)
Patient contr. UNRWA contr. Bill value
Policy 0.091 0.002 -0.001
(0.116) (0.006) (0.007)
Stay in days -0.031** 0.001 0.011**
(0.014) (0.002) (0.004)
Surgery -0.082 0.010 0.024**
(0.060) (0.010) (0.010)
Private hosp. 0.569 -0.036 0.076*
(0.390) (0.033) (0.039)
Public hosp. 0.615* 0.024 0.007
(0.302) (0.018) (0.013)




Stay in days × policy 0.015 0.001 -0.002
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
Priv. Hosp × Policy -0.296 -0.073** 0.072**
(0.249) (0.035) (0.035)
Pub. Hosp × Policy -0.502** -0.109*** 0.110***
(0.232) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant −12.743*** −6.810*** 7.328***
(0.656) (0.162) (0.047)
Observations 12,875 32,810 32,810
R-squared 0.900 0.982 0.983
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Dependent variables in log transformations; Estimations include controls for type
of hospital, gender, age, Ramadan and LoS. Standard errors clustered by hospital in
parentheses. Policy is a dummy variable that indicates the period after the last policy
change (from June 2016 onwards).Full table in Appendix, table B3.
That said, in relation to the original research questions, our findings show the introduction of
a 10% cost-sharing component for secondary care is a potential instrument for redistributing
demand, while it shows low effectiveness for containing costs for the provider. Moreover,
other than the introduction of co-payments itself, there are several aspects of the policy
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implementation process that may be behind this result, from timings to lack of information.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the data available allows us to show, the policy impact had
very low (if any) impact in terms of costs for UNRWA.
Overall, the demand shift towards PRCS and the increase in LoS control had a relevant
impact for patients and healthcare services provision. These changes had contradictory




In this study, we examine the effect of introducing a 10% co-payment in hospitalization
costs at private and public hospitals, using a natural experiment setting. We find that,
after introducing the co-payment component, the probability of going to hospitals where
coverage remained at 100% (PRCS) increased. These findings were stronger when looking
at patients with longer lengths of stay. Data demonstrate that the provider (UNRWA) costs
did not change after the policy implementation and patients are staying longer at the fully
covered and cheaper hospitals.
Building on previous evidence, this study contributes to the contemporary debate on the
net impact of implementing health care out-of-pocket payments in complex social and
political contexts, such as the one of the Palestine refugees living in Lebanon. The analysis
provides a general understanding on the demand for hospitalization in secondary care level
and a thoughtful insight on how a particular policy change affected health care services
from a lessons learned perspective. The outcomes of this project provide evidence on the
characteristics and determinants of health care demand in UNRWA contracted hospitals,
while indicating the magnitude and direction of the cost-sharing policy impact at different
levels, enabling the identification of potential issues and advantages of this type of payment
scheme in secondary care hospitalization.
According to the results, UNRWA introducing a cost-sharing component for private and
public hospitals lead to a demand re-distribution towards PRCS hospitals, where treatment
continued to be provided free of charge. This can mean an efficiency gain in case PRCS
are able to answer to a higher demand, but also that access to private and public hospitals
is now more restricted. We also found a relevant general decrease on average LoS, which
can represent not only the policy change but also the fact that UNRWA increased control
on the occupancy at the hospitals. This is evidence that increasing control was effective
and may have contributed to avoiding (or decreasing) system over-usage (overutilization
of UNRWA services is frequently mentioned as a significant challenge for the health
programme in official documents.[85] [86]) On the other side, for PRCS in particular,
average LoS increased despite being more controlled. In this context, and following our
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theoretical assumptions, this provides some evidence that patients in more severe financial
situations with more severe conditions were affected by the change in policy and face more
constraints to chose public or private hospitals, even if it is their preferred option.
Although we found statistically significant correlations, with this data it is not possible
to control for unobservable events happening during the analysis period that could affect
the results - conflicts, natural disasters, political crises, etc. As such, one cannot assume
direct causality of the policy impact. Additionally, another limitation of this study is that
there is not enough data on socio-demographics characteristics or patients benefiting from
Social Safety Net (SSN) to understand exactly to what extent the cost-sharing policy is
depriving poorest patients from quality health-care. Finally, and probably most importantly,
we do not have access to patients health outcomes nor to measures of healthcare service
quality. With this information we could have assessed whether there were any signs of
overcrowding (or crowding control measures) at PRCS hospitals before and after the policy
being implemented. The lack of updated news and information on these hospitals also
makes it more difficult to study these services.
Overall, the cost-sharing policy proved to be effective to re-distribute demand across
hospital types, indicating that patients are generally price sensitive for secondary care
hospitalization services. Nevertheless, the demand adjustment prevented UNRWA from
containing more costs than before and the co-payment fee prevented extremely fragile
patients from choosing their preferred hospital. This study provides UNRWA with an
impact evaluation in-depth exercise, including valuable information on how their policies
have an impact in terms of users behavior and cost containment strategies. We believe this
analysis can be used for future reference in policy decision making and opens an important
precedent of how research and institutions can work together to achieve a greater good for
the target population.
Chapter 3
No ordinary leaders and family care
- Evidence from Female-headed households in Palestine
Refugee Camps 1
Abstract
Subject to stigmatization in a community with strong traditional gender roles, female household
leaders in Palestine Refugee Camps find themselves with more barriers to provide the basic needs
to their families than most. We explore the potential differences in terms of healthcare expenses
between male and female-headed households (FHH) in Palestine Refugee camps in Lebanon
and make a first approach to assess mental health issues associated with being a female head of
household (HoH) in this context. In addition, we measure possible improvements on FHH living
standards between 2010 and 2015.
This study produces a deep understanding on the different types of households and of female-
headed households, in particular. Data are from AUB Socioeconomic Surveys from 2010 and 2015
with household and individual level information and representative of the refugee population. We
perform a cross section analysis using a Two-Part Model (probit and glm) and Propensity Score
Matching to understand correlations between household composition and spending decisions, and a
probit model to study mental health issues associated with being a female HoH. We also deepen the
study on income elasticity to potentially disentangle stigma/preferences effects.
Results show that expenditure in healthcare as a percentage of total spending is 1.4 pp higher for
FHH in 2010 (p<0.05) and 2.2 pp in 2015 (p<0.01). This difference is higher in families headed
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by widows or single women. Most mental health indicators are worse for female HoH, of which
most are widows. Between 2010 and 2015, female HoH positive feelings indicators show small
improvements from one year to the other.
We highlight the need to continue providing financial support to these families, along with a
more inter-sectoral approach to protect these families from severe intergenerational psychological
damage.
3.1 Background
More than 70 years passed after the entrance of Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL), who
are still considered as foreigners under the Lebanese law. This status does not grant them
any special legal protection and deprives them from economic and human rights, including
denial of a permission to work in 39 professions or the right to own property. Most of PRL
families still live in precarious conditions and a large share of them still depend on the
services of education, social security and health provided by the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). [87] Female headed
households (FHH) in particular, are a minority of PRL families that, in this context of
poverty, have to overcome the cultural and social barriers of ruling a whole family in an
extremely patriarchal community.
A recent wave of economics literature has focused on FHH and how they may be subject
to a different leadership than most families. [88], [89], [90] This is specially disruptive
in societies ruled by strong cultural values that give the default financial responsibility
and leadership to the husbands and fathers. Expenditure decisions on health, education or
tobacco (and drinking) are all choices typically subject to the influence of the household
head (HoH) and that may have long-term effects on the other family members. As such,
shifting from the default male leadership, to a woman ruling the household by herself
can mean a significant difference in terms of living conditions and well-being. Moreover,
since for a large share of FHH the leader is a widow, they also have to overcome all the
emotional and financial issues inherent to losing the main income earner.
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Having to manage all these challenges creates an extraordinary burden for these household
leaders. Studies on food insecurity and health expenditure have shown that females are
more likely to show stronger signs of mental distress, compared to male HoH. [91], [92]
Having a societal structure that enables mental health issues among a minority is dangerous
and can perpetuate structural issues that go beyond financial issues.
In 2010, the AUB Socioeconomic Survey showed that FHH living in Palestine refugee
camps were more likely to report severe food insecurity. [93] About 19.2% of FHH
experienced severe food insecurity (against 13.8% of MHH) and although they only
represent 22.3% of the total population, 30% of households reporting severe food insecurity
were FHH. Facing these numbers, together with AUB, between 2010 and 2015, UNRWA
changed the policy for distributing the Social Safety Net support (SSN - social protection
support for the poorest families) by adding FHH as a relevant criterion to enter the list of
beneficiaries. [94] While before FHH were as likely as others to receive this support, now
they have better chances. This way UNRWA aimed at improving the fund’s effectiveness
in promoting equity and fair distribution.
This paper expands knowledge on FHHs in Palestine Refugee camps, starting with the
assessment of their budget expenditure patterns and unveiling the factors that make these
families different from the rest. In particular, with potential mental health implications
for the female HoH here explored. At the same time, this study also analyses potential
indicators on whether FHH managed to improve their living standards or changed their
preferences after becoming a specific target of UNRWA SSN support. Our findings show
that expenditure in healthcare as a percentage of total spending is 1.4 pp (p < 0.05) higher
for FHH in 2010 and 2.2 pp (p < 0.01) in 2015 compared to MHH. However, since women
earn less and FHH income is lower, this difference is not enough to achieve the absolute
value MHH spend in health. Most mental health indicators are worse for a female HoH and
female HoH positive feelings indicators show small improvements between 2010 and 2015.
Our study shows that financial support is crucial, but a more intersectoral approach should
be considered in order to protect these families from severe intergenerational psychological
damage.
The remaining of this study is organised as follows: section 3.2 presents the literature
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review on the social context of PRL and expenditures and mental health studies; section
3.3 explains the data with focus on topics of interes; 3.4 explains the theoretical approach
and econometric models used for this analysis; section 3.5 presents the results, followed by
the discussion in section 3.6 and the study limitations in section 3.7, concluding in section
3.8.
3.2 Literature Review
Household expenditure determinants have been a topic of interest for economists for
centuries. Several researchers have made important contributions to the understanding
of factors associated with consumer choice. [95], [96], [97] Engel suggested that a
higher propensity of households experiencing increasing income spend a bigger proportion
of the food budget on a diversified diet thus improving the nutritional status of the
household members. Engel’s original work showed the relevance of income and family
size in influencing household expenditure, and later studies confirm that larger families
typically have larger budget shares of necessities than smaller families at the same income
level. Becker (1965) theory of household production is often used to model household
expenditure analysis. [98] The theory extends to consider how households choose the best
combination of commodities to maximize utility, while subject to time, resources, and
technology constraints. Building on this work, the present study adopts these methods to
study differences in household expenditures between FHH and MHH.
Sociology and economics literature have established that historically women and men
have different preferences in terms of income expenditures. [99],[100],[101] Moreover,
cultural values also have an impact within the family structure and gender roles. [102],
[103] Cultures where the family member roles are well established, the HoH is responsible
for the household budget and for choosing what is best for every member and thus HoH
characteristics and preferences may have relevant consequences on the family well-being.
Kennedy and Petters (1992) use data from Kenya and Malawi to evaluate the effects of
gender of household head on income, food consumption, and nutrition. [104] Their results
suggest that income and gender of the HoH are important determinants of food security
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and pre-schooler nutritional status. Namely, when income is controlled by women, the
household’s caloric intake increases. In turn, Akadiri et al. (2017) show evidence that
female-headed households in Nigeria and Ethiopia are more likely to experience severe
food insecurity, which is very correlated with poverty. [105] This is a cross-sectional study
that applies different binary models and finds significant differences in the determinants
of food security between male and female HoH. According to this study, female HoH do
not manage to benefit as much from improvements in education as the male counterparts.
Similar evidence was also found by Mallick and Rafi (2009) in Bangladesh, where the
authors also highlight the important role of noneconomic institutions to improve households
food security, especially the female-headed ones. [106]
Being HoH is a position of responsibility and leadership that is generally not assumed by
choice, but rather by seniority or being the household member that ensures the household
income (or a combination of both). Boris et al. (2008) explore mental health and depression
among young HoH. [107] The authors find that the Epidemiologic Studies Depression
scale for young HoH in Rwanda exceeds the most conservative published cutoff score for
adolescents. In the same direction, Audet et al. (2018) conduct a survey across 14 rural
districts in central Mozambique in 2014 where 14% of the sample screened positive for
depression. [108] While this represents a personal health problem for the HoH, children
being raised by a depressed parent/adult tend to develop mental health problems themselves.
A 20 and 30-year follow-up study of biological offspring of depressed (high-risk) and non-
depressed (low-risk) parents finds that the risks for anxiety disorders, major depression,
and substance dependence were approximately three times as high in the offspring of
depressed parents as in the offspring of non-depressed parents. [109], [110] In the context
of PRL, these children are even more subject to develop depression related diseases due to
the economic and social conditions they are living in through their childhood. [111]
The countries covered in the literature above - Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Bangladesh, Rwanda and Mozambique - are all considered as traditionally patriarchal
societies, similar to PRL and Palestinians in general. This project contributes to this
universe of studies with a detailed description of household typologies present in PRL
refugee camps and a thorough study of household expenditure differences at different
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points in time. Following the evidence mentioned, we also address mental health issues
inherent to being a female HoH in this setting. According to the best of our knowledge,
having such effects studied in the context of refugees is novel, and likely to be relevant as
the number of displaced people in the world is increasing.
3.3 Project description
3.3.1 Data set
The data are from the AUB socioeconomic survey from 2010 and 2015.[93], [112] This
survey includes household and individual level information on Palestine Refugees from
Lebanon (PRL), in Lebanon since 1948, and Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS), that
came to Lebanon around 2012 after the Syria crisis. This study is a cross-section analysis
restricted to PRL families spanned across 12 refugee camps and areas outside the camps in
Lebanon with data on 2,627 randomly selected PRL households in 2010 and 2,974 in 2015.
Palestine refugees are distributed over five Lebanese regions, the Beqaa, North Lebanon
Area (NLA), Central Lebanon Area (CLA), Saida, and Tyre. Note that since both surveys
are 5 years apart and a policy change happened in between through the study we analyse
both years separately.
The HoH in this project is the person identified as such by the respondent. This said, the
leader is the person seen as the head of the family by the other members, usually the main
financial provider and decision-maker of the household. In Muslim societies men are
entitled to be responsible for women and children, which means that a female HoH is most
likely ruling the family on her own. Of all HoH only 23% in 2010 and 21% in 2015 were
women.
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3.3.2 Household typologies
In what concerns household composition, FHH are more diversified than MHH. While
MHH are mostly composed by the HoH, the respective wife and sons and daughters, in
FHH the share of husbands is almost zero. Female HoH mostly live with their sons and
daughters but also with brothers or sisters, nieces or nephews and their son or daughter
in law (Figure 3.1). There is also a higher prevalence of chronic disease among FHH for
having generally older members.
Figure 3.1: Household composition
(a) 2010
(b) 2015
Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households.
Almost all of men HoH are married in both survey years, while the women’s marital status
changed between both years. The share of single women HoH increased (6 pp) and of
being a widow or separated decreased (8 pp) between 2010 and 2015. The traditional
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family in this sample is larger than the typical FHH. On average, in a MHH there are 5 to 6
sons/daughters with an average age of 15 years old, against 4 to 5 in FHH with an average
of 28 years of age. This is interesting as in these families daughters/sons already reached
the adult age, but the role of HoH remains with the mother.
Other important differences between both types of HoH are the participation in the labour
market and education level. In FHH, the ratio working-to-not-working members is 0.42,
against 0.56 for MHH. In addition, almost half of female leaders did not attend education,
which is a very high percentage compared to that of men (Table 3.1) - even taking into
account the age difference. Household expenditure is lower in FHH, but the differences are
smaller in 2015 and the share of FHH with access to UNRWA social support is relatively
higher than that of MHH. This higher share of social support to FHH in 2015 can be a
result from the increase in the UNRWA efforts to support FHH in particular, following the
report from AUB socieconomic survey 2010.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for head of households (AUB Socioeconomic Survey)
2010 2015
Men Women Men Women
Age 49.55 63.02 49.46 61.14
(14.48) (13.14) (14.10) (13.95)
Marital Satus
- Single 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.16
- Widow 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.65
- Married 0.89 0.08 0.87 0.11
SAH 0.73 0.53 0.73 0.58
CLA 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.28
Log (HH exp) 6.77 6.33 6.96 6.60
(0.57) (0.73) (0.63) (0.68)
Social Safety Net 0.31 0.57 0.36 0.54
Education
- None 0.08 0.47 0.06 0.39
- Elementary 0.39 0.31 0.37 0.30
- Preparatory 0.29 0.14 0.32 0.20
- Secondary 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.06
- Vocational 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02
- University 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.04
- Post-graduate 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Standard errors for continuous variables in parentheses. Note: Except for
age and household expenditure, all variables are binary variables. Values of
dummy variables indicate the percentage relative to female or male HoH. All
values were computed using AUB Socioeconomic Survey survey weights.
To explore further this subject, we look into differences in average income between female
and male HoH. Note that since remittances from abroad, informal jobs and financial aid
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also provide income, even those who do not engage in work may have some income
level. Work is measured as a self-reported variable of whether the respondent has engaged
in some form of work during the last week. Table 3.2 shows average income of HoH
depending on employment status and gender.
Table 3.2: Income differences between male and female HoH, by year
2010 Employed Unemployed
Male HoH (I0) Female HoH (I1) Male HoH (I2) Female HoH (I3)
Monthly income (USD) 529.5 322.2 418.1 299.7
Gender gap (I0 - I1) 207.3
Unemployed gap (I2 - I3) 118.3
2015 Employed Unemployed
Male HoH (I0) Female HoH (I1) Male HoH (I2) Female HoH (I3)
Monthly income (USD) 628.7 423.8 464.2 398.9
Gender gap (I0 - I1) 204.9
Unemployed gap (I2 - I3) 65.3
An employed man HoH in 2010 earned on average 111.4 USD more per month than an
unemployed peer. At the same time, an employed woman HoH only earned 22.5 USD
more than as if she was not working. The figures show similar tendencies in 2015. From
unemployment to employment men manage to earn on average 164.5 USD more per month,
whereas women earn only 29.4 USD, with an around 50% of jobs being full time for both
genders. These simple calculations raise a strong argument that women not only earn less
on average, but also that their marginal gain with engaging in some kind of work is much
lower than that of men. The low participation and lower wages among women in the labour
market illustrate the large gap and inequalities in this sample. Since work opportunities
and marginal gain can be related to gender, age and other factors it would be interesting to
study the mechanisms behind these differences more in depth in future research.
3.3.3 Preferences and mental health
Taking into account the different household compositions that characterize FHH and MHH,
let us now look into average changes in expenditures and mental health indicators, which
will be the focus of the econometric analysis that follows.
Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of total household expenditure spent in different categories
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and divided by MHH and FHH. While FHH spend more of their household expenditure
on health, the average share spent with education is higher for MHH in both years. Since
FHH are generally older, these differences can reflect logistics associated to the household
demographic composition rather than preferences. Tobacco expenditure is higher in male
headed households for both years and in 2015 MHH are spending a lower share of total
expenditure on food.
In absolute values, the average total expenditure per month was approximately USD 1063
and USD 1302 for MHH in 2010 and 2015, while FFH lived with an average of USD 907
and USD 1129 in 2010 and 2015 (excluding single-member families).
Figure 3.2: Household expenditure by category as % of total
(a) 2010
(b) 2015
Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households.
The mental health indicators included in this study consist in a set of five binary variables
that correspond to feeling calm, happy, depressed, angry or upset. Each variable obtains
the value 1 if the respondent had that feeling at least some of the time, and 0 otherwise.
Looking into the averages in our sample, there are less female HoH reporting to be happy
and calm. The share of male HoH reporting to be happy went from 53% in 2010 to 46%
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in 2015 while in 2010 only 40% of female leaders were happy, which dropped to 36% in
2015. Women also report feeling more upset on average, but less angry in both years.
In 2010 the survey was conducted between July and August and in 2015 during April, all
warm months outside the Ramadan period, which should not make a significant influence
on the responses regarding mental health.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Demand for Healthcare - Theoretical Approach
To understand the HoH decision process, let us follow basic economic theory to
describe how individuals’ preferences determine their demand for healthcare (services and
products).
Consider the vector of goods X to be all goods other than health care and the vector H
to represent health care services and products consumed. All other goods and services
include tobacco, education, food, etc.
Households’ preferences (decided by the HoH) can be characterized as U(X,H). This
utility function is increasing and concave in goods and healthcare consumption. With
this framework, utility increases with consumption, but the marginal increase is lower as
consumption increases. Each household leader would like to maximize their household
utility, subject to how much of disposable income they have available. With the price of
healthcare given by ph and that of all other goods as px, the budget constraint of each
household, i, is just m = ph.h+ px.x, where m is the household income.
Following, the maximization problem is given by:
Max U(X,H) s.t. m ≤ ph.h+ px.x (3.1)
In this specification, patients chose the affordable bundle of healthcare and all other goods
that maximizes their utility. The affordable set is such that the total expenditure cannot
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exceed the available income, m ≤ ph.h+ px.x. The equilibrium condition, given by the
first order conditions, is the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of
health care and all other goods and services. Assuming households do not save any income
at any period of time, their well-being is maximized when their income is completely spent
on both types of goods.
FHH Preferences
Previous literature has evidenced that the role of HoH managing the family budget is
extremely relevant. [113],[114],[115] Characteristics such as services availability or illness
severity can have a negative or a positive impact on health care spending. When it comes
to gender, specially in a typically patriarchal society, when a woman becomes the leader of
the household the decision maker’s preferences change and so does the optimal bundle that
maximizes their household utility. Following the evidence from previous studies and the
data analysis in section 3.3, this translates in an increased preference for spending more
on healthcare in exchange for a larger sacrifice of other goods. The FHH’s utility will
thus have a marginal rate of substitution different from that of the other households. The
balance between this and the income effect explained in the next paragraph will inform the
household’s optimal bundle.2
FHH Income Effect
For both survey years under analysis, FHH had lower disposable income and expenditure
levels than that of MHH. While we cannot precisely understand why this happens, it can
be associated with the presence of stigma against women in the market, female HoH
being less physically strong for some types of job or having less time to dedicate to their
profession.
In our sample, most of the employed participants have elementary occupations like street
vendors, building caretakers or garbage collectors. Among HoH, 36.14% of males and
2See Appendix, sectio A3.1 for a detailed description.
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43.75% have this type of occupation. The second most common job for male HoH is crafts
and trade worker, while for female is service workers. In terms of hours worked per week,
men HoH worked on average around 8h more than women. These differences in terms
of occupation can contribute to the wage gap, along with stigma. In fact, they can be
extremely correlated. If women are not able to access the most highly paid jobs due to
stigma, they will have to work in professions earning less. At the same time probably they
cannot work as many hours as men because responsibility at home is not shared equally
between male and female members, which is also associated with gender inequalities. For
a matter of simplicity, throughout this study we will use the word stigma, bearing in mind
that it can incorporate many other factors that are directly or indirectly related to it.
Literature on the impact of stigma, for example HIV-related studies, include stigma as
a determinant of income in the sense that it reduces the HoH opportunities of finding a
job. [116] As income decreases, the less choices they have available to consume. This can
mean a decrease in the healthy choices available, both in terms of food and in terms of
health care services. Holding all else constant, a lower income implies a decrease in the
budget set, and consequently leads the household to consume less of goods and services,
including healthcare. Consider a new budget constraint as:
Max U(X,H) s.t. m = ph.h+ px.x− s.m (3.2)
Where s is the stigma variable (s ∈ [0, 1]), that represents the fraction of income that
is negatively affected by stigma if the HoH is female. 3 Thus, compared to the other
households, FHH suffer a negative shock on income, that leads to less freedom of choice
and worse general well-being.
The remaining of the study estimates statistically significant differences between MHH and
FHH in terms of budget management and mental health indicators, using this theoretical
background as an important guide through the HoH decision process.
Our hypothesis is that women HoH prefer to spend a larger share of their household budget
on healthcare, however that does not translate into better end health outcomes, as other
3Note that if m resulted from work this would be a gender gap, but is not restricted to wages here.
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elements change at the same time (with an eventual negative impact on health). FHH have
lower income available, live in worse conditions and with tougher mental health challenges
than the other households. Understanding this mechanism will help explaining what it
means to belong to a FHH and inform public policy.
3.4.2 Econometric models
Engel curves
To identify patterns and determinants of household expenditure between MHH and FHH
we estimate Engel curves for each household expenditure category using Locally Weighted
Regressions. [117] This non-parametric method is based on fitting a linear model to
observations in a neighbourhood of a point to estimate the relationship between the
share of household expenditure on a particular good and the logarithm of total income or
expenditure. The result is a set of graphical analysis that sheds light on different trends of
expenditures in health, tobacco, education and food.
Two-part model
There is a vast literature on models for identifying the expenditure determinants. Since
our dependent variables are continuous, a simple linear model could be a good first-guess.
However, proportions of total expenditure are generally extremely skewed, for which the
OLS estimator may not be the most efficient. [118]
In our study sample, around 26% of the individuals belong to households with no healthcare
expenditure, 37% with no tobacco expenditure and more than 50% with no education
expenditure. Regarding food, education, health and other public services, UNRWA
provides part of these services free-of-charge, which explains the distributions. In these
cases, literature considers that two-part models as the best fit for these data. [119] A two-
part model is designed to estimate variables that have a significant number of observations
in the lower bound (zero). Using these models, in the first part, we estimate the variables
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related to any healthcare expenditure (logit binary model) and in the second part, the model
measures factors associated with the quantity of expenditure conditional on the existence
of some expenditure (glm). Following Belotti et al. (2014), the general form of a two-part
model can be written as follows:
E[y|x] = Pr(y > 0)× E[y|y > 0, x] (3.3)
where y is the dependent variable of interest and x is a set of covariates, as aforementioned.
[118] The first part of the model is estimated a model for the probability of a positive such
as:
Φ(y > 0) = Pr(y > 0|x) = F (xδ) (3.4)
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, δ is the corresponding vector of parameters
and F is the cumulative distribution function of an i.i.d. error term, typically chosen to
be from the standard normal (probit) or logistic (logit) distributions. For the positive
expenditure value, the model can be represented as:
Φ(y|y > 0, x) = g(xγ) (3.5)
where γ is the vector of parameters of x to be estimated, and g is an appropriate density
function for y|y > 0. We use the same covariates x for both parts of the model, assuming all
of them may affect both parts to some extent. Nonetheless, there are conceptual differences
that could justify using a different set of variables in each part. In this case, one can expect
that variables like age, household size and having children would be more related to the
binary choice part (to spend or not). The youngest and the eldest in the sample are more
likely to be sick and to need care, thus having a family member in these groups means
having to use health services almost certainly. At the same time, age does not carry a lot of
information on how much care each member needs. Health status related variables, like
having a chronic condition, would thus be a better candidate to predict the continuos part
(how much to spend). While we use the same variables in both parts, we will take these
differences into account when discussing the results.
Our estimation uses a logit function for the first part and for the positive part a generalized
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linear model (GLM) with logarithm function and Gamma distribution, which essentially
corresponds to a linear regression via maximum likelihood, commonly used for positive,
continuous variables with positive variance. [120]
Propensity score matching
Comparing MHH and FHH is challenging not only for their intrinsic differences, but also
because FHH are a minority in the community. This said, we develop a Propensity Score
Matching model (PSM) to find similar groups between FHH and MHH within the sample
and improve the statistical validity of this comparison. Both groups are comparable in
terms of age average, per capita expenditure (in logarithm), area of residence, household
size, chronic and acute illness indicators, having direct family abroad and living in a
refugee camp.
This model constructs a statistical comparison group based on a propensity score that
indicates the probability of being in the treatment or the control group, using observed
characteristics. In this case, for the purpose of adapting our study to the model, we
consider being a member of a FHH as a natural “treatment” and thus consider MHH as
the “comparison group”. What we aim at measuring is the average effect of belonging to a
FHH, by computing the mean difference in previously selected outcome variables. Using
this method, we assume that there are no unobserved factors affecting participation - i.e.,
being a member of a FHH cannot change due to unobserved factors - and that we are able
to find an overlap in the probability of belonging to a FHH across the FHH and MHH in
the sample. [121]
To apply the PSM model we start by defining the optimal bandwith and deriving the
matching weights with kernel matching. Since we need to include survey weights we then
combine matching with survey weights to achieve the final weights. After confirming that
the after matching samples are balanced among the covariates chosen, we compute the
mean differences between FHH and MHH using a two-part regression model.
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Probit
The final estimation exercise consists in a Probit model to estimate the determinants of
mental health indicators: feeling, happy, calm, angry, upset and depressed explained in
section 3.3. For this purpose, we perform a non-linear Probit model, which follows the
expression in equation (3) of the Two-part model.
Results for the Probit model will be presented as marginal effects, which give us the impact
(in pp) of a one unit change in the explanatory variables on the probability of the dependent




Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the Engel curves for FHH and MHH for both survey years,
2010 and 2015. There is a clear difference between the FHH and MHH curves for health
and tobacco expenditure. At the same levels of expenditure, FHH spend consistently a
larger share of their budget on health and smaller on tobacco when compared to MHH.
The differences are higher for poorer households as curves seem to converge with higher
expenditure levels.
Looking at differences over-time, from 2010 to 2015, FHH with the highest level of
expenditure increased the share spent on health and decreased the share spent on education.
For FHH that reported lower expenditure levels, the share spent on tobacco in increased
considerably from one year to the other. From 2010 to 2015 besides the difference between
FHH and MHH being reduced, both groups decreased their expenditure in healthcare (both
curves are at a lower level).
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Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households.
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Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households.
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3.5.2 PSM model
The PSM two-part model results in tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the intensive, extensive and
overall marginal effects for health, tobacco, education and food expenditure as a percentage
of total household expenditure (see complete table in Appendix, section A3.2).4 The overall
margin is a combination between the marginal effects from both the probit and glm model,
the intensive and extensive margin, respectively. The intensive margin represents the
impact on the probability of spending any share of total expenditure, while the intensive
margin shows the impact on the share of total expenditure spent in each category. Following
the estimation, being in a FHH is related to higher relative levels of healthcare expenditure
compared to MHH.
The covariates used in the PSM model include age average at household level, household
per capita expenditure (in logarithm), area of residence fixed effects, along with a series of
binary variables indicating: a household with more than 4 members in 2010 and 3 members
in 2015 (the average household sizes for FHH in each year), at least one household member
with a chronic disease, an acute disease, children, being below the low poverty line, having
direct family living abroad and living in a refugee camp.
The resulting groups, one with female (“treatment”) and another with male leadership
(“comparison group”), are comparable - i.e., are similar in average values, in terms of
the above mentioned characteristics. The results that follow show the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE) of living in a FHH in the share of total household expenditure spent in each
category - health, education, tobacco and food.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show before and after matching values for the age average by household
for 2010 and 2015. After matching values are achieved using the weights found with the
PSM model. To estimate the mean differences in outcomes after matching we perform a
two-part model, similar to the one in the previous section.
4Note that these do not add up to 100% because of other categories, like communication, clothes,
entertainment that are not studied in this project, due to lack of consistent data.
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Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households. Results for household expenditure in Appendix, Figure 4.6 and 4.7
Table 3.3 shows the coefficients and marginal effects for both parts of the two-part model
and the overall treatment effect using PSM weights for health and tobacco expenditures.
FHH spend on average 1.4 percentage points more of total household expenditure on health
than MHH in 2010 (p<0.05) and this impact increases to 2.2 pp in 2015 (p<0.01). The
PSM results indicate that the difference between FHH and MHH is significant only in
terms of the share of total expenditure spent, an important difference from the results found
with the previous model. This means, both FHH and MHH dedicate part of their household
expenditure to health care, but FHH spent a larger share of their expenditures.
In 2010, FHH spent 1.6 pp less of their household expenditure on tobacco than MHH and
0.6 pp less in 2015. Moreover, being in a FHH decreases the probability of spending any
part of household expenditure in tobacco by 17.3 pp in 2010 and by 12 pp in 2015.
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Table 3.3: PSM ATE results - Health and Tobacco expenditure
2010
Health expenditure Tobacco expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated 0.090 0 .158** -0.498*** -0.114
(coef.) (0.101) (0.076) (0.087) (0.112)
Treatment effect 0.023 0.020** 0.014** -0.173*** -0.023*** -0.016***
(margins) (0.025) (0.010) (0.006) (0.030) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 9933 10257
Pseudo R-squared 0.148 0.108
Log-likelihood 7.986 7.167
2015
Health expenditure Tobacco expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated 0.038 0.290*** -0.320*** -0.109
(coef.) (0.117) (0.068) (0.092) (0.079)
Treatment effect 0.009 0.031*** 0.022*** -0.120*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(margins) (0.026) (0.009) (0.006) (0.035) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 10375 11192
Pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.0459
Log-likelihood 9.373 9.724
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. All specifications include controls for household age
average, per capita expenditure by household (in log), having at least one chronic/acute disease, having 1 child, more than
4 (3 for 2015) people living in the household, having direct family working abroad, living in a camp, having insurance
and region.
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Table 3.4 holds the results for education and food household expenditures. While most
coefficients on education expenditure are not statistically significant at 5%, belonging to
a FHH in 2015 is associated with an increase in the probability of spending any share of
total expenditure on education by about 1.4 pp, statistically significant at the 10% level. As
for food expenditure, belonging to a FHH does not have a statistically significant impact
on the share of household expenditure spent with food compared to MHH.
Table 3.4: PSM ATE results - Education and Food expenditure
2010
Education expenditure Food expenditure
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated -0.178* -0.049 -0.180 -0.002
(coef.) (0.097) (0.119) (0.238) (0.032)
Treatment effect -0.047* -0.010** -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(margins) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 10588 10578
Pseudo R-squared 0.196 0.274
Log-likelihood -0.824 4.072
2015
Education expenditure Food expenditure
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated -0.078 -0.054 -0.232 0.048
(coef.) (0.119) (0.173) (0.326) (0.033)
Treatment effect -0.020 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.012 0.012
(margins) (0.030) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 11132 8930
Pseudo R-squared 0.228 0.377
Log-likelihood -0.362 5.911
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. All specifications include controls for
household age average, per capita expenditure by household (in log), having at least one chronic/acute
disease, having 1 child, more than 4 (3 for 2015) people living in the household, having direct family
working abroad, living in a camp, having insurance and region.
Between 2010 and 2015, the overall impact of FHH spending a larger share of expenditure
in health increases in 8 pp. On the other hand, the difference between both household
groups in terms of tobacco expenditure reduced from one year to the other. As for education
and food, we could not find strong differences between household types nor changes in
coefficients between survey years.
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Tables C9 and C10 in Appendix show similar results using a GLM model without using
the PSM weights.
Effects on health expenditure
The distinction between extensive and intensive margin using PSM shows that both MHH
and FHH spend part of their budget on healthcare services and thus, the difference between
both groups is not so much a matter of ‘if’, but rather of ‘how much’ to spend on healthcare.
To further investigate these differences, we used some descriptive statistics and basic
calculations. Let us assume a random distribution of illness across the population and
that each household will spend a given amount, h, of their budget to pay for treatment.
Consider m to be the MHH income and that the share of MHH budget spent on healthcare
expenditure is given by h/m. From Table 3.1, in 2015 FHH earnings were 67.4% of that
of MHH. FHH income can thus be defined as αm, where α = 0.674 and, from Figure
3.2, we have that h/m = 0.08. In this framework, the difference between both household




















× 0.08⇒ ∆ = 0.039 (3.6)
Without controlling for anything else, if MHH and FHH spent a fixed amount of money
on healthcare, FHH would have to spend around 4% more (of their budget) than MHH
to match that value. From Figure 3.2, ∆ is in fact 0.047 (0.127 − 0.8 = 0.047), which
is 0.7% more than if the difference in spending were proportional to income. However,
the PSM estimates show that in 2015 FHH were associated with a share of health care
spending just 2.2 pp above the other families (Table 3.3).
Comparing the estimation value with the mechanical difference one could think that either
FHH prefer to spend less than MHH on healthcare or, because their income is lower, the
trade-off between different household spending categories leads FHH to spend less than
proportionally on healthcare - high income elasticity.
To achieve a parametric version of what is potentially being captured by the PSM, we
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can estimate the share of income spent on health care as a function of all income related




= θ is the share of total income spent on healthcare. We then estimate θ as a function
of a trans-log approximation to m. To test income elasticity directly, we also interact the
FHH binary indicator with each income-related variable. For a matter of simplification,
the cross quadratic terms were set to zero.
As the income elasticity is not constant in this setting, and controlling for all income effects,
having a less elastic demand and a larger budget share spent on health care corresponds
to a stronger preference for spending more on healthcare. Results in Table 3.5 show that
FHH are associated with a share of healthcare expenditure about 3.2 pp larger that the
counterparts. At the same time, FHH elasticity coefficients of interaction with age and
household size are negative and statistically significant at 5% level.
From the above results, FHH spend less (than MHH) in health care due to income
reductions associated with being FHH, even if they have a stronger preference for health.
We thus find, in this setting, that the stigma effect mentioned in section 3.4 would surpass
that of FHH preferences.
3.5.3 Mental Health
Focusing on the role of female HoH, we conduct a set of five probit models to study each
mental health outcome. The results are presented on Table 3.6.
In general, being a woman or a HoH are associated with positive impacts on the mental
health indicators selected. At the same time, being a woman and HoH is associated with a
lower probability of feeling happy and calm and a higher probability of feeling upset and
depressed. These women were 12.2 pp and 7.7 pp less likely to feel happy in 2010 and
2015 (p<0.05). Receiving SSN support, which half of FHH do (54%), is also associated
with a negative impact on most mental health outcomes. Since SSN families are the most
fragile ones (according to UNRWA’s criteria), these poorer mental health outcomes may
result from living in very bad conditions, making being SSN beneficiaries highly related to
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Table 3.5: Linear regression on the share of health care expenditure - using translog
HC expenditure as % of total budget (1) (2) (3)
FHH 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln monthly income -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln monthly income × Ln age -0.006 -0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln monthly income × Ln hhsize -0.021* -0.025* -0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Ln monthly income × Ln educ level -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Year × Ln monthly income 0.009 0.008 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Ln monthly income × FHH -0.007 -0.016
(0.009) (0.012)
Ln monthly income × Ln age x FHH -0.043**
(0.017)
Ln monthly income × Ln hhsize x FHH -0.046*
(0.027)
Ln monthly income × Ln educ level x FHH -0.006
(0.015)
Year x Ln monthly income × FHH 0.017
(0.031)
Constant 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 16,819 16,819 16,819
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.070
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. The complete table is presented in Appendix
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poor mental health outcomes in general.
Between both survey years, while positive feelings such as happiness and feeling calm
improved, in 2015 female HoH were 10.5 pp more likely to feel upset (p<0.01) and 8.9 pp
more likely to feel depressed (p<0.05).
An additional specification is added to control specifically for female HoH who are also
widows. Assuming that the female HoH in this situation would not be leading the family
in case the husband would still be alive, results presented in table 3.7 show some evidence
that this group can be driving the negative impact on the mental health for female HoH.
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Table 3.6: Probit results - Mental health (marginal effect)
2010
Happy Calm Angry Upset Depressed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman 0.072*** 0.049** -0.005 -0.022 -0.036*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
HoH 0.113*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.051** -0.053**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Female HoH -0.122*** -0.073** 0.001 0.022 0.032
(0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) (0.037)
Chronic -0.097*** -0.096*** 0.066*** 0.095*** 0.061***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Acute -0.062*** -0.074*** 0.068*** 0.082*** 0.033*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
SSN -0.111*** -0.169*** 0.025 0.044 0.091***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027)
Obs. 7,748 7,748 7,748 7,748 7,748
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0506 0.0478 0.0307 0.0275 0.0304
2015
Happy Calm Angry Upset Depressed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman 0.076*** 0.046** 0.014 -0.083*** -0.075***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
HoH 0.089*** 0.058*** 0.034 -0.080*** -0.058**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Female HoH -0.077** 0.041 -0.030 0.105*** 0.089**
(0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.037) (0.040)
Chronic -0.071*** -0.089*** 0.048*** 0.067*** 0.072***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Acute -0.069*** -0.091*** -0.007 0.037* 0.004
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
SSN -0.112*** -0.101*** 0.077*** 0.126*** 0.093***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Obs. 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0351 0.0367 0.0223 0.0384 0.0308
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. All specifications include controls
for age household size, being married, per capita expenditure (in log), a direct member living abroad,
living in a camp, working and region fixed effect.
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Table 3.7: Probit results - Mental health (marginal effect), trauma specification
2010
Happy Calm Angry Upset Depressed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman 0.068*** 0.049** -0.006 -0.019 -0.034*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
HoH 0.112*** 0.086*** 0.005 -0.050** -0.052**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Female HoH -0.108** -0.118** 0.037 -0.035 0.006
(0.052) (0.052) (0.046) (0.052) (0.052)
Widow 0.146*** -0.020 0.048 -0.096* -0.091*
(0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.056) (0.054)
Female HoH x widow -0.130* 0.083 -0.088 0.156** 0.108
(0.071) (0.071) (0.065) (0.073) (0.071)
Obs. 7,748 7,748 7,748 7,748 7,748
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0515 0.0480 0.0310 0.0281 0.0308
2015
Happy Calm Angry Upset Depressed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman 0.072*** 0.041** 0.011 -0.082*** -0.076***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
HoH 0.088*** 0.057** 0.032 -0.081*** -0.058**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Female HoH -0.031 0.089* -0.042 0.048 0.080
(0.049) (0.051) (0.044) (0.047) (0.050)
Widow 0.116** 0.139*** 0.071 -0.022 0.011
(0.052) (0.053) (0.050) (0.054) (0.053)
Female HoH x widow -0.153** -0.171** -0.025 0.112 0.007
(0.073) (0.074) (0.066) (0.072) (0.071)
Obs. 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0359 0.0379 0.0228 0.0389 0.0308
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. All specifications include controls for age
household size, being married, per capita expenditure (in log), a direct member living abroad, living in a camp,
receiving SSN support, having chronic/acute disease, working and region.
3.6. Discussion 95
3.6 Discussion
Following previous studies, the results discussed in section 3.5 focus the importance of
HoH in expenditures management and the implications in terms of mental health that being
in charge of the household decisions may have for women. [122], [123])
Our analysis finds that living in a household with female leadership is related to higher
expenditures on health (% total expenditure) - which is widely supported in the literature
- and lower expenditures on tobacco. [124],[125], [126] This last analysis of healthcare
spending shows that despite FHH having preference for spending more on health care,
these families end up spending less than MHH in absolute terms, even if it represents a
higher percentage of their available budget. This happens due to a penalty on disposable
income associated with being in a FHH and having a less income elasticity.
Glick et al. (2018) conduct a representative survey among Palestinians and argue that risky
behaviours such as smoking and drinking are more likely among young men than others.
[127] This indicates that male HoH have to spend a larger share of total expenditures
on tobacco to sustain their lifestyle, as also suggested by our results. As for education
and food expenditure, which are directly related to taking care of children and cooking
activities, mothers being involved in these spending decisions also in MHH could be what
is driving MHH and FHH to have similar expenditures patterns.
Mental health issues are a very serious problem in contexts of conflict and migration all
over the world. [128], [129] For PRL, the emotional burden of living in a country that even
after 70 years continues to impose severe restrictions for this community can have severe
damages on people’s well-being. In addition, literature on the impacts of sickness and
wars have shown that factors as such have strong impacts on decision making processes.
[130], [131], [132]) In our study, most women HoH are providing for a family after a loss
which can be affecting their mental health, rather then the HoH role itself.
Whether due to a traumatic event or not, when a woman becomes HoH her weight in
the decision-making process of household expenditures increases and, depending on her
preferences, there can be significant differences for the household members. While we find
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evidence that FHH are more likely to have a healthier lifestyle than MHH - that should
translate into better health - , we also find that they spend a larger share of expenditure
on health. These contradictory results indicate that FHH may need more care then MHH,
most likely due to having worse living conditions, less resources, less hygiene and worse
isolation. This hypothesis is also related to the impact of stigma measured in terms of
average income. It is also possible that female leaders invest in more expensive treatments,
but less likely given their lack of financial resources and stability.
Looking at time trends, between 2010 and 2015 FHH increase further the share of
expenditure spent on health relative to MHH and there are small improvements on the
education expenditure. Positive feelings also improve for FHH from 2010 to 2015. While
these trends cannot provide robust evidence that FHH improved their living standards
between both survey years, they can be related to the increase in financial support provided
by UNRWA to these families after 2010.
We suggest the need to go beyond financial incentives to FHH and create an inter-sectoral
support system that helps the HoH to sustain their families in a more structured way. These
policies may consist in providing personalised psychological support and contributing to
break stereotypes in the labour market, such as promoting entrepreneurship opportunities
that allow women to achieve a stable career and normalize their lives, as much as possible.
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3.7 Limitations
The biggest limitation of this study resides in the fact that MHH and FHH are so distinct
that comparing both groups is a rather complex task and makes it impossible to argue for
causality between belonging to a FHH (or being a female HoH) and the results found.
Nonetheless, we overcome this limitation as much as possible by using different models
and the PSM, that provided consistent evidence with different specifications. In addition,
UNRWA provides financial support for health, education and security that may provide
services differently for different types of households. In principle, controlling for SSN
families should identify the households receiving more support, but we cannot exclude the
hypothesis that we might not be grasping other type of financial supports for which we do
not have information (seasonal supports, specific aid programs, among others).
Regarding the mental health section, given that the indicators are based on self reported
measures, these depend on how willing are the respondents to answer truthfully. If women
tend to complain less about their conditions, they might tend to under-evaluate their status
even if they feel miserable. This would give a misleading evidence on the impact of being
a woman HoH. Nonetheless, in terms of mental health, these measures are one of the few
resources available for researchers to study and literature has shown their ability to predict
depression related conditions. [133]
3.8 Conclusion
This article provides an in-depth analysis and uses different methods to understand core
differences between female and male headed households living in Palestine refugee camps
in Lebanon.
Following the literature, this study uses two-part models using probit and GLM and
combines these methods with a Propensity Score Matching model to create artificial
treatment and comparison groups. [134] Using these models we find statistically significant
differences between household budget management in FHH and MHH. FHH consistently
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spend more on healthcare, despite showing evidence of having healthier habits. The
differences found are stronger in FHH where the HoH is single or widowed.
Regarding mental health indicators, the Probit model results show female HoH are typically
less happy, calmer and more depressed then male HoH. Different specifications also
show that these negative effects are mostly driven by female HoH who are also widows.
Moreover, we find evidence of a strong stigma effect that negatively affects the female
HoH’s ability to earn income, provide for her families and their general well-being.
We consider it is of utmost importance to continue providing financial support for these
families along with psychological support to overcome trauma and severe challenges that
are common to the HoH of these families in particular.
Chapter 4
Can intersectoral interventions reduce
substance use in adolescence?
- Evidence from a randomized controlled multicentre
study1
Abstract
We measure the impact of an inter-sectoral intervention entitled “Caiu na rede”, designed to tackle
substance use among adolescents in Brazil. The intervention consisted in a multicentre Randomized
Controlled Trial study implemented between 2017 and 2019 with students from Brazil, Paraguay,
and Argentina. The complete sample was composed by 880 adolescents aged between 14 to 17
years old, enrolled across 23 different institutions that provide extra-curricular activities for young
adults after school.
The intervention consisted in joining 5 professionals from each institution to work together with
a group of randomly selected students (440 in 2017) to develop a set of activities related to
health education, rapid health diagnosis, prevention, and risk behaviours and the attainment of
the sustainable development goals. The activities that resulted from this joint exercise were then
delivered as part of the institution’s agenda to adolescents both in the treatment and control groups.
We use difference-in-differences models measure the impact of the intervention in alcohol, tobacco,
and cannabis consumption. We also measure the impact of participating in the activities developed
1with Rafael Correa and Judite Gonçalves
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during the intervention after involving some of the subjects themselves in the activities design
process.
An adolescent in the treatment group is 8 pp less likely to consume tobacco and cannabis (p<0.01)
and 13pp less likely to consume alcohol at least one day in the last month (p<0.01). While the
intervention did not have a strong impact on frequent consumption, participating in the activities
(complete sample) was associated with lower probability of frequent consumption. Adolescents
showed a higher consumption of alcohol in the last 30 days compared to other substances. The
frequency of alcohol and cannabis use increases with age and one additional day in the group
average consumption leads to a 3 pp increase in the individual alcohol and tobacco consumption
(peer effect) (p<0.01).
This study shows the relevant and successful impact of an intersectoral intervention to tackle
substance use among adolescents. It sheds light on the relevance of getting subjects involved in the
design of activities for themselves in a very intercultural region. We believe this type of activities
can be a key instrument in decreasing substance use in a very crucial stage of life.
4.1 Introduction
Adolescence is the stage of life when individuals are more likely to engage in risky
behaviours and substance use tends to increase.[135] Tobacco, alcohol, and cannabis
consumption among teenagers can have devastating health consequences and jeopardize
users’ professional and personal prospects.[136],[137] Implementation of policies aiming
to discourage initiation and decrease substance use should focus on this specific age group,
where intervention is likely to be more effective. [138], [139] Moreover, tackling substance
use at this critical developmental stage is key for empowering and providing youths with
opportunities to grow healthy and successful in both professional and personal aspects of
life. This study assesses the effectiveness of an intervention tackling alcohol, tobacco, and
cannabis consumption among teenagers in a tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and
Paraguay, a critical environment for substance use.
Engagement in consumption of tobacco, alcohol, and cannabis is associated with a series
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of psychological and social factors. Being subject to domestic violence or abusive
relationships is commonly associated with risky behaviours. Migration can also be a
catalyst for (abusive) consumption, partly due to lack of parental control. [140],[141] Peer
influence and the social environment are key determinants of substance use and engagement
in delinquency, behaviours that in turn contribute to increased levels of crime, violence,
and danger. [142] All of these interconnected factors, occurring at such an early stage of
life, can jeopardize a person’s future, in addition to perpetuating inequalities and impacting
on the lives of those around. Governments and social actors must adopt a holistic approach
to address the triggers of substance use and provide adequate assistance to teenagers —,
inserted in their communities— to prevent initiation and reduce consumption.
Following the World Health Organization (WHO) definition, inter-sectoral actions refer
to ‘actions affecting health outcomes undertaken by sectors outside the health sector,
possibly, but not necessarily, in collaboration with the health sector’. This type of action is
a main tool for governments to integrate different services, from coordination structures
to funding mechanisms, and develop strategies that aim to improve health outcomes
in the population. [143] This implies joint planning by all different agents involved in
an intervention, which may include for example governmental and non-governmental
organizations, teachers, social workers, and investors. Recently, some inter-sectoral actions
have been developed jointly with the subjects of the intervention themselves, as a way to
enhance engagement and achieve better results. [144] For instance, including adolescents
in the design and co-development of an intervention for them not only allows for a better
and more comprehensive understanding of their needs, but also empowers them to promote
their own health and well-being.
The United Nations (UN) agenda for sustainable development goals contemplates the
legal and political articulation of health systems focusing on the needs of adolescents.
[145], [146], [147] Governments should adopt more comprehensive public health strategies,
going beyond the traditional approach. Examples of more comprehensive strategies include
establishing platforms and multicomponent actions involving adolescents, parents, schools,
and communities to address substance use and other health-related issues. [138] Such
approach requires long-term planning, intervention, monitoring, and evaluation. Moreover,
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targeting vulnerable groups living in complex environments should be a priority, in order
to create sustainable investments in adolescent health at local, national, and global levels.
[148], [149], [145] In order to move forward and building on existing evidence, we need
to implement different types of interventions to learn what kind of activities work, at
what ages, and how they help adolescents —e.g., by keeping them out of dangerous
environments for longer? By providing them with coping mechanisms to prevent initiation
of substance use in the first place? Or by helping them not to transition from light to heavy
consumption?
The present study analyses an intervention that took place in neighbouring Iguazu River
Mouth in Brazil, Puerto Iguazu in Argentina, and Caaguazu in Paraguay. Due to its
geographical characteristics and weak local governance, this region constitutes a “perfect
storm” of critical factors for criminal activity and socioeconomic disadvantage. [150] The
Human Development Index (HDI) in this region is between 0.52 and 0.82 (low and medium
Human Development), and the Gini Index between 0.47 and 0.55. 2 The proportion of
people with low incomes is between 21% and 25.5%. [151] In this complex environment,
the risk factors for early substance use are abundant. We measure the effectiveness of a
randomized controlled inter-sectoral intervention tackling alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis
consumption among teenagers in this region. The intervention involved students from
different social organizations in the design and co-development of a set of activities to
raise awareness on substance use and keep them and their peers occupied after classes.
Teenagers in the treatment group did this exercise together with teachers and social workers
from their institutions, and later participated in the activities. Teenagers in the control
group, who belong to the same organizations, participated in the activities but did not take
part in their design and co-development. In addition to evaluating the effectiveness of
the intervention, we identify the main socio-demographic characteristics associated with
substance use.
Results show that the intervention (i.e., development of the activities on top of participation
in the activities) reduced the probability of any alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis consumption
2The whole Brazil has a Gini Index value of 53.30 and ranks 8th place in the world,
according to the World Bank - GINI index (World Bank estimate), Country ranking, in:
https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings
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(first time or not), but not the probability of frequent consumption among users —i.e.,
all decreased but participating in the brainstorming for developing the activities was not
critical for the intensive margin.
Participating in the activities, on the other hand was associated with lower probability of
frequent consumption. There is room to investigate further how the involvement of the
participants in the activities design reduced frequency of use for all students, both in the
treatment and in the control group.
This study is organized as follows: section 4.2 presents the background and study design,
section 4.3 presents the data and methods, and section 4.4 contains the main results. Section
4.5 discusses the results and concludes.
4.2 Background and Study Design
4.2.1 Literature Review
Both WHO and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA) have advocated for the importance of integrating education, health, social
security, and housing dimensions in substance use prevention strategies, due to proven
efficacy in the past. [152], [153] Yet, existing literature shows that fragmented approaches
are common, rather than transversal and coordinated strategies to tackle the problem of
substance use at an early stage of life. Intersectoral interventions have also proven effective
in other fields, such as mental health. [154], [155]
Marsiglia et al., (2019) identified the importance of involving adolescents, their context
and relationships, to reach higher levels of effectiveness in preventing substance use among
adolescents.[156] Van Ryzin and Roseth (2018) identified the importance of peer support
and cooperative learning, and Spoth et al. (2017) and Strøm et al. (2014) the importance
of delivering a universal prevention intervention. [157],[158], [159]
Griffin and Botvin (2010) provide an extensive literature review of 46 studies on
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interventions tackling substance use among teenagers. [139] Interventions developed
in schools have shown positive results. School-based interventions including anti-drug
information, refusal skills, self-management skills, and social skills training are also
known to be effective in reducing combined substance use. The EU-Dap study (European
Drug Abuse Prevention trial) is an example of a successful school-based program to
prevent tobacco, alcohol, and drug use in seven countries. With a 12-hour class-based
comprehensive curriculum on social influence, this intervention reduced consumption,
prevented baseline non-smokers or sporadic smokers from moving onto daily smoking, but
was not effective in making daily smokers reduce or stop smoking. [160]
Interventions involving preventive measures targeted at the individual, their family and/or
community, guided by relevant psychosocial theories, are considered to be the most
effective to tackle substance use. [139] Griffin and Botvin (2010) review several school-
and family-based prevention programs, along with model community-based prevention
approaches. Despite the undeniable effectiveness of these interventions, several challenges
were identified in their implementation, including how to reach the most vulnerable families
and insufficient resources. Lastly, a qualitative study by Sanders (2000) analyses a family
support intervention to prevent risk factors associated with drug abuse in youths, called
Triple P-Positive Parenting Program. [161] This program included media interventions
with wide reach and intensive behavioural family interventions with narrow reach for
high-risk families. The author finds evidence that parenting interventions can have a
pervasive impact on the quality of life of families.
Brazil has high prevalence of alcohol, tobacco, and illicit substance consumption among
adolescents, which makes it a priority country for substance use prevention. [162] In their
national survey, Madruga et al. (2012) report that more than half of adolescents in the
sample were regular alcohol users, the mean age of cigarette smoking onset was 14.7 years,
and 3% of participants had used at least one illicit drug.
The existing literature presents us with several examples of successful interventions that
were developed with and for teenagers, aiming to reduce levels of substance consumption.
Our study contributes to the discussion in two main ways. First, we provide evidence on
the specific mechanisms behind the negative relationship between extracurricular activities
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and alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis use —is it increased awareness from the involvement in
the co-design of activities, or avoiding risky environments by participating in the activities?
Second, as the intervention took place in the tri-border area of Iguazu River Mouth, we
can explore the interaction between the intervention and participants’ socio-demographic
characteristics, specifically immigrant status from Paraguay or Argentina.
4.2.2 Study Design
This study evaluates a multicentre randomized controlled experiment conducted between
2017 and 2019. In total, 880 students from Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina participated,
with around 67% participating in all three data collection waves (see below). The study
was approved by the research ethics committee of the State University of the West of
Paraná (CAAE 82847418.6.0000.0107) and registered according to the CONSORT (UTN
U1111=1252-6877). [162]
We started by identifying 23 institutions and 115 project ‘implementers’ with different
nationalities through meetings with public managers and service providers in the fields of
education, health, social assistance and sports. These institutions dedicate to providing
teenagers with social support at different levels, including sports associations for promoting
physical activity, integrating young immigrants in the community, or social institutions
focused on substance abuse. All institutions signed a participation form and provided a
list of implementers including managers, parents or guardians, university students, and
adolescents. The eligibility criterion for being an implementer was to belong to one of the
participating institutions and their role was to support the development of activities with
adolescents (as well as responsibility for data collection).
In each institution, classes were randomized into treatment and control classes, with a
total of 440 adolescents allocated to treatment classes and 440 to control classes. The final
sample was composed of 880 adolescents from 14 to 17 years old: 376 Brazilians (42.7%),
292 Paraguayans (24.1%), and 212 Argentineans (33.2%) (for more details see Table D1
in Appendix).
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The intervention lasted for three years. In each year, the implementers and adolescents in
the treatment group worked together in teams, during a 4-month cycle of health education,
brainstorming activities, and strategic planning. The teams thus worked as incubators of
new ideas and strategies for improving the activities offered at each institution to make
them more suited to the participants’ interests and needs. The intervention took place
through three monthly meetings in the beginning of each year, lasting 120 minutes each, on
the following themes: (1) vulnerability and health care network, (2) analysis of indicators
of adolescent health, and (3) strategic planning and development of proposals for future
activities. Each year, between the first and the second meeting, the students answered
an electronic survey to collect a set of indicators related to their substance consumption,
mental health, physical activity, and relationship with their parents. Adolescents in the
treatment group participated in all stages of the project with the implementers at their
institution, while the control group only answered the electronic survey, without providing
any input to what the activities should be and how they should be conducted. Students
in the treatment group analysed the survey indicators in the second meeting to define the
priorities by institution and action area (see Appendix Table D2), based on the proposal of
the National Health Plan. [163]
The formal proposals were developed in the third meeting of the intervention and delivered
from 2018 onwards. Both treatment and control group students participated in the
activities. In sum, this study measures the effectiveness of involvement in the design and
co-development of activities (what the treatment group worked on) on top of participation
in the activities (both treatment and control groups). At the beginning of each year,
the project team did an assessment of how the intervention was being conducted at the
institutions. Figure 4.1 shows the intervention timeline with the meetings, survey and
activities happening from 2017 to 2019.
4.3 Data and Methods
Data collection occurred between the first and second meetings, each year (2017, 2018,
2019). An electronic platform was established for the purpose (http://caiunarede.pti.net.br).
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Figure 4.1: Average frequency of consumption by gender over age (excluding non-consumers)
Note: Meeting 1- Health education training (Health educ); 2- Survey indicators analysis (Indic.): 3- Development of proposals (Prop.);
N participants=880; Meetings are conducted by project implementers.
The virtual environment was accessed by the project implementers on the institutions’
computers through an available login and password. The indicators used were self-reported
and self-registered, and adapted from instruments of public use validated for the three
countries. [164]
Information collected included the student’s country, institution, age, and gender, whether
they felt lonely in the last year, Body Mass Index (BMI) (classified into underweight,
normal weight, overweight, or obese), early initiation of sexual activity (sexual intercourse
before the age of 15 [165]), tobacco use in the last 30 days, alcohol use in the last 30 days,
cannabis use in the last 30 days, physical activity in the last week, parental connection in
the last 30 days (felt understood by their parents), and parental regulation in the last 30
days (parents knew what they were doing on their free time).
We focus our analyses on three main outcomes that capture individual behaviours targeted
by the intervention: current tobacco, alcohol, and cannabis use. These consumption
indicators are categorical and represent self-reported consumption frequency (in days) over
the last 30 days. The seven categories are: never, used in 1 to 2 days, 3 to 5 days, 6 to 9
days, 10 to 19 days, 20 to 29 days, everyday.
4.3.1 Methods
For each relevant outcome, the impact of the intervention was measured by the difference
between the measurements before and after the intervention, in the treatment versus the
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control group, using a differences-in-differences (DiD) estimation model. This method
allows us to correct for pre-existing differences between individuals in the two groups (e.g.,
age, gender, weight, height) when measuring changes in the outcomes. The DiD estimator
provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect under the assumption that without
the treatment, outcomes would have had the same evolution in both groups. [166] This
assumption is reasonable thanks to the randomized control study design.
We estimate Probit regressions for each outcome variable as a function of the explanatory
variables and the DiD terms, as specified in the following expression [167]:
P (Y T,A,Cit = 1 | Treati, T imet, X) =
Φ(α + β1ageit + β2genderit + β3countryit + β4BMIit+
+ β5earlySEit + β6Treati + β7Timet + β8Treati × Timet)
(4.1)
In equation 4.1, Y Tit is a binary variable indicating consumption of tobacco, Y
A
it alcohol,
and Y Cit cannabis in at least 1 out of the past 30 days. A series of individual characteristics
(X) are included in the model, not only to control for differences between treatment and
control groups, but also to understand their associations with the outcomes. These include
age, gender, country, under and overweight BMI levels (below 15 and over 23 if girl and
below 16 and over 22 for boys), and risky personality (proxied by early sexual activity).
Treati identifies individuals in the treatment group. Timet identifies the period after the
intervention (2018 and 2019). The coefficient of main interest is β8, the coefficient on
the interaction term. As the models are non-linear, the impact of the intervention on a
specific outcome is obtained by calculating the average marginal effect that corresponds
to β8. Lastly, Φ(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution. All estimations cluster standard errors at the institutional level to account for
correlations between students from the same institution.




it ) are dichotomized and take value
one if the respondent consumed alcohol, tobacco, or cannabis in at least one day over the
last 30 days, and zero otherwise (i.e., any consumption or consumption on the extensive
margin). To investigate consumption along the intensive margin, or in other words to
distinguish heavy use from social consumption, we estimate an additional probit model
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where we exclude those who do not consume and the dependent variable takes the value
0 for those who consumed up to 9 days in the last month and the value 1 for those who
consumed in at least 10 days. As a sensitivity check we also performed an ordered probit
where the dependent variables are categorical instead of binary and take value 0 for those
who did not consume, value 1 for those who consumed in up to 9 days in the last 30, and
value 2 for those who consumed in more than 9 days in the last 30 —the heavy consumers.
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Around 49.3% (n=434) of all participants in this study were male, and 450.7% (n = 446)
were female. Around 42.7% (n = 376) of the participants were Brazilian, 33.2% (n =
292) Paraguayan, and 24.1% (n = 212) Argentinian. Table 4.1 shows the descriptive
statistics for the different years and genders. The sample is quite balanced in terms of
gender and age. Nationalities representativeness is quite stable over time, as well as
average BMI and early sexual activity. Peer effect is included following the leave-one-out
strategy, which consists in including the group average (excluding the individual) as a
control in the model (in complementary analyses). [168] In this case, because consumption
is a categorical variable, we need to transform the variable such that each level takes the
mid-point value (e.g. category 3 to 5 days in the last 30 acquires the value 4), and then
compute the leave one out average for each student.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
2017 2018 2019
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Age Avg. 15.49 15.32 15.88 15.76 16.40 16.28
Brazil Prop. 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.36 0.43
Paraguay Prop. 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.39
Argentina Prop. 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.30 0.17
BMI Avg. 21.96 21.73 22.05 21.82 21.56 21.82
Early sexual activity Prop. 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.16
Peer alcohol cons. Avg. (days) 3 3 2 2 2 1
Peer cannabis cons. Avg. (days) 2 2 1 1 1 1
Peer tobacco cons. Avg. (days) 4 4 3 3 3 3
Total N 446 434 318 327 223 235
Figure 4.2 shows substance use by gender and over time (any consumption in the past
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30 days). Alcohol is the substance that more participants, of both genders, reported to
consume at least once in the last month. The proportion of males consuming any tobacco
is larger than that of females, whereas cannabis consumption is more common among
females in 2018 and 2019. Consumption intensity (frequency of use), by gender and
substance is shown in Figure 4.3. Frequency of use is higher for tobacco for both genders
(share of students consuming more than 3 days is higher). Female participants show less
frequent consumption of alcohol and cannabis (boys share of consuming more than 10
days is larger), but the percentage of students who didn’t consume any substance is higher
among males. One possible explanation is that girls tend to use more but in more moderate
frequency, while the boys either don’t consume, or when then do they do it with more
intensity (measure in frequency).





The interaction coefficients in the DiD models are statistically significant and show negative
impacts of the intervention on all indicators of interest: alcohol, cannabis and tobacco
consumption in at least one day in the last month (Table 4.2). The likelihood of a teenager
consuming alcohol in at least one day in the last month is 13 percentage points (pp) lower
for those in the treatment group compared to the control group after the intervention (p
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Figure 4.3: Frequency of consumption in the past 30 days by gender and substance
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<0.01). Further, the intervention reduced the likelihood of consuming either tobacco or
cannabis in at least one day in the last month by 8 pp (p <0.01). These results indicate
that the intervention was successful in decreasing the probability of consuming substances
along the extensive margin. The peer effect is statistically significant for all substances.
A one day increase in the average frequency of consumption among peers increases the
likelihood of consuming substances at least once by 2 pp for alcohol, 4 pp for cannabis
and 3 pp for tobacco.
Regarding socio-demographic characteristics, results show that being of Brazilian
nationality is associated with a 16 pp (p <0.05) lower likelihood of having consumed
cannabis at least once in the last month, compared to foreign participants from Paraguay
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Table 4.2: Impacts of the intervention on any consumption in the last 30 days (marginal effects)
Alcohol Cannabis Tobacco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. -0.01 0.03 -0.03** 0.03 0.03 0.07***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Treatment -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
DiD -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Girl 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Age 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.03* 0.05** 0.03*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Brazilian -0.02 -0.00 -0.16** -0.13 -0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
BMIunder 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.12 -0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
BMIover 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05** -0.05**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Early sex exposure 0.15* 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.15* 0.15*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Peer tobacco cons. 0.02** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at institution level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are binary with the value 1 if the respondent consumed each substance at least once in the last
month; and 0 otherwise. Peer is the (leave one out) average group consumption in days. BMI under and over are
binary variables indicating whether each individual has an unhealthy BMI (by deficiency or excess) or not. Results
showing the introduction of a peer effect in interaction with the intervention related variables – time, treatment and
both (DiD) - had very similar results, presented in Appendix, Table D3.
or Argentina, but the effect loses significance when the peer effect is included. Age is
associated wit higher likelihood of consuming all substances — in particular, one more
year of age increases the likelihood of reporting having consumed alcohol at least once in
9 pp (p <0.01). Having had an early initiation of sexual activity is associated with higher
likelihood of consumption for alcohol and tobacco, but the impact is also reduced when
the peer effect is included. Being over the healthy BMI level is associated with lower
likelihood of tobacco consumption.
In the second specification, we exclude participants that reported no consumption and
compare those who consumed in less than 10 to 19 days in the last month to those who
consumed at least that frequently.
Results in Table 4.3 show that the probability of frequent consumption was reduced by the
intervention by 15 pp in the case of cannabis, but no impact of the intervention in terms of
light or heavy consumption of tobacco or alcohol. Nonetheless, the post-treatment indicator
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has a negative and statistically significant sign, for all consumption outcomes. This shows
the impact of the activities conducted at the institutions for all students during the project
duration. This means the activities developed together by the students themselves and the
institutions’ professionals had a relevant impact to reduce frequent substance consumption
among everyone.
Table 4.3: Impacts of the intervention on light vs. heavy consumption (marginal effects)
Alcohol Cannabis Tobacco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. -0.16*** -0.06 -0.11** 0.00 -0.17*** -0.10*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Treatment -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
DiD 0.01 0.02 -0.15* -0.16* -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Girls -0.06** -0.05** -0.01 0.01 0.10*** 0.08**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.09*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Brazilian -0.05* 0.03 0.03 0.09* -0.33*** -0.24***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
BMIunder - - - - 0.24 0.27*
(0.15) (0.15)
BMIover -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14*** -0.12***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Early sex exposure -0.04 -0.05 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Peer avg. cons. 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 773 773 371 371 627 627
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at institution level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are binary with the value 1 if the respondent consumed each substance at least 10 to 19 days
in the last month; and 0 otherwise. Peer is the (leave one out) average group consumption in days. BMI under and
over are binary variables indicating whether each individual has an unhealthy BMI (by deficiency or excess) or not.
Complete table in Appendix, Table D4.
Being of Brazilian nationality is associated with less heavy tobacco consumption (33 pp
lower probability of heavy use compared to Argentinian or Paraguayan nationality; p
<0.01). The peer effect has a similar impact as in the previous specification - one day more
in the group average frequency of consumption increases the likelihood of consuming
alcohol, cannabis and tobacco frequently by 4, 5 and 3 pp, respectively (p <0.01). Female
gender displays a negative association with heavy use of alcohol, but positive with heavy
use of tobacco. Being one year older is now associated with an increase in the likelihood
of heavy consumption by 9 to 10 pp (p <0.01). Early sexual activity is associated with
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consuming cannabis and tobacco more frequently at the 1% significance level. Participants
that are overweight (have a BMI above healthy level) are 14 to 12 pp less likely to be heavy
smokers.
The fact that post-treatment variables and peer effect have a significant and positive impact
on heavy consumption shows that there may be positive treatment spillovers to the control
group and/or due to the fact that including students in the activities design and development
process made them more interesting and engaging for the participants. These results
suggest that the intervention had impact for students both in treatment and the control
group. Assuming students from both groups interact during the activities and on their daily
lives, this positive spillover can result from students in the treatment group changing their
consumption and influencing others to follow (peer effect). Another possible hypothesis
is that by including some of the students on the development and design processes, the
activities became more interesting for all, every participant engaged more and changed
their substance consumption.
4.5 Discussion
To summarize, results show that the intervention successfully reduced the use of alcohol,
cannabis and tobacco both on the extensive margin (i.e., likelihood of consuming) and, to a
lower extent, on the intensive margin (i.e., frequency of consumption among consumers). In
addition, consumers in the control group, who only participated in the activities developed
by the treatment group, also decreased their consumption frequency. Brazilian students
are less likely to engage in heavy tobacco consumption and we find a positive relationship
between substance consumption and risky behaviour, proxied by early sexual initiation.
Consumption increases with age and average consumption levels of peers.
Similar trends in frequency of alcohol consumption in adolescents, by sex and age, have
been identified in other studies. [169], [170], [171], [172] The increase in the consumption
of alcohol and other substances among adolescents is still a controversy when discussing
the effectiveness of interventions. For example, the intervention described in Valente et
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al. (2020) showed a decrease in decision-making ability and an increase in substance use
in adolescents in the follow-up. [173] The increase in consumption of other substances
was also observed after participating in school programs, multicomponent interventions,
as well as interventions involving students, parents and teachers. [174], [175], [176]
The change in the likelihood of using substances related to migration and nationality has
also been previously studied. Marsiglia et al. (2019) highlight the influence of interpersonal
relationship patterns and cultural clashes on consumptions. [176] The authors identified a
reduction in substance use among adolescents resultant from an intervention with parental
content, that compared the parents’ culture of origin and consumption behaviours in Latin
America. In our case, students with Brazilian nationality seem to have healthier habits,
which can be related to having more stability compared to those with foreign nationality.
This evidences the potential lack of integration of foreign students.
As for the peer effect, our results show that the group average consumption frequency
influences the consumption frequency of each student, for all substances in almost all
specifications. Our study also aligns up with the evidence found in Cordova et al.(2020) on
the relationship between risky behaviours and substance consumption. That study showed
the impact of a mobile app to change teenagers’ behaviours that helped reduce substance
consumption and sexual risk behaviours together, highlighting the relationship between
both. [177]
While we find robust results that this type of intervention can be a relevant tool to decrease
substance consumption among adolescents, we do not have access to an extensive list
of socio-demographic and consumption indicators. Household composition, residential
area, or parents participation in the labour market may have important impacts on the
probability and frequency of consumption, as well as on how the intervention changes the
subjects’ behaviour. Moreover, since this intervention was implemented in a tri-border area,
students may change supplier according to alcohol, cannabis, and tobacco price variations,
an important factor that we are not able to include in the estimation.
Overall, we argue that participatory multisector interventions involving the subjects
themselves, are effective to decrease substance use among teenagers, with benefits both
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for the adolescents involved in the development of the activities and the ones that only
participate in the activities, potentially by improving the level for awareness, engagement,
attractiveness/adequacy of the activities, and integration of foreign and local students.
Recognizing the results of intersectoral initiatives to improve collaboration between
students and implementing agents is as important as monitoring and evaluating these
programs for their effectiveness. Considering the positive results than have been recently
found, this strategy can be a relevant tool for health policy decision makers to tackle
substance use at an early stage, with support from different sectors, while avoiding the
fragmentation of services and resources.
Based on ours and previous results, we consider this type of intervention to be very effective
in engaging participants and reducing harmful behaviours, which may subsequently
improve their health outcomes, general well-being, and socio-economic conditions. We
believe governments and social institutions should continue to and increase financing of
intersectoral interventions at an early stage, while also developing research studies that
identify the most effective mechanisms for different individuals and adapt the intervention
to their needs.
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Appendix
A1 Chapter 1
A1.1 Additional summary statistics
Table A1: Visited Traditional Practitioner in the last 4 weeks, in percentage of total population
sample
2000 2007 2014
15-24 3.46 10.36 20.28
25-44 3.12 12.74 23.18
45-64 2.24 10.94 20.70
65-79 2.76 7.07 10.51
80+ 1.64 4.08 10.78
Total 2.91 11.28 20.68
(1,646) (10,270) (11,710)
Note: IFLS Community Survey 2000, 2007,
2014. Relative percentage and absolute number (in
parentheses) of respondents who affirm to have visited a
TP in the last 4 weeks, by age group.
Table A2: Community Summary Statistics
2000 2007 2014
Urban 0.58 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.67 (0.47)
Number of
Health Centres 2.13 (0.93) 2.31 (1.15) 2.26 (1.36)
Private HP 4.78 (2.38) 4.48 (2.29) 5.35 (3.57)
Traditional P. 2.4 (1.7) 2.82 (1.63) 3.64 (2.91)
Hospitals 2.08 (1.14) 2.31 (1.22) 4.03 (2.81)
Note: IFLS Community Survey 2000, 2007, 2014. Table presents
mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) values for each variable.
Urban shows the share of villages considered urban areas. Apart from
this variable, all the others are represented in absolute numbers. Namely,
number of health posts, health centres, private health centres, traditional
practitioners and hospitals.
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Table A3: Type of health facilities in Indonesia
Health facility Description Public/Private
A. Multiple-provider facilities
Public hospital Public hospital located at the district level Public
Private hospital Private hospital located at the district level, national and provincial
government enterprises, police, defence forces.
Private
Hospital for women and children Private hospital for women and children located in the district. Private
Women’s hospital Private women’s hospital located in the district. Private
Maternity clinic Private maternity clinics with more than 2 beds. Private
Health centre Public health centre located in the district – in general they are located
at the sub-district level.
Public
Auxiliary health centre Public auxiliary health centre – in general they are located at the
sub-district level, usually in a village.
Public
Private clinic Treatment clinic. Before the advent of the puskesmas there were
private and public treatment clinics. As the puskesmas was developed
the public treatment clinics were incorporated in the puskesmas with
the result that only the private balai pengobatan remained. Although
they have been ignored by the government and donors they remain a
significant source of treatment, especially in urban areas. They are
licensed by the local government and must have a doctor as the
supervisor. In practice, most of the doctors named as the supervisor




Village midwife (BDD) BDD is a village midwife who receives a government salary and also
may charge for the services she provides and retain the fee herself.
Although the village midwife theoretically lives in the village (desa)
there are reports indicating that in many villages she lives elsewhere,
maybe in a nearby urban area. The services provided by the BDD may
be offered in a room in her house or in a structure in that is the property
of, and was built by, the village government (polindes). In the polindes
the services are provided by the village midwife who charges for the
services and retains the fees.
Private
Doctor in full-time private practice. Doctor whose primary professional activity is private practice and who
does not receive a salary from the government.
Doctor in part-time private practice. Doctor whose primary professional appointment is with the
government to work in a government health facility and who also has a
part-time private practice after office hours.
Private
Nurse in part-time private practice Nurse whose primary professional activity is in a public or private
health facility and who has a part-time private practice after hours.
Private
Midwife in full-time private practice Midwife whose primary professional activity is private practice and
who does not receive a salary from the government.
Private
Source: Heywood and Harahap (2009) [180]
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A1.2 Additional regression tables
Table A4: Linear regression on treatment costs
(1) (2) (3)
Cost TP Cost Public Cost Private
Days in bed -0.197** 0.219** 0.100*
(0.096) (0.093) (0.057)
Age 0.020* 0.005 0.027***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
Age2 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher education 0.361*** 0.013 0.309***
(0.091) (0.159) (0.083)
Woman -0.099* -0.016 0.059
(0.058) (0.074) (0.045)
Urban 0.149* -0.196** 0.001
(0.076) (0.093) (0.063)
Constant 9.258*** 8.185*** 9.442***
(0.229) (0.239) (0.160)
Observations 30,145 44,842 51,860
R-squared 0.046 0.011 0.022
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the estimation
results using a linear regression model controlling for year, province and island
fixed effects, using IFLS Community Survey data from 2000, 2007, 2014. The
dependent variables, cost of TP, public and private healthcare are continuous
cost variables that correspond to the reported treatment value by each patient.
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Table A5: Multinomial logit results for different age status
Specification (1)
Age Woman Urban Hosp.
20 0.063*** 0.002*** 0.098***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
35 0.067*** 0.002*** 0.104***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
70 0.076*** 0.003*** 0.118***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 1,488,563 1,488,563 1,488,563
Specification (2)
Age N Public N TP N Priv. Cost Private Cost Public Cost TP Distance
20 -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.000 -0.011*** -0.007*** 0.004*** 0.016**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
35 -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
70 -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.008*** 0.002*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006)
Observations 49,473 49,473 49,473 49,473 49,473 49,473 49,473
Note: IFLS Community Survey 2000, 2007, 2014. Table presents mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) values
for each variable. Urban shows the share of villages considered urban areas. Apart from this variable, all the others
are represented in absolute numbers. Namely, number of health posts, health centres, private health centres, traditional
practitioners and hospitals.
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Table A6: 2nd step - Outpatient visit last week (Mult. Logit (marginal effects))
(1) (2)
Visit Priv Visit TP
Married 0.084*** 0.005
(0.028) (0.017)












BMI - good 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.005)
BMI - high -0.006 0.033***
(0.007) (0.005)








Cost public -0.004 -0.041***
(0.012) (0.008)
Cost private -0.023* -0.013
(0.013) (0.009)
Cost TP 0.089*** 0.048***
(0.013) (0.009)
N. Public HC 0.003 -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001)
N. Priv. 0.007*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results
using a multinomial logit model with year, province and
island fixed effects and data from 2000, 2007, 2014. The
dependent variable is categorical: Service type has the
value 0 if the individual visited a public health centre
during the last week (outcome 1), 1 if the individual
visited a private clinic (outcome 2) and the value 2 if the
patient visited a TP (outcome 3). Options are mutually
exclusive and results show marginal effects for the possible
outcomes.
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Table A7: Number of visits to the Traditional practitioner (Neg. Binomial - Marginal effects)
Dep. variable: N. Visits TP (1) (2)
Age 0.015*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.003)
















BMI - good -0.017 -0.019
(0.023) (0.026)
BMI - high -0.047** -0.045*
(0.023) (0.027)



























Pseudo R-sq. 0.0810 0.114
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the
estimation results using a Negative Binomial model with year, province
and island fixed effects, using IFLS Community Survey data from 2000,
2007, 2014. The dependent variable Number of visits to TP is a count
variable that indicates the number of visits to the TP in the last month.
Treatment costs are predictions from the preliminary linear model.
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Table A8: Visits and number of visits to the Traditional practitioner, by expenditure quintiles
(Probit and Neg. Binomial - Margins)
Low quantiles Top quantiles
Private clinic TP Private clinic TP
Married 0.339*** 0.149*** 0.156*** 0.112***
(0.039) (0.018) (0.055) (0.027)
HH size -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.002 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(pce) -0.024** 0.057*** 0.153*** 0.014**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Higher education 0.219*** -0.135*** -0.030* 0.076***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.010)
Woman -0.040*** -0.074*** -0.023*** -0.094***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Urban -0.008 0.015*** 0.087*** -0.008
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Acute 0.017** -0.022*** -0.011 -0.012*
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
BMI - good -0.039*** 0.029*** 0.035** 0.057***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
BMI - high -0.061*** 0.029*** -0.005 0.048***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009)
Good health -0.058*** 0.023*** -0.002 0.036***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
Worse -0.010 -0.019*** 0.044*** -0.024***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Hospitalized -0.051 0.203*** 0.261*** 0.026
(0.054) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022)
Insurance -0.023*** -0.089*** -0.013 -0.041***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Cost public 0.105*** -0.140*** 0.109*** 0.005
(0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.013)
Cost private 0.146*** -0.069*** -0.056*** -0.071***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.022) (0.013)
Cost TP -0.095*** 0.157*** 0.106*** 0.048***
(0.024) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013)
N. Public HC -0.012*** -0.017*** 0.018*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N. Priv. 0.012*** -0.020*** 0.014*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
N. TP 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Distance -1.633*** 1.372*** -0.505** 0.184
(0.201) (0.151) (0.204) (0.122)
Obs. 20,982 19,599
Pseudo R-sq. 0.1450 0.1280
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the estimation results using Probit
and Negative binomial models to estimate the determinants of having visited the TP in the last
4 weeks and number of visits to the TP, respectively. Estimation separate for households in the
first two (low income) and the last two quantiles of monthly expenditure. Families in middle
income quantile are not included. This includes year, province and island fixed effect, using IFLS
Community Survey data from 2000, 2007, 2014. Results show marginal effects for each coefficient
in all specifications. The interaction variable is used to grasp and the effect of having a modern
health-care facility built in a district with a given number of TP.
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Table A9: Number of visits TP - CMP model
(1) (2)
Cost TP Number of visits TP




























Number of TP 0.021**
(0.009)
Number of HC -0.002
(0.014)










New HF*Number of TP 0.026
(0.041)
Year FE X X
Province FE X X




Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents
the estimation results using a cmp model controlling for year,
province and island fixed effects and using IFLS Community
Survey data from 2000, 2007, 2014. The dependent variables,
is a continuous cost variables that correspond to the reported TP
treatment value by each patient and number of visits TP indicate
the number of visits of each participant during the last month.
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Table A10: Seemingly unrelated regression for healthcare demand
(1) (2) (3)
Visit Public Visit Priv. Visit TP
Age 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.024*** -0.005 -0.027***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
HH size -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(HH Exp.) -0.012*** 0.011*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Higher education 0.014*** 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Woman 0.015*** 0.004*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.013*** 0.009*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acute 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BMI - good -0.010*** 0.009*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
BMI - high -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Good health -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Worse 0.004*** -0.000 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hospitalized 0.049*** 0.012** 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Insurance 0.040*** 0.010*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number public 0.007*** 0.001** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Number private 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number TP 0.000 0.001*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost public 0.106*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost private -0.003*** 0.090*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost TP 0.000 0.001*** 0.094***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance -0.028*** 0.022*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.246*** -0.070*** -0.043***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 113,734 113,734 113,734
R-squared 0.790 0.851 0.780
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents
the estimation results using Seemingly unrelated regression
model to estimate the determinants of having visited the different
health care providers. This includes year, province and island
fixed effect, using IFLS Community Survey data from 2000,
2007, 2014.
A1. Chapter 1 147
Table A11: BMI and good self assessed health (SAH) (Multinomial and Probit results - Margins)
(1) (2) (3)
BMI - Underweight BMI - Obese Good health (SAH)
Age -0.020*** 0.016*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age sq 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log exp. -0.030*** 0.038*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Higher education -0.011*** 0.017*** 0.042***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Woman -0.048*** 0.092*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Self-treat -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.047***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.014*** 0.037*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BMI - Normal 0.030***
(0.001)
BMI - Overweight 0.031***
(0.002)
Days in bed 0.033*** -0.020*** -0.180***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Symptoms 0.006*** 0.002 -0.073***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N. Public HC 0.014*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N. Priv. -0.010*** 0.006*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N. TP -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N. Public x TP -0.017*** 0.011*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N. Private x TP 0.014*** 0.000 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 887,556 887,556
Log pseudo likelihood -5114825.4 -1846862.8
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.12
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the estimation results
using Probit and Negative binomial models to estimate the determinants of having visited
the TP in the last 4 weeks and number of visits to the TP, respectively. Estimation
separate for households in the first two (low income) and the last two quantiles of monthly
expenditure. Families in middle income quintile are not included. This includes year,
province and island fixed effect, using IFLS Community Survey data from 2000, 2007,
2014. Results show marginal effects for each coefficient in all specifications. The
interaction variable is used to grasp and the effect of having a modern health-care facility
built in a district with a given number of TP.
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⇔ B(η)− S2C2(η) ≥ 0⇔
⇔ f(S2, q) ≥ 0⇒ f(S2, η∗) = 0
(4.2)
Then, by the application of the Implicit Function Theorem: If f : Rm × R ⇒ R is a C1
function, f(x0; y0) = 0, and ∂f∂x 6= 0, then for some neighborhood U ⊂ R
m of (x0) there
is a C1 function g : U ⇒ R such that g(x0) = y0 and f(x, g(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ U . The


























According to this relationship, the threshold for patients to get treatment is positively
related to the price of the low quality hospital. This is, as the patients’ contribution share
increases, more severity is needed for patients to get treatment.
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Proposition 2
Consider condition 2:
θB(η)− S1C1(η) ≥ B(η)− S2C2(η)⇔
⇔ (θ − 1)B(η)− S1C1(η) + S2C2(η) ≥ 0⇔
⇔ g(S1, S2, η) ≥ 0⇒ g(S1, S2, η∗∗) = 0
(4.4)
Once again, by the application of the Implicit Function Theorem:
∂η∗∗
∂S1




























































































, C ′(η) > 0 (4.12)
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A2.2 II - Maps
Figure 4.4: Hospitals by enumeration area
a) North Lebanon Area (NLA) - Tripoli b) Central Lebanon Area (CLA) - Beirut
c) Beqaa d) Saida
e) Tyre
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A2.3 III - Tables
Results (main) - Standard Errors clustered by hospital
Robustness checks
Trying to further understand the results, in order to also better ensure their reliability, we
performed a series of robustness checks to the estimations. These exercises consist in
using different clustering methods, different policy shifts, dependent variables and model
specifications.
The first check consisted in estimating the probability of changing hospital and assessing
how those patients that shifted to a PRCS after the policy change are affecting the results.
We created a binary variable for when patients go to a private or public hospital in the first
visit before June 2016, but change to a PRCS hospital for the second or further visit after
that same date. Note that only 297 patients changed to a PRCS hospital, which corresponds
to 1.10% of the sample and does not give us enough power to achieve rigorous estimates.
Nevertheless, it can be useful to learn more about this small sample.
Results show that staying one more day hospitalised, slightly (but significantly) decreases
the probability of changing to a PRCS hospital. This indicates that people that changed
hospital had longer stays on average, which can relate to the theory that patients with
more severe conditions - that take longer to treat - have more difficulties covering for
the increase in costs. After the policy, patients are 3% more likely to change to a PRCS
hospital, highlighting the previous result that demand for PRCS increased with the
introduction of the cost-sharing component.
The following estimations replicate the main exercise using data between January and May
2016. This aims at capturing the shift between the first policy change (January to March
2016) and the negotiations period (April to May 2016). During this first policy, patients
had to cover 5% of their costs for secondary care in PRCS hospitals, 10% in public and
15% in private, whereas during the negotiations, secondary care was free of charge at all
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Table B1: Policy impact estimation on demand for hospital type (Multinomial Logit - margins),
from April 2016 to October 2017
PRCS Priv. Hospital Pub. Hospital
(1.a) (1.b) (2.a) (2.b) (3.a) (3.b)
Var. of interest:
Policy 0.035** 0.180*** -0.018 -0.147*** -0.016 -0.033
(0.015) (0.061) (0.017) (0.032) (0.013) (0.065)
Stay in days -0.055*** 0.022*** 0.035*** -0.017*** 0.019 -0.005
(0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015) (0.005)
Surgery -0.005 0.098** 0.017 -0.048 -0.012 -0.050
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.030) (0.026) (0.031)
UNRWA contribution 2.880*** -1.819*** -1.061*
(0.678) (0.404) (0.633)
Bill value -3.001*** 1.880*** 1.121*
(0.717) (0.430) (0.661)
UNRWA contr. (at p3==0) 5.745*** -3.547** -2.198
(2.226) (1.582) (1.621)
UNRWA contr. (at p3==0) 2.016* -1.142 -0.874
(1.097) (0.725) (0.602)
Difference -3.26 2.405 1.324
Stay in days (at p3==0) 0.077*** -0.052*** -0.024
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
Stay in days (at p3==1) 0.008 -0.007 -0.002
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Difference 0.069*** 0.045** 0.022
Controls:
Age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001** -0.002 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ramadan -0.016 -0.002 0.012 0.004 0.004 -0.002
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Distance 0.035 0.034 0.023 0.097*** -0.058 -0.131**
(0.058) (0.033) (0.040) (0.029) (0.096) (0.056)
CLA 0.395 0.123** -0.438 -0.153 0.043 0.030
(0.317) (0.055) (0.301) (0.109) (0.116) (0.109)
Visit 0.005 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 32,851 32,810 32,851 32,810 32,851 32,810
Note: Dependent variables are a log transformation of the bill value, unrwa and patient contribution. Specification a does not
contain costs related variables and avoids any potential issues of multicollinearity. Policy is a dummy variable that indicates the
period of the policy change (from June 2016 onwards). Clustered standard errors by hospital in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B2: Policy 3 impact estimation on Stay in Days (Neg. Binomial/Mult. Poisson - IRR), from




Policy 3 0.996 0.860*** 0.906***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.020)
Surgery 0.716*** 0.678*** 0.694***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.060)
UNRWA contr. × Policy 3 1.001*** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Priv. Hosp × Policy 3 0.778*** 0.851***
(0.051) (0.049)
Pub. Hosp. × Policy 3 0.763* 0.810
(0.123) (0.127)
Private hospital 1.363*** 1.389***
(0.105) (0.113)
Public hospital 1.451*** 1.444**
(0.205) (0.210)
Controls:
Age 0.986*** 0.994*** 0.993***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Age squared 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman 0.968** 0.971** 0.964**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018)
Ramadan 0.976 0.971* 0.960
(0.021) (0.016) (0.032)
Visit 1.033*** 1.017*** 1.023***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006)










- Tyre 0.896*** 0.944*
(0.024) (0.032)
Constant 2.526*** 2.194*** 1.758***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.097)
Observations 32,851 32,811 33,402
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Coefficients show Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) for a negative binomial and
multinomial poisson regression results. Standard errors clustered by hospital in
parentheses. Policy 3 is a dummy variable that indicates the period after the last policy
change (from June 2016 onward).
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Table B3: Policy impact estimation on patients and UNRWA contribution, and Bill value (OLS),
from April 2016 to October 2017
Bill value UNRWA contr. Patient contr.
(1.a) (1.b) (2.a) (2.b) (3.a) (3.b)
Var. of interest:
Policy 3 -0.007 -0.001 -0.040** 0.002 -0.134 0.091
(0.013) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.102) (0.116)
Stay in days 0.199*** 0.011** 0.193*** 0.001 0.191*** -0.031**
(0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.002) (0.019) (0.014)
Surgery 0.605*** 0.024** 0.590*** 0.010 0.935*** -0.082
(0.085) (0.010) (0.086) (0.010) (0.095) (0.060)
Private hosp. 0.732*** 0.076* 0.602*** -0.036 1.511** 0.569
(0.049) (0.039) (0.041) (0.033) (0.558) (0.390)
Public hosp. 0.601*** 0.007 0.504*** 0.024 1.110** 0.615*
(0.058) (0.013) (0.055) (0.018) (0.525) (0.302)




Stay in days × -0.002 0.001 0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.015)
Priv. Hosp × policy 3 0.148*** -0.109*** 0.273
(0.014) (0.016) (0.405)
Pub. Hosp × policy 3 0.118*** -0.085*** 0.113
(0.010) (0.014) (0.381)
Controls:
Age -0.001 0.000** -0.001 -0.000** 0.000 0.003**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman -0.019** -0.002 -0.017 0.001 -0.049** -0.011
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.019) (0.010)
Ramadan -0.021* 0.004 -0.026** -0.006 0.007 0.041
(0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.056) (0.038)
Distance 0.012*** 0.001** 0.011*** -0.000 0.010 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.012) (0.005)
Visit 0.006* 0.001 0.005* -0.000 0.019** 0.008*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.005)
Area
- CLA
0.389*** 0.066*** 0.328*** -0.045*** 0.581 -0.162
(0.099) (0.015) (0.092) (0.013) (0.422) (0.284)
- NLA 0.455*** 0.043*** 0.418*** -0.018 0.672*** 0.045
(0.064) (0.014) (0.060) (0.014) (0.125) (0.069)
-Saida 0.387*** 0.047** 0.345*** -0.026* 0.740*** 0.157**
(0.069) (0.018) (0.058) (0.014) (0.163) (0.072)
- Tyre 0.268*** 0.031** 0.241*** -0.016 0.296*** -0.021
(0.043) (0.011) (0.039) (0.010) (0.053) (0.027)
Constant 11.325*** 7.328*** 4.100*** -6.810*** 0.975* -12.743***
(0.065) (0.047) (0.055) (0.162) (0.550) (0.656)
Observations 32,811 32,810 32,810 32,810 12,875 12.875
R-squared 0.702 0.983 0.675 0.982 0.596 0.900
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Dependent variable is in log transformation; Policy 3 is a dummy variable that indicates the period after the last policy
change (from June 2016 onward). Standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses;
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Table B4: Policy impact estimation on probability of changing hospital type (Probit - margins),





























Note: Dependent variable is a binary
variable, equal to 1 if the patient
changed from a public or private
hospital to a PRCS after the second
visit. Policy 3 is a dummy variable
that indicates the period after the last
policy change (from June 2016 onward).
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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hospitals (as it was for the main estimations). We consider the first three months as the
policy 1 and estimate its impact using exactly the same model and estimation strategies as
before.
Table B5 to B7 show the results for the three main impact estimations: LoS, hospital
demand by hospital type and costs. The results obtained in this section confirm our
previous reasoning, in the sense that patients are price sensitive and when they have to
cover for a larger share of the costs, demand increases at the facilities where that share
is smaller, which also follows the previously developed theoretical framework. Length
of stay was higher in public hospitals during policy 1 but significantly lower in private
hospitals. Going to a private hospital when policy 1 was in place decreased the rate of stay
in days by 0.24, meaning that patients were going less and for shorter stays, as in the case
of policy 3 (table B5). Demand for PRCS hospitals was 20% during policy 1, which meant
a decrease of almost the same magnitude in the demand for private hospitals, as showed
in table B6. In terms of costs, again there is no direct impact of the policy at any level.
UNRWA contribution decreased in policy 1 for private and public hospitals, and length of
stay during policy 1 affected negatively the bill value, which is mot likely related to the
average LoS decrease in the most expensive hospitals. The results for policy 1 follow the
general evidence found for policy 3, which was in place after June 2016 and charges 10%
of secondary care costs at private and public hospitals.
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Policy 1 × UNRWA cont. 0.821**
(0.065)
Policy 1 × Priv. Hosp. 0.740**
(0.11)





























Note: Dependent variable is a count variable
equivalent to the number of days each patient stayed at
the hospital in each visit. Policy 1 is a dummy variable
that indicates the period of the 1st policy change (from
January to March 2016). Robust standard errors in
parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Policy 1 0.202** -0.170** -0.032
(0.095) (0.077) (0.030)
Policy 1 × UNRWA contribution -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Policy 1 × Stay in days 0.208*** -0.144*** -0.064
(0.043) (0.037) (0.049)
Stay in days -0.048*** 0.027** 0.021
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Controls:
Age 0.002 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman 0.016* -0.011 -0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003)
Distance 0.042 0.030 -0.072
(0.064) (0.042) (0.105)
Surgical 0.181*** -0.112*** -0.069
(0.043) (0.039) (0.060)
Observations 8,295 8,295 8,295
Note: The dependent variables are binary variables with the value 1 if the patient is at
each hospital type and 0 otherwise. Note that all patients get treatment, thus for each
observation at least one option must be selected. Coefficients show average marginal effects
for multinomial logit regression results. Standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses.
Policy 1 is a dummy variable that indicates the period of the 1st policy change (from January
to March 2016). Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B7: Policy 1 impact estimation on costs, from January to May 2016
(1) (2) (3)
Bill value UNRWA Contr. Patient Contr.
Var. of interest
Policy 1 0.052 -0.039 -0.214
(0.049) (0.044) (0.253)
Policy 1 × UNRWA cont. 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Policy 1 × Stay in days -0.063** 0.002 -0.019
(0.025) (0.021) (0.040)
Private hospital 0.680*** 0.616*** 1.840***
(0.058) (0.063) (0.298)
Public hospital 0.538*** 0.544*** 1.918***
(0.053) (0.046) (0.288)
Policy 1 × Priv. Hosp -0.059 -0.092** 0.146
(0.036) (0.043) (0.298)
Policy 1 × Pub. Hosp -0.040 -0.086** -0.424
(0.057) (0.039) (0.281)
Stay in days 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.156***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Controls:
Age 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.050**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.022)
Area
- CLA 0.135 0.112 -0.011
(0.131) (0.128) (0.140)
- NLA 0.205* 0.200* 0.200
(0.117) (0.113) (0.121)
- Saida 0.127 0.118 0.157
(0.120) (0.114) (0.121)
- Tyre 0.094 0.096 0.001
(0.114) (0.113) (0.116)
Surgical 0.505*** 0.550*** 0.409***
(0.064) (0.082) (0.062)
Constant 11.582*** 4.271*** 1.633***
(0.124) (0.121) (0.272)
Observations 8,295 8,295 4,628
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Dependent variables are a log transformation of the bill value, unrwa and patient
contribution. Policy 1 is a dummy variable that indicates the period of the 1st policy change (from
January to March 2016).
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The last robustness check, presented in table B8 uses the year of 2017 as proxy for a control
year. Facing one of the greatest limitations of this project - not being able to evaluate
the before and after trends in a control group of people from the same context - in this
estimation we perform the same regression as the main model in 2.4 but with data from
2017 and thus considering a fictional policy change in June 2017. We assume patients in
2017 are equivalent to the patients in 2016, thus a potential control group, that was not
subject to a policy change. These results help confirming that the main estimation is not
grasping an effect of seasonality associated with the month of June, despite all the control
variables. All policy indicators are not significant. Length of stay at private hospitals after
June 2017 seems to decrease with a statistically significant impact, but the coefficient is
really close to zero (marginal effect of 0.6%).
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Table B8: Proxy policy impact estimation on hospital demand, from January to October 2017
(1) (2) (4)
PRCS Priv. Hosp. Pub Hosp
Var. of interest
Policy -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
UNRWA contribution 1.753 -1.009 -0.744
(1.126) (0.702) (0.569)
Bill value -1.790 1.019 0.771
(1.163) (0.721) (0.587)
Stay in days 0.005 -0.006* 0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Surgery 0.043 -0.022 -0.021
(0.044) (0.025) (0.026)
UNRWA contr.
(at p4==0)-(at p4==1) 0.038 0.008 0.005
Stay in days
(at p4==0)-(at p4==1) -0.001 -0.001 0.001
Controls
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman -0.005 0.000 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ramadan -0.004 -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance 0.023 0.105*** -0.128***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.035)
CLA -0.002 -0.054 0.056
(0.027) (0.112) (0.096)
Visit 0.000 -0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 17,524 17,524 17,524
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables are binary variables with the value 1 if the
patient is at each hospital type and 0 otherwise. Note that all patients get
treatment, thus for each observation at least one option must be selected.
Coefficients show average marginal effects for multinomial logit regression
results. Standard errors clustered by hospital in parentheses. Policy is a dummy
variable that indicates the period of the 3rd and main policy change if it had
happened in 2017 (from June 2017 onward) - Proxy policy.
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A3 Chapter 3
A3.1 Optimal bundles
Following the analysis in the Results section, here we look further into Engel curves for
clothes and communication expenditure. Expenditure on clothes presents similar patterns
to those of education expenditure already mentioned. Regarding communication, 2015
was a year with higher migration levels due to the Syrian conflict. As refugee camps and
services became crowded, families had more incentives to move. In addition, since access
to borders changed due to the high influx of migrants, it is possible that the opportunities
to leave the country for lower income families increased. The relatively high level of
spending in communication for FHH in 2015 follows this story line in the sense that
historical records have shown that the men of the HH typical leaves first, searching for
opportunities abroad, living his household and his wife/mother as the HoH, which would
explain why this high level of expenditure is not visible in MHH.
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Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households.
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Table C1: Determinants of Health-care Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - coefficients
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Health care expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (1) (2)
Probit GLM Probit GLM
Treated 0.038 0.290*** 0.130 0.131*
(0.117) (0.068) (0.105) (0.073)
Average age by HH 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Log (Percap Exp) 0.798*** 0.484*** 0.343** 0.161**
(0.153) (0.094) (0.139) (0.077)
Below lower poverty level 0.159 0.636** -0.298 0.166
(0.357) (0.268) (0.222) (0.196)
Having a child -0.073 -0.051 -0.067 -0.125**
(0.106) (0.060) (0.085) (0.059)
HH size above 3 0.180 0.143* 0.093 -0.019
(0.121) (0.077) (0.115) (0.088)
Having one family member living abroad -0.002 0.041 0.043 0.145*
(0.110) (0.069) (0.125) (0.088)
Living in a camp 0.011 -0.027 -0.111 0.268***
(0.127) (0.069) (0.119) (0.076)
Average # chronic disease by HH 0.727*** 0.571*** 1.064*** 0.388*
(0.172) (0.143) (0.136) (0.202)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.097 0.289*** 0.349*** -0.061
(0.177) (0.085) (0.103) (0.077)
Insurance 0.157 -0.181 -0.099 -0.321***
(0.183) (0.117) (0.190) (0.119)
Saida 0.600*** -0.040 0.139 0.250**
(0.168) (0.095) (0.151) (0.126)
Tyre 0.304** -0.027 0.219 0.302***
(0.153) (0.099) (0.135) (0.102)
Bekaa 0.166 -0.250** 0.414*** 0.354***
(0.201) (0.105) (0.150) (0.110)
NLA -0.128 -0.044 -0.103 0.135
(0.172) (0.104) (0.175) (0.114)
Constant -5.036*** -6.351*** -2.847*** -4.597***
(0.934) (0.544) (0.746) (0.476)
Observations 10,375 10,375 9,931 9,931
Pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.152 0.152
Log-likelihood 9.373 9.373 7.438 7.438
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared, age
and working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C2: Determinants of Health-care Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - margins
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Health care expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated 0.009 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.033 0.020** 0.013**
(0.026) (0.009) (0.006) (0.026) (0.010) (0.006)
Average age by HH 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log (Percap Exp) 0.181*** 0.075*** 0.053*** 0.086** 0.034*** 0.021***
(0.034) (0.012) (0.008) (0.035) (0.010) (0.007)
Below lower poverty level 0.036 0.059* 0.050** -0.075 -0.006 0.005
(0.081) (0.032) (0.021) (0.056) (0.024) (0.016)
Having a child -0.017 -0.008 -0.005 -0.017 -0.015** -0.011**
(0.024) (0.008) (0.005) (0.022) (0.007) (0.005)
HH size above 3 0.041 0.021** 0.014** 0.023 0.001 0.001
(0.027) (0.009) (0.007) (0.029) (0.011) (0.007)
Having one family member living abroad -0.000 0.010 0.003 0.011 0.015 0.012
(0.025) (0.009) (0.006) (0.032) (0.011) (0.007)
Living in a camp 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.028 0.022** 0.017***
(0.029) (0.009) (0.006) (0.030) (0.010) (0.006)
Average # chronic disease by HH 0.165*** 0.095*** 0.058*** 0.268*** 0.118*** 0.057***
(0.038) (0.018) (0.012) (0.030) (0.020) (0.015)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.022 0.027** 0.023*** 0.088*** 0.017* 0.004
(0.040) (0.012) (0.008) (0.026) (0.009) (0.006)
Insurance 0.036 -0.019 -0.010 -0.025 -0.042*** -0.027***
(0.042) (0.013) (0.009) (0.048) (0.013) (0.010)
Saida 0.125*** 0.013 0.009 0.038 0.024** 0.020**
(0.035) (0.012) (0.008) (0.041) (0.012) (0.009)
Tyre 0.072* 0.006 0.005 0.058 0.040*** 0.026***
(0.037) (0.012) (0.008) (0.036) (0.011) (0.008)
Bekaa 0.041 -0.015 -0.013 0.103*** 0.059*** 0.036***
(0.049) (0.012) (0.008) (0.036) (0.015) (0.009)
NLA -0.036 -0.017 -0.007 -0.030 0.013 0.005
(0.048) (0.013) (0.009) (0.052) (0.012) (0.008)
Observations 10,375 10,375 10,375 9,931 9,931 9,931
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared, age and
working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C3: Determinants of Tobacco Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - coefficients
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Tobacco expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (1) (2)
Probit GLM Probit GLM
Treated -0.498*** -0.114 -0.320*** -0.109
(0.087) (0.112) (0.092) (0.079)
Average age by HH -0.014*** 0.005* -0.008** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log (Percap Exp) -0.110 -0.463*** 0.014 -0.365***
(0.096) (0.126) (0.117) (0.113)
Below lower poverty level -0.448** -0.403 -0.357 -0.367
(0.206) (0.274) (0.305) (0.249)
Having a child -0.092 0.098 -0.085 -0.063
(0.076) (0.100) (0.084) (0.056)
HH size above 3 0.405*** -0.135 0.327*** -0.332***
(0.103) (0.082) (0.103) (0.090)
Having one family member living abroad -0.081 -0.062 -0.036 -0.180**
(0.109) (0.085) (0.098) (0.081)
Living in a camp 0.157* 0.140 -0.106 0.079
(0.093) (0.100) (0.097) (0.082)
Average # chronic disease by HH 0.139 0.110 0.074 0.137
(0.139) (0.099) (0.140) (0.098)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.093 0.072 -0.179 -0.082
(0.091) (0.083) (0.132) (0.117)
Insurance 0.156 -0.185 0.325** 0.250**
(0.172) (0.131) (0.151) (0.126)
Saida 0.793*** -0.083 -0.277** -0.249**
(0.134) (0.131) (0.124) (0.098)
Tyre 0.607*** 0.115 -0.171 -0.198*
(0.118) (0.175) (0.130) (0.101)
Bekaa 0.300** -0.516*** -0.316* -0.267**
(0.128) (0.130) (0.167) (0.129)
NLA 0.284* -0.489*** -0.403*** -0.423***
(0.160) (0.149) (0.145) (0.138)
Constant 1.028* -0.622 0.914 -0.706
(0.554) (0.602) (0.713) (0.690)
Observations 10,257 10,257 11,192 11,192
Pseudo R-squared 10257 10257 11192 11192
Log-likelihood 0.108 0.108 0.0459 0.0459
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared,
age and working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C4: Determinants of Tobacco Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - margins
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Tobacco expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated -0.173*** -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.120*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.030) (0.004) (0.005) (0.035) (0.003) (0.003)
Average age by HH -0.005*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.003** -0.000** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log (Percap Exp) -0.038 -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.005 -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.033) (0.007) (0.007) (0.044) (0.004) (0.004)
Below lower poverty level -0.156** -0.034** -0.028* -0.134 -0.019** -0.016*
(0.071) (0.015) (0.015) (0.114) (0.009) (0.008)
Having a child -0.032 0.000 0.003 -0.032 -0.003 -0.003
(0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002)
HH size above 3 0.141*** 0.005 0.002 0.123*** -0.002 -0.004
(0.035) (0.005) (0.004) (0.038) (0.003) (0.003)
Having one family member living abroad -0.028 -0.004 -0.005 -0.014 -0.005* -0.006**
(0.038) (0.005) (0.005) (0.037) (0.003) (0.003)
Living in a camp 0.055* 0.010* 0.010* -0.040 0.001 0.001
(0.032) (0.006) (0.005) (0.036) (0.003) (0.003)
Average # chronic disease by HH 0.048 0.011* 0.008 0.028 0.005 0.005
(0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.053) (0.003) (0.004)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.032 0.004 0.005 -0.067 -0.004 -0.005
(0.032) (0.005) (0.004) (0.049) (0.004) (0.004)
Insurance 0.054 -0.005 -0.005 0.122** 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.060) (0.007) (0.007) (0.057) (0.005) (0.004)
Saida 0.283*** 0.022*** 0.014** -0.104** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.045) (0.007) (0.007) (0.046) (0.004) (0.004)
Tyre 0.220*** 0.027** 0.022** -0.064 -0.010** -0.010**
(0.042) (0.010) (0.011) (0.049) (0.004) (0.004)
Bekaa 0.109** -0.007 -0.013** -0.119* -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.046) (0.005) (0.006) (0.063) (0.005) (0.005)
NLA 0.103* -0.006 -0.012* -0.153*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.058) (0.006) (0.006) (0.055) (0.004) (0.005)
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared, age and
working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C5: Determinants of Education Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - coefficients
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Education expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (1) (2)
Probit GLM Probit GLM
Treated -0.178* -0.049 -0.078 -0.054
(0.097) (0.119) (0.119) (0.173)
Average age by HH -0.018*** -0.005 -0.022*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Log (Percap Exp) 0.508*** 0.420*** 0.455*** 0.384***
(0.115) (0.108) (0.150) (0.149)
Below lower poverty level 0.354 0.565** -0.388 1.413*
(0.235) (0.253) (0.303) (0.728)
Having a child 0.317*** -0.371*** 0.345*** -0.213***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.085) (0.071)
HH size above 3 1.111*** 0.301** 1.362*** 0.030
(0.109) (0.118) (0.145) (0.189)
Having one family member living abroad 0.018 0.158 0.064 0.366**
(0.116) (0.139) (0.124) (0.176)
Living in a camp 0.004 -0.282** 0.162 0.497***
(0.104) (0.128) (0.123) (0.162)
Average # chronic disease by HH -0.346*** -0.063 0.081 -0.378*
(0.133) (0.143) (0.180) (0.211)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.095 -0.315*** -0.213 0.137
(0.100) (0.111) (0.184) (0.173)
Insurance 0.413* 0.074 0.163 -0.038
(0.230) (0.148) (0.173) (0.219)
Saida -0.340** 0.087 0.410*** -0.114
(0.146) (0.181) (0.151) (0.204)
Tyre 0.031 -0.338** -0.021 0.243
(0.132) (0.150) (0.166) (0.223)
Bekaa -0.096 -0.164 -0.359* -0.027
(0.144) (0.170) (0.211) (0.264)
NLA -0.179 -0.017 0.241 0.029
(0.192) (0.252) (0.186) (0.253)
Constant -2.350*** -4.075*** -2.774*** -5.113***
(0.671) (0.693) (0.942) (1.004)
Observations 10,588 10,588 11,132 11,132
Pseudo R-squared 0.196 0.196 0.228 0.228
Log-likelihood -0.824 -0.824 -0.362 -0.362
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared, age
and working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C6: Determinants of Education Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - margins
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Education expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated -0.047* -0.010** -0.007 -0.020 -0.003 -0.004
(0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.030) (0.009) (0.007)
Average age by HH -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.000*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log (Percap Exp) 0.133*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.115*** 0.013 0.025***
(0.029) (0.006) (0.005) (0.036) (0.010) (0.007)
Below lower poverty level 0.093 0.024** 0.031*** -0.098 0.019 0.039
(0.062) (0.011) (0.012) (0.077) (0.036) (0.028)
Having a child 0.083*** 0.002 -0.006* 0.087*** 0.006 0.001
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.005) (0.003)
HH size above 3 0.290*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.343*** 0.066*** 0.036***
(0.025) (0.007) (0.006) (0.031) (0.022) (0.008)
Having one family member living abroad 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.011 0.014*
(0.030) (0.006) (0.006) (0.031) (0.007) (0.008)
Living in a camp 0.001 -0.015** -0.011* 0.041 0.036** 0.021***
(0.027) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.014) (0.008)
Average # chronic disease by HH -0.090*** -0.012* -0.011* 0.021 -0.019 -0.011
(0.034) (0.007) (0.006) (0.045) (0.014) (0.009)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.025 -0.006 -0.009* -0.054 -0.015 -0.001
(0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.046) (0.012) (0.008)
Insurance 0.108* 0.019* 0.014* 0.041 0.021 0.003
(0.060) (0.011) (0.008) (0.044) (0.025) (0.009)
Saida -0.087** -0.005 -0.007 0.108*** 0.007 0.006
(0.037) (0.008) (0.009) (0.038) (0.013) (0.008)
Tyre 0.009 -0.007 -0.012* -0.005 -0.001 0.008
(0.037) (0.006) (0.007) (0.040) (0.011) (0.009)
Bekaa -0.026 -0.001 -0.009 -0.078* -0.014 -0.009
(0.039) (0.009) (0.008) (0.045) (0.009) (0.008)
NLA -0.047 0.001 -0.006 0.061 0.001 0.007
(0.050) (0.012) (0.011) (0.047) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 10,588 10,588 10,588 11,132 11,132 11,132
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared, age and
working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C7: Determinants of Food Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - coefficients
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Food expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (1) (2)
Probit GLM Probit GLM
Treated -0.180 -0.002 -0.232 0.048
(0.238) (0.032) (0.326) (0.033)
Average age by HH 0.007 0.001 -0.051** -0.000
(0.010) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001)
Log (Percap Exp) 0.745** -0.034 0.950** -0.216***
(0.320) (0.038) (0.438) (0.045)
Below lower poverty level -0.340 -0.150 -0.840 -0.168
(0.536) (0.095) (0.863) (0.181)
Having a child 0.076 -0.001 -0.131 0.087***
(0.322) (0.024) (0.297) (0.024)
HH size above 3 2.296*** -0.114*** 2.035*** -0.152***
(0.444) (0.034) (0.539) (0.040)
Having one family member living abroad 0.007 -0.073** 0.152 -0.009
(0.243) (0.032) (0.317) (0.035)
Living in a camp 0.588*** 0.203*** 0.457 0.052
(0.224) (0.035) (0.368) (0.031)
Average # chronic disease by HH 0.265 -0.032 0.222 -0.125**
(0.355) (0.043) (0.575) (0.053)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.072 -0.060** 0.018 0.004
(0.248) (0.030) (0.505) (0.059)
Insurance -0.062 -0.126** - -0.098*
(0.350) (0.053) (0.052)
Saida 0.454 -0.093** 0.555 -0.048
(0.388) (0.042) (0.409) (0.044)
Tyre 0.237 -0.017 1.514** -0.037
(0.401) (0.047) (0.609) (0.044)
Bekaa -0.534 -0.157*** 1.083** -0.109**
(0.326) (0.040) (0.525) (0.046)
NLA -0.808** -0.240*** -0.113*
(0.380) (0.054) (0.058)
Constant -2.212 -1.026*** -0.033 -0.005
(1.896) (0.213) (2.681) (0.274)
Observations 10578 10,578 8930 8930
Pseudo R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.377 0.377
Log-likelihood 4.072 4.072 5.911 5.911
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size
squared, age and working status of the HoH and region.
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Table C8: Determinants of Food Expenditure (two-pm model, glm results) - margins
2010 2015
Dep. var.: Food expenditure as % of total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
Treated -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.012
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Average age by HH 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log (Percap Exp) 0.011* -0.005 -0.007 0.010* -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
Below lower poverty level -0.005 -0.046 -0.043 -0.009 -0.045 -0.044
(0.008) (0.028) (0.027) (0.010) (0.047) (0.047)
Having a child 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
HH size above 3 0.035*** -0.027*** -0.026*** 0.021** -0.036*** -0.038***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Having one family member living abroad 0.000 -0.022** -0.021** 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Living in a camp 0.009** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.005 0.014* 0.014*
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Average # chronic disease by HH 0.004 -0.008 -0.008 0.002 -0.032** -0.032**
(0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
Average # acute disease by HH 0.001 -0.017* -0.017* 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015)
Insurance -0.001 -0.037** -0.036** - -0.024* -0.025*
(0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Saida 0.004 -0.028** -0.027** 0.009 -0.011 -0.012
(0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Tyre 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 0.013* -0.007 -0.009
(0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Bekaa -0.012 -0.048*** -0.046*** 0.012 -0.026** -0.027**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
NLA -0.025 -0.073*** -0.069*** -0.027* -0.029**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 10,588 10,588 10,588 8930 8930 8930
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. We control for household size and household size squared,
age and working status of the HoH and region.
172 APPENDIX


































































































Note: Data from AUB socioeconomic survey 2010 and 2015. All values were computed using survey weights. We exclude single
member households.
A3.2 Complete regression tables
Propensity Score Matching Model
Two-part model
FHH are associated to more 2.1 and 3.1 percentage points (pp) of total expenditure being
spent on healthcare in 2010 and 2015. Looking at intensive and extensive margins, FHH
are more likely to spend any share of expenditure on health and more likely to spend a
larger share as well. This impact is stronger for FHH where the HoH is either a widow
or single. Having a chronic disease turn out to be a driver of health care expenditure,
more than having acute disease or disability. This can be due to recall periods of chronic
diseases or the amount of medication that requires for out-of-pocket spending. Acute and
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disabilities probably have more expenses at hospital level and less medication, which can
be supported by UNRWA.
In what concerns tobacco expenditure, in FHH the share of total expenditure spent is
significantly smaller than in MHH for all specifications. Comparing probit with GLM
marginal effects, for this category the results are driven by the intensive margins as FHH
are 15.4 and 10.6 pp less likely to spend any budget on tobacco in 2010 and 2015.
As follows from the graphical analysis in the previous section, average food expenditure as
a percentage of total expenditure does not vary significantly between types of households.
The negative impact of FHH on education expenditure is not significant in all specifications
nor for all models.
In general, from 2010 to 2015 the coefficients remain mostly the same. One exception is
the impact of having a single HoH, which in 2015 reduces the probability of spending any
expenditure in education by 38 p.p, with 5% significance level.
A3.3 Robustness check
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Table C9: Two-part model results for health and tobacco expenditure - margins
2010
Health expenditure Tobacco expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
FHH 0.030 0.025*** 0.022*** -0.095*** -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.028) (0.008) (0.007) (0.031) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 9930 10257
Pseudo R-sq. 0.138 0.0766
Log-likelihood 99378 141527
FHH
- Married -0.039 0.034* 0.033* -0.035 0.000 -0.001
(0.059) (0.019) (0.017) (0.072) (0.008) (0.007)
- Widow 0.054* 0.027*** 0.023*** -0.116*** -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.032) (0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.004) (0.003)
- Single -0.030 0.030* 0.025* -0.080 -0.014** -0.013**
(0.053) (0.016) (0.013) (0.062) (0.007) (0.006)
- Separated -0.006 0.008 0.014 -0.084 -0.023** -0.021***
(0.059) (0.027) (0.027) (0.088) (0.009) (0.008)
Obs. 9930 10257
Pseudo R-sq. 0.139 0.0787
Log-likelihood 99860 142362
2015
Health expenditure Tobacco expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
FHH 0.028 0.024*** 0.023*** -0.093*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.032) (0.008) (0.007) (0.035) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 11403 12658
Pseudo R-sq. 0.122 0.0338
Log-likelihood 125573 158319
FHH
- Married -0.048 0.019 0.020 -0.062 -0.000 -0.001
(0.066) (0.016) (0.014) (0.076) (0.007) (0.007)
- Widow 0.068* 0.030*** 0.028*** -0.120*** -0.012*** -0.009**
(0.038) (0.009) (0.008) (0.042) (0.004) (0.004)
- Single -0.041 0.029* 0.026* -0.054 -0.010 -0.009
(0.064) (0.016) (0.013) (0.071) (0.007) (0.008)
- Separated -0.108 -0.003 0.014 -0.066 -0.021** -0.021**
(0.067) (0.035) (0.032) (0.107) (0.009) (0.008)
Obs. 11403 12658
Pseudo R-sq. 0.125 0.0344
Log-likelihood 126094 158572
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. Marital status variables are dummy variables in
interaction with the HoH gender. Each status is compared with the corresponding status of the male leaders. All
specifications include controls for household size, household age average, having direct family working abroad,
living in a camp, average number of chronic and acute disease per household, having insurance and region fixed
effects.
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Table C10: Two-part model results for education and food expenditure - margins
2010
Education expenditure Food expenditure
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
FHH 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.009 -0.008
(0.037) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010)
Obs. 10588 10575
Pseudo R-sq. 0.204 0.315
Log-likelihood 35119 54676
FHH
- Married 0.022 0.000 -0.003 - 0.008 0.007
(0.074) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
- Widow -0.029 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.044) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010)
- Single -0.088 -0.056** -0.017 - -0.017 -0.020
(0.115) (0.026) (0.012) (0.025) (0.025)
- Separated 0.161** 0.025* 0.023* -0.003 -0.039 -0.037
(0.081) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.027) (0.027)
Obs. 10588 10298
Pseudo R-sq. 0.206 0.329
Log-likelihood 35433 54779
2015
Education expenditure Food expenditure
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probit GLM Overall Probit GLM Overall
FHH 0.016 0.010 0.014* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.037) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Obs. 12562 10471
Pseudo R-sq. 0.181 0.627
Log-likelihood 29810 72638
FHH
- Married -0.055 0.013 0.014 - -0.008 -0.009
(0.077) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019)
- Widow 0.061 0.012 0.017* 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.044) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
- Single -0.377** -0.080* -0.029* 0.002 0.027* 0.027*
(0.164) (0.043) (0.016) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)
- Separated 0.049 0.026 0.008 -0.002 -0.025 -0.025
(0.119) (0.023) (0.018) (0.002) (0.021) (0.020)
Obs. 12562 10300
Pseudo R-sq. 0.186 0.635
Log-likelihood 30558 72704
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. Marital status variables are dummy
variables in interaction with the HoH gender. Each status is compared with the corresponding status of the
male leaders. All specifications include controls for household size, household age average, having direct
family working abroad, living in a camp, average number of chronic and acute disease per household,
having insurance and region fixed effects.
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Table C11: Linear regression on the share of health care expenditure - using translog
HC expenditure as % of total budget (1) (2) (3)
FHH 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln monthly income -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln age 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln hhsize -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln educ level -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln monthly income × Ln age -0.006 -0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln monthly income × Ln hhsize -0.021* -0.025* -0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Ln monthly income × educ level -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Ln age × Ln hhsize -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.041***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Ln age × Ln educ level 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln educ level × Ln educ level 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Year 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Year × Ln monthly income 0.009 0.008 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Year × Ln age -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year × Ln hhsize -0.013 -0.013 -0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Year × Ln educ level 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln monthly income × FHH -0.007 -0.016
(0.009) (0.012)
Ln monthly income × Ln age x FHH -0.043**
(0.017)
Ln monthly income × Ln hhsize x FHH -0.046*
(0.027)
Ln monthly income × Ln educ level x FHH -0.006
(0.015)
Year x Ln monthly income × FHH 0.017
(0.031)
Saida 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Tyre 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bekaa 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
NLA 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 16,819 16,819 16,819
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.070
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Data from AUB SE 2010 and 2015, using survey weights. All specifications include
controls for age household size, being married, per capita expenditure (in log), a direct
member living abroad, living in a camp, working and region.
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Figure 4.8: Figure A1. Region map
Table D1: Human Development Index by intervention region
Region Population HDI
Iguazu River Mouth– Parana, Brazil 264,044 inhab. 0.751
Coronel Oviedo – Caaguazu, Paraguay 117,514 inhab. 0.521
Puerto Iguazu – Misiones, Argentina 80,020 inhab. 0.817
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Table D2: Number of adolescents by institution
Inst. Code Action area Country Total enrolled Participants
1 Social services Brazil 818 84
2 Social services Brazil 38 4
3 Social services Brazil 140 14
4 Social services Brazil 10 1
5 Social services Brazil 38 4
6 Education Brazil 400 41
7 Education Brazil 327 34
8 Education Brazil 403 41
9 Education Brazil 200 21
10 Education Brazil 291 27
11 Education Brazil 187 19
12 Education Brazil 66 7
13 Justice Brazil 59 6
14 Education Brazil 326 33
15 Sports Brazil 40 4
16 Health Brazil 351 36
17 Health Brazil 20 9
18 Education Brazil 320 144
19 Social services Argentina 20 9
20
Social services Argentina 20 9
Justice Argentina 90 41
Health Argentina 170 42
Justice Argentina 186 46
21 Social services Paraguay 100 25
22 Sports Paraguay 610 150
23 Education Paraguay 120 29
Total 5350 880
Note:
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Figure 4.9: Average frequency of consumption by gender, substance and year
Never
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Table D3: Alcohol, tobacco and consumption by gender and year
Tobacco
0 consump. 1 - 9 days consump. 10 - 30 days consump.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. 0.00 -0.09* -0.00 0.04* -0.00 0.06*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Treatment -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
DiD 0.08*** 0.17 -0.03*** -0.06* -0.05*** -0.10
(0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07)
Peer -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Post-treat x Peer 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Treatment x Peer -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DiD x Peer -0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Alcohol
0 consump. 1 - 9 days consump. 10 - 30 days consump.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. 0.06*** 0.04 -0.04*** -0.03 -0.02*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Treatment 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
DiD 0.11*** 0.10* -0.07*** -0.07* -0.03** -0.03*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Peer -0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-treat x Peer -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Treatment x Peer -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
DiD x Peer -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Cannabis
0 consump. 1 - 9 days consump. 10 - 30 days consump.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. 0.05*** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Treatment 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
DiD 0.08*** 0.12*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Peer -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-treat x Peer -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Treatment x Peer 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
DiD x Peer -0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1.982 1.982 1.982 1.982 1.982 1.982
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D4: Probit estimation – light vs. heavy consumers
Tobacco Cannabis Alcohol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. -0.17*** -0.18* -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.11** -0.00
(0.05) (0.11) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
Treatment -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
DiD -0.02 -0.16 0.01 0.07 -0.15* -0.18
(0.07) (0.14) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
Peer 0.02* 0.03*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Post-treat x Peer 0.02 0.03** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Treatment x Peer -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
DiD x Peer 0.03 -0.02 -0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Woman 0.10*** 0.08** -0.06** -0.05** -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.03* 0.10*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Brazilian -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.05* 0.02 0.03 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
BMIunder 0.24 0.27* - - - -
(0.15) (0.15)
BMIover -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Early sex exposure 0.13*** 0.12** -0.04 -0.04 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 627 627 773 773 371 371
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D5: Ordered Probit results for tobacco consumption
Tobacco 0 consumption 1 to 9 days 10 days or more
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. 0.00 -0.09* -0.00 0.04* -0.00 0.06*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Treatment -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
DiD 0.08*** 0.17 -0.03*** -0.06* -0.05*** -0.10
(0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07)
Peer -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Post-treat x Peer 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Treatment x Peer -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DiD x Peer -0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Woman 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Age -0.07*** -0.03** 0.02** 0.01** 0.04*** 0.02**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brazilian 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
BMIunder 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
(0.11) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
BMIover 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Early sex exposure -0.14* -0.14* 0.05* 0.06* 0.09** 0.09**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 1.983 1.983 1.983 1.983 1.983 1.983
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is an ordered variable indicating the frequency of consumption in the last 30 days - with the value 0 for 0
days; value 1 if consumed between 1 and 9 days; value 2 if consumed more than 10 days. DiD is the difference-in-differences
coefficient. Peer is the (leave one out) average group consumption in days. BMI under and over are binary variables indicating
whether each individual has an unhealthy BMI (by deficiency or excess) or not.
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Table D6: Ordered Probit results for cannabis consumption
Drugs 0 consumption 1 to 9 days consumption 10 days or more
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. 0.05*** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Treatment 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
DiD 0.08*** 0.12*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Peer -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-treat x Peer -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Treatment x Peer 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
DiD x Peer -0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Woman -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.08*** -0.04** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Brazilian 0.16** 0.12* -0.11** -0.08* -0.05** -0.04*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
BMIunder -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
BMIover 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Early sex exposure -0.09* -0.09** 0.06* 0.06** 0.03* 0.03**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 1.982 1.982 1.982 1.982 1.982 1.982
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is an ordered variable indicating the frequency of consumption in the last 30 days - with the value 0 for 0 days;
value 1 if consumed between 1 and 9 days; value 2 if consumed more than 10 days. DiD is the difference-in-differences coefficient.
Peer is the (leave one out) average group consumption in days. BMI under and over are binary variables indicating whether each
individual has an unhealthy BMI (by deficiency or excess) or not.
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Table D7: Ordered Probit results for alcohol consumption
Alcohol 0 consumption 1 to 9 days consumption 10 days or more
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-treat. 0.06*** 0.04 -0.04*** -0.03 -0.02*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Treatment 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
DiD 0.11*** 0.10* -0.07*** -0.07* -0.03** -0.03*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Peer -0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-treat x Peer -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Treatment x Peer -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
DiD x Peer -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Woman -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.13*** -0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Brazilian 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
BMIunder 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03)
BMIover 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Early sex exposure -0.12* -0.11 0.08 0.08 0.04** 0.04*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1.983 1.983 1.983 1.983 1.983 1.983
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is an ordered variable indicating the frequency of consumption in the last 30 days - with the value 0 for 0 days;
value 1 if consumed between 1 and 9 days; value 2 if consumed more than 10 days. DiD is the difference-in-differences coefficient.
Peer is the (leave one out) average group consumption in days. BMI under and over are binary variables indicating whether each
individual has an unhealthy BMI (by deficiency or excess) or not.
